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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
outheast Asia is a region of geographical, cultural, 
religious and political diversity. Modernising at 
varying paces, each of the eleven countries in 
Southeast Asia carries with it a rich heritage as well as 
the weight of its distant past, marked mostly by 
European colonisation, occupation by foreign forces, 
and in several cases, civil strife stemming from 
conflicting political ideologies and ethnic tensions. 
The early influences that shaped the old empires and 
principalities in a region that is currently home to over 
600 million people were from India and China. Indian 
or Chinese culture played a major part, for instance, in 
the development of Southeast Asian religion, art and 
political theory. The people of Southeast Asia, such as 
the Cambodians, Indonesians, Vietnamese, Burmese 
and others adapted foreign ideas only so far as to suit 
their own needs and values. The glories of Pagan, 
Angkor and the temple complexes of Java, for instance, 
have their own individual character, as did the Buddhist 
stupors and images all over Thailand and Laos. Islam 
too, has had a strong influence in the Malay 
Archipelago and the maritime states of Southeast Asia. 
The expansion of trade among West Asia, India and 
Southeast Asia helped bring Islam to the region. Either 
through war or intermarriages, the religion permeated 
the region and provided a unifying force among the 
ruling and trading classes. 
As observed by historian Milton Osborne, there is a 
linguistic unity that cuts across the boundaries drawn, in 
many cases, by the former colonial powers.  1
Notwithstanding the dialectical variations, this points to 
broader social unities beyond geographical confines. 
Modern Vietnamese and Khmer (or Cambodian) 
appear to have a common, if very distant linguistic 
ancestor. The Tai language spoken in Thailand is 
pervasive in parts of Southern China, Vietnam, the Shan 
states of Myanmar, Laos, north-eastern and western 
Cambodia as well as the extreme north of peninsular 
Malaysia. One can also find the Indonesian/Malay 
language or Austronesian, spoken in variants 
throughout modern Brunei, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and the coastal regions of 
Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. 
Except for Thailand that has remained under self-rule, 
all the other Southeast Asian nations shared the 
common fate of having been colonised or occupied by 
the Europeans: the Dutch in Indonesia, the Portuguese 
in Timor-Leste, the French in Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos, the Spanish in the Philippines, and the British in 
Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Myanmar. The 
Japanese Occupation, in addition, was a dark period in 
the history of many of these countries.  Hence, common 
among the various countries in Southeast Asia was the 
fight for independence and the struggle for 
nationhood. Except for Thailand, eight of the Southeast 
Asian countries attained independence within two 
decades of each other. Vietnam was the first to gain 
independence from colonial domination in 1945. The 
Philippines followed in 1946, Burma in 1948, Indonesia 
in 1945, Cambodia in 1953, Laos in 1954 and Malaysia 
in 1957. Singapore attained self-government in 1959 
and independence in 1965. Brunei attained self-
government in 1959 but only ceased to be a British 
protectorate in 1984 while Timor-Leste gained 
independence from the Indonesians only in 1999, after 
a long period of resistance.  
Today, Southeast Asia comprises a mix of sultanate, 
communist regimes, military rule and democratic 
governments.  All are members of ASEAN  except for 2
Timor-Leste. Each of the Southeast Asian countries has 
 Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History, Allen & Unwin, 2013, p7.1
   Association of Southeast Asian Nations was set up in 1967 with five founding members: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. 2
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registered fairly high growth in the past decade. The 
economic prospects of the region are hence 
increasingly promising. Change and transformation is 
the order of the day, especially for the communist states 
that have begun to adopt capitalist policies. National 
unity remains a key struggle for many and tensions in 
the political arena continue to exist between those who 
govern and those who are governed. The following 
chapter, National Landscapes gives a brief history of 
each of the countries and details the challenges that are 
specific to each, due to its historical and social-cultural 
context. Following on, key and emerging challenges 
that cut across several of the countries are discussed 
and a case made for the need for societal leadership 
and cross-sectorial collaboration as a means to address 
some of these complex societal issues. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
NATIONAL LANDSCAPES 
This chapter provides a brief introduction of the 
historical background of each of the eleven Southeast 
Asian countries as well as the key challenges that have 
bearing on efforts towards societal impact in the region. 
BRUNEI 
Historical Background 
Brunei, known as the ‘Abode of Peace’, is a small state in 
Southeast Asia located on the northwest coast of the 
island of Borneo in the Indonesian Archipelago. Islam 
started to influence Brunei in the 14th century and by 
the 15th century, the Islamic sultanate of Brunei 
expanded its power over the island of Borneo, 
including the present-day Malaysian states of Sabah 
and Sarawak. The sultanate also extended its influence 
into some parts of the Sulu islands in the Philippines. 
Due to internal conflicts, the power of the Bruneian 
Empire began to decline continuously from the end of 
the 16th century through to the 19th century with the 
arrival of the Europeans. Brunei became a British 
protectorate in 1888, and the British control of the 
country lasted until World War II when the Japanese 
occupied Brunei. After the Japanese were defeated in 
the region in 1945, the British resumed their control of 
Brunei and the two countries started negotiations on 
the eventual independence of Brunei. In 1959, Brunei 
became self-governing according to the constitution 
with Britain still being responsible for its defence and 
foreign policy. In 1962, Brunei elected a legislative 
council with limited authority but the conversion to a 
representative government was interrupted later that 
year by a revolt. The 1962 rebellion or Brunei Revolt 
came as a surprise to many and led to the deployment 
of British troops against the leftist North Kalimantan 
People’s Army supported by the Brunei People’s Party, 
which has since been banned. The rebellion was put 
down but the Sultanate has been under an official state 
of emergency ever since, with the Sultan fully and solely 
in charge. On 1 Jan 1984, Brunei became fully 
independent according to a 1979 treaty that the United 
Kingdom and Brunei signed. Brunei is a member of the 
Commonwealth, Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although the political structure 
of Brunei is different from that of the other ASEAN 
countries, as the Sultan holds full executive authority, 
Brunei has remained more politically and economically 
stable than many of the countries in ASEAN. Oil was 
first discovered and produced in Brunei in 1929 and 
Brunei has been one of the wealthiest countries per 
capita in the world because of that. It also has one of 
the most enviable health and welfare systems in the 
world.  
Key Challenges  
The Predicament of Being a Sovereign State 
Brunei Darussalam is a sultanate that has been ruled by 
the same family for more than 600 years. The current 
sultan, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah, traces his ancestry 
back to the very first ruler, Sultan Mohammad Shah who 
reigned from 1362 to 1402 and established the House 
of Bolkiah which has provided successive sultans ever 
since. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah is both Head of State and 
Prime Minister. He holds the portfolios of Minister for 
Finance and Minister for Defence. He is Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces and Inspector General of 
Police. The Sultan also heads five powerful councils, all 
of whose members are appointed by him. The Privy 
Council advises him on matters of the state and matters 
pertaining to succession. The Brunei Islamic Religious 
Council advises on religious matters and determines 
policies for the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The Council 
of Ministers or the Cabinet comprises heads of  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ministries who sit with the Sultan and other leading 
government officials, also appointed by him. Prince 
Mohamed Bolkiah, the Sultan’s eldest brother heads 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Out of the 
twelve children of the Sultan, the eldest and heir 
apparent, Crown Prince Al-Muhtadee Billah is Senior 
Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office. The Crown Prince 
also oversees the National Board for Disaster 
Management, Brunei’s Vision 2035 and National 
Development Plan. The Crown Prince is a general in the 
Bruneian army and the Deputy Inspector General of 
Police. 
Bruneians are governed under longstanding 
emergency powers that place no limits on the Sultan’s 
power. The Legislative Council, made up of appointed, 
indirectly elected and ex-officio members, meets 
during the year and exercises a limited role in 
recommending and approving legislation. Security 
forces report to the Sultan. In 2011, the Sultan had 
suggested that in the future, elections could be held for 
some of the seats on the Legislative Council, but this 
reform has yet to be enacted. While the current Sultan 
is widely recognised as a benevolent ruler and a caring 
man, Bruneians do worry about their future should 
successive rulers fail in their duty of care towards their 
subjects. It has been an unspoken rule in Brunei that no 
one comments on government policies nor royal 
decrees. Social media, although fairly vibrant in Brunei, 
steer clear of domestic politics and issues. Chinese 
Bruneians and minorities (especially Permanent 
Residents) have been primed to keep a low profile. 
Some 40,000 of them are stateless and even though the 
Sultan has promised to integrate them as citizens, the 
conferment of citizenship has been arbitrary and very 
slow in happening.  
The uncertain future of a full enactment of Malay Islamic 
monarchy  
Due to Brunei’s long-standing association with the 
United Kingdom, English common law has been used 
for many years as a basis for much of its legal system. 
This has worked in parallel with sharia law that has, until 
recently, been confined to matters such as religious 
observance, family law and inheritance matters 
concerning Muslims. The Oct 2013 announcement that 
the powers of the sharia courts would be progressively 
expanded to include offences that were previously 
within the jurisdiction of civil criminal courts has caused 
consternation among the people, especially those who 
are non-Muslim. Non-Muslim Bruneian citizens and 
Permanent Residents (PRs) who comprise close to one 
third of the population worry over the new jurisdictions 
that the sharia court now has, over their actions both 
within and outside of Brunei. The reinforcement of the 
need for citizens and PRs alike to maintain a strong 
respect for Islam, the religion of the ethnic Malay 
majority, through official observance of sharia law, has 
been explained as simply the enactment of the political 
philosophy of a Malay Islamic Monarchy (MIM) which 
the country has paid credence to at independence. 
Outside of Brunei, human rights organisations have 
expressed alarm and treated the announcement as a 
huge setback for human rights in Brunei. Whether it is 
in the context of ASEAN integration or in relation to the 
attraction of more foreign direct investments (FDI) into 
Brunei, the move will work against Brunei’s strategic 
plans, as ASEAN members as well as MNCs will have to 
be aware that their citizens will be subject to sharia law 
when they stay and work in the sultanate. 
The predilection of being oil-rich 
Brunei is the third largest oil and gas exporting country 
in the world after Qatar and Kuwait. The oil and gas 
industry almost single-handedly funds the government. 
Energy exports have ensured a high standard of living 
for Bruneians and the country has accumulated 
substantial reserves due to outward foreign investment. 
It is a well-known fact that the country faces the 
challenge of maturing fields and a decline in oil and 
gas output. The fall in oil price will also reduce its 
income substantially. These have, however, not caused 
a crisis yet, as the government has upheld a highly 
conservative fiscal policy with large surpluses, backed 
by significant trade surpluses (which amounted to 
B$8.8b in 2013). The fiscal surpluses are directed to 
multiple sovereign wealth funds managed by the 
Brunei Investment Authority, a unit of the Ministry of 
Finance. Notwithstanding the assurance that the 
country will not be facing an economic crisis in the near 
future, the government has put in place plans to 
diversify the economy. There have been programmes to 
teach and instil entrepreneurship in the young, such as 
the establishment of the Silicon Valley-style i-Centre by 
the Brunei Economic Development Board. There have 
also been efforts made to simplify the process of 
starting new businesses by cutting red tape. The 
government has also encouraged private employers to 
hire more locals, with tighter controls on employment 
of foreign labour, and instituted policies that enforce 
local employment quotas on government and 
hydrocarbons industry contractors. A senior 
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government official has confirmed that the effects of 
economic diversification have not been significant after 
twenty years. There is evidently no sense of urgency 
among a well-catered-for citizen population to venture 
into new domains.  
In an interview with Oxford Business Group, the Sultan 
reiterated that Brunei’s Wawasan (Vision) 2035 seeks to 
‘ see Brunei recognised everywhere for the 
accomplishment of its well-educated, highly-skilled 
people, quality of life, and a dynamic, sustainable 
economy’. To achieve Vision 2035, new strategic goals 
have been drawn up, one of which is for Brunei to be an 
Islamic financial hub for the region, which will operate 
in accordance with sharia principles. Another is for 
Brunei to lead in the area of halal branding. Halal 
certification covers processed food and beverages, 
pharmaceuticals, primary meat, cosmetics and personal 
care, and nutraceuticals and confectionary goods. 
However, due to the costs of production and logistics, 
the scarcity of raw materials and other international 
certification requirements, this is carried out overseas at 
processing facilities located in China, Spain, Malaysia 
and India. Tourism is another area that Brunei has 
focused on, as a means of diversifying its economy. The 
prospects of the protected forests for eco-tourism and 
coastal sites for recreational diving are attractive. 
However, the conservatism of the country where 
tourists will not be served alcohol and where sharia law 
requires that a high regard for traditional cultural values 
be observed has made progress in this area slow.  
CAMBODIA 
Historical Background 
Once a relatively sleepy agrarian kingdom, Cambodia 
has experienced some of the most horrific violence 
since the close of the Second World War. Between 1970 
and 1999, the country was the victim of both a brutal 
civil war as well as wider regional conflicts. The Khmer 
Rouge seizure of power in 1975 brought four years of 
forced collectivisation and mass killings that have 
haunted the Cambodian psyche ever since. The decade 
of Vietnamese occupation that followed only 
exacerbated the country’s massive humanitarian 
problems. When the United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) exited after elections in 
1993, it left behind a country with less-than-stable 
political institutions, an unresolved history of mass 
violence and a chronic dependence on large infusions 
of foreign aid. 
Although Prince Norodom Sihanouk presided over a 
period of economic prosperity after Cambodia shed its 
status as a French protectorate in 1953, his policies of 
‘extreme neutrality’ increasingly alienated erstwhile 
allies while creating room for an insurgency at home. 
Sihanouk’s unrelenting suppression of left-wing 
newspapers and his police force’s anti-democratic 
crackdowns in the Cambodian countryside radicalised 
many of Phnom Penh’s French-educated elite and sent 
them into the jungle, where the future leaders of the 
Khmer Rouge made contact with the Viet Minh and 
Pathet Lao. At the same time, the prince failed to steer 
his country clear of the Second Indochina War being 
waged next door in Vietnam and Laos. His 1963 
rejection of U.S. military aid and subsequent alliances 
with Maoist China and North Vietnam spurred the right-
wing elements in the royalist government to stage a 
military coup and establish a U.S.-friendly Khmer 
Republic under Marshal Lon Nol in 1970. In 1975, the 
Khmer Rouge triumphed in the civil war against Lon 
Nol. Lon Nol fled the country, the U.S. evacuated its 
embassy and Pol Pot seized control of Phnom Penh. This 
was the beginning of the Cambodian genocide that 
systematically killed approximately 1.7 million people, 
or 21 per cent of the country’s population. The Khmer 
Rouge also dismantled the country's largely agrarian 
economy, leading to widespread famine and shortages. 
Revolutionary fighters herded the entire population of 
Phnom Penh into the countryside, where they were 
organised into labour camps and forced to work 12-
hour days. Teachers, business people and other 
educated professionals were often executed on the 
spot. 
The Vietnamese army dislodged the Khmer Rouge from 
Phnom Penh at the start of 1979, but U.S. and Chinese 
opposition to the Vietnamese precluded badly needed 
international aid from entering Cambodia throughout 
the 1980s. The Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict 
precipitated an international refugee crisis as 
Cambodians fled in droves to the Thai border. Fighting 
dragged on, with the Vietnamese-backed State of 
Cambodia (SOC) pitted against the remnants of the 
Khmer Rouge, the republican Khmer People’s National 
Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the royalist Front uni 
national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, 
pacifique et coopératif (FUNCINPEC). Cambodia's 
situation demanded outside help, but Cold War 
geopolitics prevented the international community 
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from reaching a viable solution until the Vietnamese, 
facing shrinking Soviet aid and a collapsing economy at 
home, withdrew in 1989. Up to, during and after the 
May 1993 elections, SOC and Khmer Rouge soldiers 
continued to wage civil war against each other. The 
elections were themselves overwhelmingly successful, 
but did not lead to a lasting Cambodian democracy. 
FUNCINPEC candidate Prince Norodom Ranariddh was 
declared the winner with 45 per cent of the vote, but 
incumbent Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodian 
People’s Party (CPP) refused to cede power, leading to a 
joint government with the two men sharing the prime 
ministership. In 1997, after fighting broke out between 
the two factions, Hun Sen seized power from Prince 
Ranariddh with the backing of the military and re-
instituted CPP hegemony, which has lasted to this day.  
Key Challenges  
Persistent poverty in rural districts 
Cambodia’s economy at large has posted average 
growth as compared to other ASEAN countries but 
declining human development indicators and 
persistent rural poverty still remain an unfortunate 
reality for millions of Cambodians. Between 1993 and 
2010, per capita GDP more than doubled, but poverty 
rates continued to hover around 30 per cent in 2007. 
Cambodia’s infant and child mortality rates are currently 
the highest in the region. In 1990, eight per cent of 
infants died in their first year. By 2001, that figure had 
increased to 9.7 per cent. Child mortality under five also 
climbed steadily from 11.5 per cent in 1990 to 14 per 
cent in 2001. Although the tourism and garment 
industries have generated recent economic growth in 
urban areas, particularly Phnom Penh and Siem Reap, 
rural Cambodians are still overwhelmingly poor and 
lack access to alternative sources of income. The 
Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey estimates that as 
many as 34 per cent of rural Cambodians live below the 
poverty line. Rural Cambodians have significantly lower 
life expectancies and higher infant and maternal 
mortality rates than those residing in Phnom Penh. Rural 
communities are largely poor because they lack access 
to roads, markets and irrigation systems. A weak 
education system in the countryside also leaves rural 
Cambodians with little to no alternatives to agricultural 
work. With an estimated three-fifths of the Cambodian 
labour force engaged in farming activities, an 
oversupply of agricultural workers keeps wages at rock 
bottom.  
An absence of rule of law fuelling inequitable and 
unsustainable growth 
Cambodia’s economy has consistently grown by seven 
per cent annually in the last decade, but the inability to 
hold companies and government officials accountable 
has prevented the country from achieving equitable 
and sustainable growth. Increased Chinese demand for 
agricultural products such as rubber has resulted in 
skyrocketing property prices in key rural areas, 
providing incentive for unscrupulous government 
officials to sell off tracts of land to foreign 
conglomerates. In spite of a government moratorium 
on Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) to agricultural 
conglomerates, local officials continue to appropriate 
land, at times violently, from residents. Meanwhile, 
Cambodia’s burgeoning textile industry, buoyed by 
increased demand from Western countries, has failed to 
keep up with international labour standards. Swedish 
clothing manufacturer H&M recently disclosed that one-
third of its Cambodian suppliers had strikes or mass-
fainting incidents on site. Textiles workers are paid low 
wages, work long hours, and are often the target of 
police intimidation. 
A number of hydropower and logging projects also 
threaten to do irreversible damage to Cambodia’s 
native ecosystems. With the backing of Chinese 
provider Sinopower, the Cambodian government plans 
to build a network of 17 hydropower dams that will 
provide power to several countries in the Greater 
Mekong Subregion. Keeping in mind that Cambodia is 
in dire need of infrastructural improvements, these 
hydropower projects nonetheless threaten to displace 
tens of thousands of people and destroy the forests 
upon which they draw their livelihoods. Finally, illegal 
clearing, at the hands of both large agricultural 
conglomerates and poor rural families, threatens to 
destroy Cambodia’s approximately 10 million hectares 
of forest. Cambodia lost 22 per cent of its forest cover 
between 1973 and 2009. 
The UNTAC legacy and a continued perception of 
Cambodia as a charity case 
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
or UNTAC’s presence in Cambodia between 1992 and 
1993 brought a modicum of stability to the country, but 
the country has been largely dependent on regular 
infusions of foreign aid to run day-to-day operations 
ever since. Between 1993 and 2003, Cambodia 
received US$5 billion in Official Development 
 6
Chapter 2: National Landscapes
Assistance (ODA) from foreign governments, 
amounting to 13 per cent of GDP annually. In 2007, 
foreign aid made up half the national budget. 
Cambodia is one of the few countries in the world 
where the non-profit sector threatens to out-compete 
the private and public sectors. The relatively high 
salaries offered by foreign NGOs draw the nation’s 
talented young graduates into the non-profit field at the 
expense of local business and government. Meanwhile, 
government officials are paid low salaries, fuelling 
corruption and inefficiencies. NGOs have become a 
fixture in both Phnom Penh and the countryside, 
running educational, health, social and infrastructural 
services that would ordinarily be the purview of the 
government. With business development sparse at 
present, it seems unlikely that Cambodia can transition 
to self-sufficiency in the near future.  
International focus on certain causes célèbres, 
especially sex trafficking and orphans, has diverted 
crucially needed resources and attention away from 
addressing the root causes of Cambodia’s myriad social 
and environmental problems. In recent years, foreign 
tourists visit ing Cambodia have increasingly 
volunteered at one of the hundreds of orphanages 
dotting the country. According to the United Nations 
Children’s Fund or UNICEF, only 23 per cent of children 
in these orphanages have no living parents. Some 
Cambodian orphanage owners are exploiting children 
from poor families to reap large sums from foreign 
tourists. The September 2014 closure of the 
internationally-acclaimed Somaly Mam Foundation also 
brought to light several issues surrounding the 
country’s extensive network of anti-trafficking 
organisations and NGO practices in general. A 
Newsweek article by Simon Marks printed five months 
prior to the closure presented evidence that activist 
Somaly Mam had fabricated her own story of forced 
prostitution as well as the stories of several alleged 
victims. Advocacy and lobbying efforts by foreign and 
local anti-trafficking NGOs resulted in legislation that 
conflates sex work with sex trafficking, leaving 
Cambodian sex workers open to abuse by police. These 
same organisations have routinely produced numbers 
without clear origins in order to drum up overseas 
donations. Independent analysis in 2008 by statistician 
Thomas Steinfatt placed the number of potentially 
trafficked sex workers in Cambodia at only 1,058, or 
four per cent of the 27,925 sex workers in the country. 
Meanwhile, the aggressive and unethical practices of a 
select few NGOs threaten to discredit the entire sector. 
INDONESIA 
Historical Background 
The Indonesian archipelago was a key ancient trade 
route linking Chinese goods to markets in India and 
farther west into the Mediterranean. Its cosmopolitan 
ports attracted significant numbers of Arab, Indian and 
Chinese merchants and holy men, and fostered the 
exchange of goods as well as cultural and religious 
ideas. Starting in the early eighth century, the various 
islands saw the rise and fall of several Indianised 
Buddhist and Hindu kingdoms, including Mataram, 
Singhasari and Majapahit in east Java and Srivijaya in 
Sumatra. Islam, which forms the majority religion of 
modern Indonesia was introduced, in part, by the 
Indian merchants from Gujarat and the Coromandel 
Coast. Several mainstays of Indonesian culture, such as 
its religious architecture, traditional dances and use of 
Indian epics in the wayang belie strong Indic influences.  
Spice-hungry Portuguese caravels had begun to 
penetrate the Indian Ocean in 1498, but rival European 
colonisers were primarily confined to ports and spice-
producing islands until the nineteenth century. 
Although the Dutch crown did not extend direct control 
over the entirety of the Indies until the 1920s, the Dutch 
East India Company had monopolised maritime trade 
as early as the seventeenth century and was able to 
force local rulers to sell quotas of raw goods at low 
fixed prices. Dutch colonial policies toward the Indies 
were overwhelmingly extractive in nature and 
encouraged little infrastructure development outside 
what was necessary to move cash crops (coffee, sugar, 
indigo and spices) from local plantations to sale at 
markets in Europe. The period after 1848 saw the 
introduction of some liberalising measures to improve 
the lives of native subjects, but the overall reforms were 
piecemeal and secondary to the extractive industries. 
The government did not establish native schools until 
1893 and educated natives were barred from 
occupying even low-level positions in the civil service 
until 1905. 
Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia has swung 
between wild consensus-based politics under Sukarno, 
authoritarianism under Suharto and most recently a 
renewed drive towards liberal democratic institutions. 
Sukarno’s policies throughout the 1950s and early 
1960s, which ended in a failed attempt to prevent the 
formation of the British-backed Federation of Malaysia 
(termed Konfrontasi or Confrontation in the period, 
1963-1966); runaway inflation, famine and economic 
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collapse encouraged his deposition in a military coup. 
The authoritarian Suharto regime presided over a 
period of sustained and stable economic growth from 
1965 to 1998, in spite of repressive policies directed 
towards political opponents, civil society groups and 
the press. Suharto’s ‘New Order ’ secured a 
rescheduling of foreign debts and attracted aid from 
the United States, Europe and Japan via its anti-
communist credentials. During Suharto's last decade 
and a half as president, Indonesia posted an average 
annual growth of 7.1 per cent. Once the largest 
importer of rice globally, it had become a net exporter 
by the mid-1980s. Behind this veneer of rapid 
development, Suharto’s practice of awarding contracts 
and monopolies to loyal family members, military 
insiders and Chinese taipans hollowed out any existent 
checks and balances on the executive. When the New 
Order collapsed in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian 
Financial crisis, three decades of patrimonial politics 
had left behind few well-functioning government 
institutions. Energies in the last two decades have 
largely been devoted to a tug-of-war between liberal 
institutionalists advocating for regulatory bodies and 
politicians cum business cronies devoted to preserving 
their own patronage systems. Post-Suharto era, the 
decentralisation of government authority has 
generated additional opportunities for graft. In spite of 
the above concerns, Indonesia has made enormous 
strides towards establishing a stable democratic system 
in recent years. Although more than 10,000 people 
perished in political violence between 1998 and 2003, 
the last decade has seen few major clashes. 
Indonesians directly elected their president for the first 
time in 2004, and the most recent election of political 
outsider Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi) in 
2014 has renewed optimism that voters can beat 
political patronage systems linked to Suharto or his 
predecessors.  
Key Challenges 
Persistent poverty in rural districts stemming from lack of 
basic infrastructure  
In spite of posting a consistent six per cent growth since 
2006, Indonesia is still home to widespread poverty and 
widening inequalities between urban areas and the 
countryside. Although Indonesia now contains more 
billionaires per capita than either China or India, 51 per 
cent of its population continues to subsist on less than 
US$2 per day. The benefits of economic growth have 
largely been confined to urban areas, leaving rural 
districts and islands outside Java, particularly those in 
the country’s east, with relatively little increase in 
material well-being. Only 8.8 per cent of urbanites 
earned incomes below US$1.25 per day in 2013, 
compared with 15.1 per cent of rural residents. 
The lack of modern roads, ports, railways and power 
supplies in remote regions contributes to the high-cost 
of doing business and provides private sector 
companies with few incentives to enter rural markets. 
Better infrastructure is vital to improving productivity 
and generating jobs for rural Indonesians. The Jokowi 
government has pledged to spend IDR 290 trillion (US
$23.2 billion) on infrastructure in 2015, but without 
effective public-private partnerships (PPP), the 
government alone will be unable to sustain the 
hundreds of billions needed to modernise far-flung 
provinces. Current investment laws in Indonesia make 
such PPPs difficult to arrange, and Jokowi's 
infrastructure programme currently faces hostility from 
some civil society organisations, which have taken an 
anti-colonial stance against foreign-led PPPs. Recently, 
Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah filed legal suits 
against the administration in the Constitutional Court. In 
order to revolutionise rural Indonesia, the Jokowi 
government will need to reconcile civil society concerns 
with badly needed private-sector funds from 
multinationals.  
The tens of millions of Indonesians residing in poor 
rural communities also lack adequate access to health 
services, including vaccinations and basic medicine. A 
number of international organisations, such World 
Vision Indonesia, Save the Children and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have 
worked with local communities and the central 
government to create immunisation, nutrition education 
and doctor training programmes in remote regions. The 
Indonesian Health Ministry has also recently unveiled 
an ambitious new universal healthcare scheme that will 
provide affordable coverage to millions of Indonesians. 
However, providing access to healthcare services in the 
outer islands will continue to be a challenge for local 
governments, and public-sector insurance bodies will 
be required to work with civil society and social 
enterprises if they hope to access the most remote 
regions.  
Rapidly shrinking rainforests linked to lack of livelihood 
opportunities in remote areas and among indigenous 
communities 
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Indonesia’s 94 million hectares of rainforests are home 
to over 1, 500 species of birds and plants and capable 
of absorbing large quantities of greenhouse gases, but 
rapid deforestation and unsustainable development 
have contributed to soil erosion, loss of indigenous 
livelihoods and trans-boundary haze. Indonesia loses 
many hectares of rainforest every year, many illegally. 
The government struggles to properly regulate the 
environmental and sustainability sectors, and the 
increasingly decentralised nature of the system since 
Suharto’s fall has given local politicians opportunities to 
out-manoeuvre environmentalists.  
Under the Suharto regime, the government consistently 
sold public forests to corporations without free, prior or 
informed consent of the indigenous groups who had 
traditionally used these forests for their livelihoods. 
Post-reformation courts have upheld indigenous rights 
and environmental conservation in theory but 
implementation has been haphazard. In May 2011, 
former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono instituted 
a two-year moratorium on new forestry concessions. A 
2011 Constitutional Court ruling also upheld 
indigenous ownership of public forests, but the 
government has yet to transfer land concessions to 
local groups.  
Development by large conglomerates has at times 
precipitated violent confrontations with indigenous 
peoples in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and West Papua. Since 
the Suharto-era, the government has facilitated 
migration from densely populated Java, Madura and 
Bali to remote islands, where the newcomers have often 
come into conflict with indigenous groups. Indigenous 
rights civil society organisation Aliansi Masyarakat Adat 
Nusantara (AMAN) estimated that there were 143 cases 
of conflict, expulsion and arrests of indigenous 
protesters in 2013. Within West Papua, indigenous 
protest has taken on a clearly ethnic and separatist 
tone, with ‘Melanesian’ politicians and CSOs in Vanuatu 
and Fiji advocating for an independent Papuan state. In 
January of 2015, the deaths of two Indonesian police 
officers led to widespread crackdowns on Papuan 
independence activists and local civil society groups. 
The challenge for Indonesia’s government is to bring 
the country into the developed world while conserving 
its rich ecological heritage. Remote communities in 
Indonesia need roads, bridges, energy grids and other 
infrastructure to raise standards of living. In order to 
reduce trans-boundary haze, poor rural communities 
must have access to economic alternatives to ‘slash-
and-burn’ agriculture. Several environmental NGOs 
working in Indonesia, such as Conservat ion 
International and Yayasan Kehati, currently collaborate 
with the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry and local 
communities to implement replicable business models 
fostering green development but Indonesia needs a far 
more comprehensive strategy to preserve its dwindling 
rainforests and reefs.  
Increasing frequency of religious extremism and 
sectarian violence  
Indonesia’s national ideology, Pancasila, stipulates 
belief in one God, but does not specify any adherence 
to a particular religion. 87.2 per cent of Indonesians 
identify themselves as Muslims, making it the largest 
Muslim-majority country worldwide. Mainstream 
Muslim groups such as Nathdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah have embraced the country’s secular 
democratic process, but the last two decades have seen 
a surge in Islamist fringe groups. Within recent memory, 
Indonesia has housed relatively uncoordinated 
movements to create Islamic states in Aceh, West Java 
and South Sulawesi. However, the end of centralised 
authoritarianism under Suharto has enabled religious 
conservatives and fringe groups to hijack local 
democratic processes. More troubling, the return of 
mujahideen in the 1990s from conflicts in Afghanistan 
has spawned local terrorist cells. In 2002 and 2005, 
Indonesian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
organised bombings in Bali that killed over 222 people. 
JI also orchestrated attacks on the Jakarta Marriott 
Hotel in 2003, on the Australian Embassy in 2004 and at 
the Ritz-Carlton in 2009. Other militia groups such as, 
Laskar Jihad and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia have 
destroyed churches as well as businesses, such as bars 
and nightclubs that they view to be un-Islamic.  
In post-reformation Indonesia, local politicians have 
been loathed to alienate conservative Islamic voters 
and have often ignored court injunctions against abuse 
of Christian groups and minority Islamic sects. Between 
2005 and 2010, more than four hundred churches in 
Indonesia were forcibly closed. 30 Ahmadiyah mosques 
have also been forcibly closed since 2008, and mobs 
ransacked the houses of Shia community members in 
Madura in 2012. Some paramilitary organisations, such 
as the Betawi Brotherhood Forum and the Islamic 
Defenders Front, have become semi-legitimate arms of 
the local government, operating as de facto police 
forces in spite of judicial rulings against them.  
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LAOS  
Historical Background 
Laos is a small, landlocked, mountainous country in 
Southeast Asia. As a country, it shares borders with 
Myanmar and the People’s Republic of China to the 
northwest, Vietnam to the east, Cambodia to the south 
and Thailand to the west. Laos endured multiple serious 
political upheavals throughout the 1940s and 50s. 
During World War II, it was occupied by the Japanese, 
as was the rest of French Indochina. Just before Japan's 
surrender in 1945, King Sisavang Vong of Luang 
Prabang declared independence from France. Under 
the Free Lao banner, an independent government was 
formed by the union of Vientiane, Champassak and 
Luang Prabang. The anti-French Free Lao government 
overthrew the King and only upon accepting the Free 
Lao constitution was he subsequently enthroned as the 
monarch. The relentless French forces fought back and 
succeeded in re-occupying Laos a year later. Three 
years after, in 1954, Laos was made a member of the 
French union and its independence was formally 
recognised by France. The country was ruled by pro-
Western governments until 1957 when Prince Souvanna 
Phouma led the first coalition government. However, 
this same government was broken up a year later and 
leaders of the communist Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) 
leaders were put into prison. The communist 
insurgency resumed and in 1960, a coup d’état took 
place in Vientiane, headed by paratrooper captain 
Kong Le who demanded that a neutralist government 
be formed to end the fighting. The neutralist 
government was formed under Prince Souvanna 
Phouna, but rightist forces led by General Phoumi 
Nosavan later that year replaced it. In response, Kong 
Le and the LPF formed an alliance, which was 
supported by North Laos and the Soviet Union, while 
the United States supported Phoumi Nosavan's rightist 
regime.  
During the second Geneva Conference held in 1961, an 
agreement was reached for the independence and 
neutrality of Laos. Peace did not prevail as discord 
arose soon after and civil war started again with the 
superpowers supporting different parties. The political 
struggles between communists, pro-Western forces and 
neutralists continued. The coalition government formed 
from the three parties suffered a sharp decline in 1975 
when communists claimed victories in Laos and 
Cambodia. The King was forced to give up his throne, 
and the communist Lao People's Democratic Republic 
(LPDR) was established. Communist forces took control 
of the government, ending the six-century-old 
monarchy. A strict socialist regime was instituted with 
the media coming under the control of the government 
and the private sector replaced by state enterprises and 
cooperatives. A large number of former government 
and military personnel were arrested and put into re-
education camps. The enforced political control as well 
as the worsening economic conditions forced many Lao 
people to seek refuge in other countries. It is estimated 
that close to ten per cent of the population left the 
country and from among these, 250,000 went to the 
United States. 
In the mid-1980s, the government decentralised control 
and encouraged private enterprise. When the country 
began opening up to the world in the 1990s, most of 
the re-education camps were closed and a number of 
re i n t e g rat i o n a s s i s t a n c e p ro g ra m m e s w e re 
implemented by the United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international NGOs to 
facilitate Lao refugees’ repatriation to their homeland. 
The Lao economy supported a return to family farming 
and private enterprise in some areas. The government 
also reduced subsidies to inefficient state-run 
enterprises and pursued foreign investment from 
capitalist nations. Poor communication facilities, 
inadequate transportation and an inefficient distribution 
system cont inue to hamper efforts towards 
modernisation and development. Aided by foreign-led 
infrastructure projects, economic growth recovered 
from negative rates registered in the 1980s to more 
promising rates in the 1990s. Laos became a member 
of ASEAN in 1997. Over the last ten years, total 
government revenue increased from 11 per cent to 
over 19 per cent of GDP, due mainly to revenues 
derived from mining and hydropower. Laos remains 
one of the poorest and least developed countries in the 
world. 
Key Challenges  
The paradox of a democratic republic  
In spite of its desire to be integrated with the 
international community for economic reasons, the 
structure of the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party 
(LPRP) remains typical of communist parties of the 
former Soviet states. The Political Bureau, which 
currently comprises ten members is elected from and 
by the Central Committee (CC) of the LPRP at each 
LPRP Congress. The CC has 51 members. Since the 
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formation of the Lao PDR in Dec 1975, all political 
power has been monopolised by the LPRP. Political 
dissent of even the most limited kind (in the form of 
political study groups or small peaceful public 
demonstrations) is quickly squelched. Not only is the 
LPRP the only avenue of political and social 
advancement, it is also the principal one. The Buddhist 
monastic order (the Sangha) presents a limited 
alternative avenue for social mobility through 
education, and wealth accumulation provides another. 
However, the LPRP keeps a close control over the 
Sangha and anything more than a small family business 
requires the proprietor to seek political protection 
through the patronage of a prominent LPRP member. 
Although undergirded by a Marxist-Leninist ideology, 
Laos is an authoritarian one-party state, in which the 
LPRP presides over a transitional market economy. The 
LPRP still retains control of a number of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) that it keeps for reasons of national 
security, but it welcomes foreign direct investment 
(FDI).  
The LPRP permeates and controls four key institutions 
in the country: the government, the bureaucracy, mass 
organisations and the military. In all four, leading figures 
are LPRP members. LPRP cells operate in all institutions 
and there is active recruitment of promising young 
people into the LPRP, membership of which is by 
invitation only. Anyone who is not an LPRP member 
fears the scrutiny of those who are. Civil servants at all 
levels are reluctant to make decisions without referring 
matters to their superiors. Doing nothing can be passed 
off as wisely studying a proposal; making decisions 
opens one to criticism and censure. Relatively minor 
decisions, therefore, are left to senior officials. As a 
result, the civil service is sluggish and unresponsive, 
and the best way to get things done is through 
personal and political contacts with senior LPRP 
members. The functioning of the bureaucracy thus 
depends upon the oil of politics, personal relationships 
and compensatory payments. 
The only mass organisations permitted in Laos are 
those directed by the LPRP. These number just four: the 
Lao Front for National Construction (LFNC), the 
Federation of Lao Trade Unions, the Lao Women’s 
Union (LWU), and the Revolutionary Youth Union. Local 
peasant associations are also tolerated. The Lao trade 
union movement is tightly controlled by the LPRP, and 
no free, worker-organised unions are allowed to 
operate. Probably the most active mass organisation is 
the Lao Women’s Union, which holds meetings and 
workshops for women across the country. In a country 
that is still overwhelmingly male-dominated, the LWU 
provides the only opportunity for women to organise 
and press for recognition. In so doing, it operates as the 
closest Laos has to a genuine pressure group. The 
Revolutionary Youth Union (RYU) is active in schools, 
where it serves as a recruiting ground for the LPRP. 
Though it organises youth activities, it serves principally 
as a means of political indoctrination of young Lao.  
The paradox of reform 
Tensions exist between political orthodoxy and 
economic reform. Any political in-fighting between the 
conservatives with revolutionary credentials who were 
often not very well educated and the technocrats with 
Western training has seen the former triumph. The latter 
are often expelled on the basis of ideological 
shortcomings or corruption. Despite the government’s 
commitment to greater political and economic reform, 
the human rights situation in the country remains poor. 
Amnesty International reported torture, harsh prison 
conditions and religious persecution among Lao 
dissidents. While international offenders who cross the 
line can be freed through powerful lobby groups and 
diplomacy, local prisoners have no recourse at all to 
justice.  
There is a persistent gap between policy and practice. It 
is often observed in Laos that policy as it appears on 
paper bears little resemblance to implementation on 
the ground. To quote Holly and Petit, ‘committees are 
formed but never meet, funds are established but 
remain empty, and fines are levied but are not 
enforced’ . Even as the government tries to restructure 3
its military-controlled state enterprises such as the 
Mountainous Area Development Corporation (MADC), 
the Agriculture, Forestry and Development Company 
(AFDC) and the Development of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Industry Company (DAFIC), the economic power of 
the military remains considerable, protected by the 
political influences it exercises within the party. It has 
been observed that the attempt by government to limit 
the wildlife trade and protect the environment provides 
a case study of the failure of legal measures to counter 
illegal and corrupt activities. 
 H. Holly and P. Petit (2013). Introduction: The Study of the State in Laos. Asian Studies Review, 37 (4), 417–4323
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The precarious nature of civil society 
Civil society in Laos has never been the same since the 
country’s most distinguished NGO leader was arrested 
at a police checkpoint in the capital, Vientiane, in 2012 
and has not been seen since. Sombath Somphone 
founded the Participatory Development Training Centre 
(PADETC) in 1996 with the aim of fostering sustainable, 
equitable and self-reliant development in Laos. Mr 
Sombath won the prestigious Magsaysay Award in 
2005, an award often regarded as Asia’s Nobel Prize. 
His disappearance has triggered an unprecedented 
flood of international dismay. Foreign NGOs, Asian 
parliamentarians and Western governments have raised 
their concerns with the Lao authorities. 'Missing' 
posters have popped up in Vientiane, appealing for 
word of his whereabouts. Far-reaching campaigns to 
draw attention to this case have been circulating on 
Facebook, Twitter and Avaaz. The UN Human Rights 
Council in Geneva has also expressed deep worry over 
his disappearance. Eight days before Mr Sombath’s 
abduction the government of Laos deported Anne-
Sophie Grindoz, the director of Helvetas, a Swiss NGO. 
Her offence was in writing a personal appeal addressed 
to development partners and donors, which then 
became public: We are working in a challenging 
environment: This is a country governed by a single-
party regime, where there is little space for meaningful 
democratic debate. Indeed there is far less 'space' in 
tiny Laos than in its communist neighbours, China and 
Vietnam. Ms Grindoz went on to complain that 
elements of civil society in the capital, Lao and 
international alike, are so cowed by the restrictions they 
face as to be, in effect, stifled by a system of self-
censorship. Several other NGO workers have fled Laos 
since then, in fear for their own safety. Government 
officials have offered only a deadpan reply: foreigners 
must abide by the rules and the country’s constitution. 
Many individual members of Laos' civil society are 
critical of the regime’s big-dam projects and large 
foreign-owned plantations that tend to marginalise 
small farmers. However unlike NGOs in Cambodia and 
Vietnam, Lao NGOs have not come out officially against 
the construction of the Xayaburi dam project. This is 
because it is widely known that Lao citizens with 
unpopular views have a way of vanishing. In 2007, 
Sompawn Khantisouk, the owner and manager of an 
eco-tourism lodge and a vocal critic of the proliferation 
of Chinese-owned plantations that have expanded by 
expropriating land from smallholders, disappeared. He 
has never been seen since. On another occasion, 
Thongluon Sisoulith, the foreign minister and deputy 
prime minister, welcomed participants of an 
international NGO forum warmly and seemed to take a 
positive view of their involvement in development 
activities. Yet according to several international NGO 
workers present during the forum, plain clothes agents 
could be seen copying notes, filming the forum’s local 
participants and creating an intimidating atmosphere. 
Several Lao speakers were so alarmed that they 
withdrew from the event. Not only are such stories of 
incidents repeatedly being circulated among foreigners 
in the country, they have also reached the ears of the 
young Lao who prefer to mind their own business than 
get involved in social advocacy or critique of 
government policies.  
MALAYSIA 
Historical Background 
Malaysia’s story is one of pluralism. Like many nations in 
Southeast Asia, its borders are not drawn along ethnic 
lines. Immigration and the influence from colonial 
European powers were particularly prominent in 
Malaysia because of its many important ports. Thus, 
many aspects of the country such as its economy and 
people are very different on the coasts than they are in 
the interior of the country, a distinction that generally 
mirrors the divide between urban and rural areas as 
well. 
The geographical territory of modern-day Malaysia was 
traditionally part of the larger Malay world connected 
through their similar Austronesian languages. At its 
height, the rule of the kingdom of Srivijaya (650-1377) 
extended over all of Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula and 
western Java. Sea travel constituted most of the 
movement in the region and the Straits of Malacca was 
an important route for the movement of goods and the 
spread of religion, especially Buddhism and later, Islam. 
However, maritime trade hubs were intrinsically 
exposed to foreign piracy and raids. As the power of 
Srivijaya continued to weaken, more Malay ethnic 
sultanates emerged which ruled over variously sized 
territories along the coast of the Malay Peninsula, 
northern Borneo and Eastern Sumatra, whereas non-
Malays inhabited the landlocked regions in small 
agrarian communities. These sultanates were 
decentralised and the economic ties and alliances of 
the Malay sultans were divided between rulers in 
Thailand and sultanates of Indonesia. 
Early colonial presence was limited to the Portuguese, 
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and later Dutch control of Malacca in the early sixteenth 
century. A century and a half later, the British 
established the Straits Settlements in Penang, 
Singapore and Malacca in the years 1786, 1819, and 
1830 respectively. The populations in these settlements 
grew as a result of Chinese and Indian immigrants and 
they remain where the majority of these minority 
populations still reside. The British political control of 
the entire Malay Peninsula followed as trade routes 
expanded. Their influence over previously unconnected 
territories resulted in the geographic boundaries of the 
contemporary Malaysian state.  
Japan’s unexpected capture and occupation of 
Singapore from 1941 to 1945 eradicated many of the 
advantages of the British presence resulting in local 
backlash and the sultans’ ratification of the Malayan 
Union. This political unification of the nine Malay states 
and the three Straits Settlements gave citizenship to all 
native-born colonials, regardless of ethnicity. Universal 
enfranchisement weakened Malay-ethnic political 
power and resulted in the creation of the United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO) led by Dato Onn bin 
Jaafar. The momentum towards independence 
accelerated when UMNO, the Malayan Chinese 
Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress 
(MIC) formed the Alliance Party in 1954 and their 
leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman (UMNO) was elected 
president in 1955. This alliance finally gave ‘Malaysians’ 
the critical mass they needed to strong-arm the British 
and Malaya was formally granted independence on 31 
August 1957. Tunku and his counterpart in the MCA, 
Tan Cheng Lok, agreed to write ‘Malay privilege’ into 
the new constitution. This decreed that a portion of civil 
service positions and educational scholarships were to 
be reserved for Malays. They also established Islam as 
the state religion but protected the freedom to practise 
other religions. In 1963, the Federation grew to include 
Sabah and Sarawak (North Borneo) and Singapore. The 
rivalry between the Chinese-ethnic majority Singapore 
and Malay-ethnic majority Kuala Lumpur grew until 
Singapore was expelled from the Federation in 1965. 
Coalitions pre-dated the country’s inception as a 
mainstay of Malaysian politics. For the past four 
decades, the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN) has 
held a majority of the parliamentary seats, while Pakatan 
Rakyat (PR) has become an increasingly viable 
opposition. Beginning in the 1980s, Malaysia’s two 
major Malay-Muslim political parties, UMNO and the 
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) have found that their 
successes are increasingly correlated to their synonymy 
with Muslim interests. An internal demographic shift 
saw the population of Malay ethnics, a fairly 
homogeneous voting bloc, grow by more than 7 per 
cent of the proportion of the country’s total population 
over two decades. (The Malays constituted 53 per cent 
of the population in 1980, 58.6 per cent in 1990, and 
60.4 per cent in 2000.) The defence of Muslim actors 
became a cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign policy. 
Outside of politics, the eminence of Islam penetrated 
all levels of Malaysian society, and symbols of Islam are 
widely visible across Malaysia. Fundamentalist leanings 
abated under Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohammad 
who preached Islam’s compatibility with modernity. 
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Mahathir’s 
successor, initiated the Islam Hadhari project, the first in 
a series of top-down, nation-building initiatives. This 
project did not serve UMNO well and the BN lost their 
two-thirds majority in the 2008 election for the first time 
since 1969. The unfavourable results for the incumbent 
party had a galvanising effect on society. For the first 
time, the political opposition seemed viable and it was 
no longer clear whether BN or UMNO would remain in 
power.  
Key Challenges  
UMNO as a lesser majority  
The current Prime Minister Najib Razak began his term 
by single-handedly spearheading the One Malaysia 
initiative, which championed the idea of universal 
citizenship and nation-building. The initiative saw a 
backlash from Malay-Muslim non-governmental 
organisations and lobby groups who did not believe 
Najib fully supported their interests. He has also failed 
to win over the Malaysian-Chinese population by 
leaving issues concerning Islam’s place in the law 
unresolved. (This refers in particular to a case in which 
the right of non-Muslims to use the Arabic word Allah to 
refer to God was revoked.) Since the 2013 election, 
where UMNO lost their two-thirds majority in the 
parliament, One Malaysia has quietened down, only to 
be succeeded by a new campaign, Malaysia: Endless 
Possibilities, though this was largely seen as a public 
relations exercise. The lack of popularity of these 
nation-building projects shows that divisions along 
ethnic lines in Malaysia still run deep. 
More recently, Najib hit the biggest crisis of his six-year 
tenure with allegations that hundreds of millions of 
dollars went missing in deals involving state-owned 
investment company 1Malaysia Development Berhad 
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(1MDB), which he launched in 2009. While the fate of 
the funds remains unclear, political analysts warn that 
damage from the episode could spell future electoral 
disaster for the ruling coalition that has governed for 57 
years. It already is steadily losing ground among a new 
generation of voters seeking greater political freedom 
and an end to corruption. In the meantime, the 
Malaysian ringgit has slid to 17-year lows, with investors 
rattled by the international outlook and the 1MDB 
funding fiasco.  
Difficulties with the inclusion of indigenous groups and 
influx of Muslim refugees 
Widespread institutional discrimination against the 
indigenous groups in Malaysia persists. The Orang Asli 
(‘original people’ in Malay) refers to the indigenous 
group on the Malaysian Peninsula, whose estimated 
population was 178,000 in 2010. After their help in 
defeating the communist insurgents during the 1948 
‘Emergency,’ the Aboriginal Peoples Act of 1954 was 
enacted to offer protections for their land. However, it 
also gave the Director-General of the Department of 
Orang Asli Affairs the power to evict and compensate 
them for their land. The Centre for Orang Asli Concerns 
estimates that only 12 per cent of Orang Asli villages 
are recognised as protected and inadequate 
compensation is offered when their land is seized. In 
addition, their ancestral lands are often in rural areas 
where infrastructure is costly to develop. They are 
hence excluded from many educational and economic 
opportunities as schools and other government 
services are far away from their villages. Government 
figures from 2007 indicate that 7,000 indigenous 
children were not attending school.  In Sarawak, the 
Iban and other indigenous groups make up over 40 per 
cent of the population of 2.3 million, and the Kadazan-
Dusan and other indigenous groups in Sabah make up 
60 per cent of the population of three million. These 
groups have much higher levels of poverty than their 
Malay, Chinese and Indian counterparts. In Eastern 
Malaysia, the Sabah Land Ordinance of 1930 and the 
Sarawak Land Code, laws created to protect the native 
lands of indigenous people, have been increasingly 
disregarded to allow for mass deforestation. Moreover, 
as the official language in both states is Malay, many 
indigenous people are excluded from government 
positions, which require Malay.  
The United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) estimates that there are approximately 97,000 
refugees residing in Malaysia, 40,000 of whom are 
stateless. The Malaysian government classifies these 
people as ‘irregular migrants’ and has no process in 
place to address their needs. Thus, they are not granted 
access to government aid and services. They often 
settle in urban areas that provide more opportunities 
for employment, both formal and informal. In Kuala 
Lumpur, refugees squat in Chow Kit, an area of the city 
which has become the epicentre of drug use, 
prostitution, and other illegal activities in the city. The 
present cohort of refugees consists mostly of Muslim 
minorities from nearby countries who see Malaysia as a 
safe place to practise their faith. Large numbers of 
Rohingya Muslims from the Rakhine state of northern 
Myanmar have entered the Malaysian Peninsula 
through Thailand, fleeing sectarian violence. Similarly, 
Muslims from the unstable Southern Philippines and 
the Indonesian territory of Borneo have fled to the 
Eastern Malaysian state of Sabah. However, in this case, 
the UMNO-controlled government has enfranchised 
huge portions of these groups in order to maintain the 
Muslim-majority in the state.  
Economic and security issues in the South China Sea 
Several Southeast Asian nations have overlapping 
claims to areas in the South China Sea, both with the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and amongst 
themselves. Malaysia has had mixed results when 
negotiating terms with the countries with which it 
disputes territory. Malaysia and Vietnam submitted a 
joint memorandum to the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that designated their 
respective rights to the continental shelf including the 
Spratly Islands and surrounding area. In 2009, Malaysia 
ceded ownership of a contested maritime territory to 
Brunei in exchange for permission to explore the 
territory for resources. Though it does not specifically 
address contested maritime territory, Malaysian state-
owned Petronas agreed to supply natural gas to the 
PRC’s Shanghai LNH company which increases the 
incentive and stakes for state cooperation. In total, 
bilateral trade with the PRC has surpassed US$50 
billion in recent years, making Malaysia one of PRC’s 
largest trading partner in Southeast Asia. Relations with 
other states have been less amicable. Indonesia and 
Malaysia have engaged in short naval disputes over 
Ambalat, the sea area to the southeast of Sabah. The 
Philippines still officially regards Sabah as disputed 
territory, although the only recent action was taken by a 
non-state actor, an armed Filipino Muslim group who 
referred to themselves as the ‘Sultans of Sulu’ who 
invaded and attempted to occupy the island before 
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they were stopped by Malaysian security forces in 
March 2013.  
  
MYANMAR 
Historical Background 
Myanmar or Burma as it was previously known, began 
in the early centuries as a city along the trade route 
between China and India. The Pyus and the Mons 
prospered as a result of the precious cargoes brought 
in by the Indian merchants and were imbued with the 
religious and political ideas that came with them. By the 
11th century, most of the land in the region of northern 
Burma and the core of what is Myanmar today had 
been united into a single kingdom based in Pagan. 
When the British and the Dutch came vying with the 
Portuguese and the French for dominance of the 
region, Burma found itself at war with all these 
European powers and also with Siam (now Thailand) 
and China. Three Anglo-Burmese wars were fought with 
the British, the last of which saw Burma annexed to the 
British Empire as a province of colonial India in 1885. 
The last king of Burma, Thibaw was sent into exile and 
the monarchy eliminated. Refusing to accept the British 
victory as final, many Burmese joined guerrilla wars led 
by former officers of the Burmese royal army against 
the British colonial rule. Amongst the groups fighting 
for independence were leaders of the Young Men's 
Buddhist Association (YMBA), Burmese peasants as well 
as a radical student group of the University of Rangoon 
known as the Thakin Movement which Aung San (father 
of present-day National League for Democracy general 
secretary, Aung San Suu Kyi) joined. The uprising 
earned Burma some measure of self-government in 
1937 when the British government separated Burma 
from India. However, World War II came and the 
Japanese troops invaded Burma. This led Aung San and 
his army to join forces with the British instead. A 
coalition of political parties which included the Thakins 
was formed under the banner of the Anti-Fascist 
People's Freedom League, or AFPEL. After the 
Japanese were defeated in 1945, the British military 
administrat ion and members of the pre-war 
government who returned from exile demanded that 
Aung San be tried as a traitor. In regard of Aung San's 
popular support, the Allied Commander in Southeast 
Asia, Lord Mountbatten, appointed the more 
conc i l i a tory S i r Hubert Rance to head the 
administration. Rance formed a new cabinet that 
included Aung San, and they began discussion for a 
peaceful transfer of power as well as Burma's 
independence. In June 1947, the British agreed to 
Burma's independence and its departure from the 
Commonwealth. However, these agreements met with 
opposition from the communists and conservatives in 
the AFPEL who were forced to go underground. In July, 
gunmen allegedly sent by the former Prime Minister U 
Saw assassinated Aung San and many members of his 
cabinet. Thakin Nu became the new leader of the 
AFPEL. 
At independence, Prime Minister U Nu’s civilian 
government inherited a country still reeling from its 
experience during World War II and equipped with a 
decentralised colonial system that treated each of 
Burma’s diverse ethnic groups as separate political 
entities. The British had co-opted local ethnic minorities 
and hill tribes into the colonial civil service and military 
which bred ill-feeling among the majority Bamar, many 
of whom sided with the Japanese occupation during 
the Second World War. As U Nu and the primarily 
Bamar government attempted to forge a unified polity 
post-independence, tensions and war memories boiled 
over. In addition to putting down communist 
insurgencies and repelling Kuomintang incursions, 
Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, has at various times 
since independence been at war with separatists 
militias made up of ethnic Chins, Kachins, Karens, Mons, 
Palaungs, Shans, and Was. Fighting has also been 
sectarian in nature, with Rohingya Muslims, Buddhist 
Rakhines, and the army periodically engaging each 
other in western Rakhine State. 
The instability and militarisation of Burma in its 
fledgling years crippled the U Nu administration and 
paved the way for military takeover. A 1962 coup 
brought the Tatmadaw to power for the long term. 
Under the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism,’ General Ne Win 
nationalised close to 15,000 private firms and 
established a massive collection of ‘State Economic 
Enterprises’ (SEEs). As part of the British Empire, 
colonial Burma had attracted large communities of 
Indian and Chinese merchants, who together 
constituted the country's up-and-coming middle class. 
Ne Win’s initial seizure of local businesses forced 
approximately 200,000 ethnic Indians to quit Burma. 
Maoist encroachments in the mid-1960s provided an 
additional excuse to appropriate Chinese-owned 
businesses. Foreign investment during this period 
ground to a halt. Between 1962 and 1988, Ne Win’s 
isolationist economic policies yielded sluggish growth, 
widened income disparities and incurred US$3.4 billion 
in government debt. Once the ‘rice bowl of Asia,’ with 
grain exports exceeding 1.7 million tonnes, Myanmar’s 
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agricultural production had contracted by 90 per cent 
within a decade of the 1962 coup. In 1987, the UN 
placed Burma on its list of ‘least developed countries.’ 
In spite of Ne Win’s decision to step down in 1988, 
Burma’s economy shrank further when several foreign 
governments, including West Germany, the United 
States and Japan withdrew ODA in response to violent 
crackdowns on student protesters. The post-Ne Win 
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and 
its successor, the State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC), also refused to honour the 1990 election of 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy 
(NLD), leading not only to additional economic 
sanctions but also piecemeal liberalisations as the 
Tatmadaw scrambled to make up the windfall. Although 
the government signed deals with several Thai firms in 
the 1990s and 2000s, conducting business in Myanmar 
continued to be notoriously difficult during this period. 
Despite rosy double digits posted by the government, 
independent observers have estimated that GDP 
growth in Myanmar was only two to three per cent 
between 1988 and 2010. Meanwhile, the military 
government drew both headlines and additional 
sanctions when it violently broke up Buddhist clergy 
and protesters involved in the pro-democracy ‘Saffron 
Revolution’ in August 2007. The following year, 
international relief organisations also criticised the 
government’s delayed response to Cyclone Nargis that 
killed over 138,000 Burmese and displaced an 
additional 2.4 million. 
President Thein Sein’s decision in 2011 to dissolve the 
military junta has opened up new opportunities and 
challenges for Myanmar. Initial reforms have included 
easing censorship laws, appointing an anti-corruption 
committee, opening the 2012 by-election to opposition 
parties and releasing political prisoners, including 
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Throughout 2012 
and 2013, Myanmar’s national assembly, the Hluttaw, 
has continued to introduce new legislation at a brisk 
pace, including laws addressing food standards, the 
national census, consumer protection, water supply, 
minimum wage and disability rights. For the first time in 
50 years, opposition members were allowed to hold 
seats in the national assembly. The initial success of the 
above reforms has bolstered investor confidence in 
what is widely seen as an emerging market. To date, the 
European Union, the United States and Canada have 
largely rolled back economic sanctions, paving the way 
for increased foreign investment, loans and 
development aid. Along with significant investments 
made by China, South Korea, Japan and Singapore, 
cumulative foreign direct investment in Myanmar 
reached an unprecedented US$44 billion in December 
2013. 
Key Challenges  
Renewed ethnic tensions, the Nationwide Ceasefire 
Agreement and sectarian violence in Rakhine and 
Mandalay 
Over the last 25 years, the Tatmadaw has negotiated 
ceasefires with nearly all armed insurgent groups 
operating within the country but lasting peace still 
remains elusive. After 17 years of relative peace, conflict 
between the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) 
and the military resumed in June 2011, partly because 
increased Chinese interest in the northern state had 
raised the stakes for autonomy. The Tatmadaw has also 
recently clashed with the Shan State Army, the Ta’ang 
National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Karen 
National Liberation Army (KNLA). It still remains to be 
seen how the reformed government would integrate 
ethnic minorities such as the Kachin into greater 
Myanmar, or whether it would grant them limited 
autonomy under a federal structure. In the meantime, 
Myanmar’s lawless northern border, including parts of 
Kachin and the United Wa States, continues to act as a 
haven for smugglers and poachers.  
Although tensions between Myanmar’s Buddhists and 
Muslims have existed since colonial times, violence 
between the two groups has flared since liberalisation 
in 2011. In 2012 and early 2013, reports that a Buddhist 
Rakhine woman had been assaulted and murdered by a 
group of Muslim youths led to rioting and reprisals 
throughout Rakhine State, resulting in 192 deaths, 265 
injuries and the destruction of 8,614 homes. Large 
numbers of Rohingya Muslims, fleeing the violence, 
were forced into refugee camps along the Bangladesh 
border. The Burmese government maintains that the 
Rohingyas are illegal Bangladeshi migrants, and that it 
bears limited responsibility for their welfare. In February 
2014, the government went as far to suspend Médecins 
Sans Frontières from operating in Rakhine State, citing 
the fact that the international aid group had failed to 
remain ‘impartial’ in the ongoing Rakhine-Rohingya 
conflict. This has left up to 750,000 ethnic Rohingyas 
living in the refugee camps without access to adequate 
healthcare. Sectarian violence has also spread beyond 
Rakhine state to Yangon and Mandalay, where both 
Indian and Chinese Muslims (Panthay) have been the 
target of violence stoked by extremist monk Ashin 
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Wirathu and his anti-Muslim 969 movement. Recently, 
the violence and resulting refugee crisis has taken on a 
regional dimension, with large numbers of Rohingya 
migrating, often illegally, to Malaysia through Thailand. 
Buddhist Burmese migrant workers have also become a 
target of reprisals in Muslim-majority Malaysia. 
Development projects, land disputes and anti-China 
sentiment 
Myanmar has signed an array of trade agreements with 
foreign companies with the goal of developing the 
country’s infrastructure and heavy industry, but several 
projects have been stalled or cancelled due to land 
disputes between locals and the government. In June 
2013, the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) agreed to provide approximately US$500 million 
in loans to fund the construction of a special economic 
zone (SEZ) and deep sea port at the village of Thilawa, 
25 km south of Yangon. China is also eager to develop 
Myanmar’s vast natural resources, having received 
concessions to build a copper mine at Letpadaung in 
Sagaing division.  
A murky system of land deeds left over from the Ne Win 
and SPDC-eras has led to current disputes, with locals 
contending that they sold land to the then-military 
government under duress, and the government 
arguing that it is only liable to compensate villagers for 
housing and crops. Several villagers from Thilawa have 
staged protests in Yangon demanding that the 
government provide additional compensation or else 
reverse its decision to develop the Japanese-sponsored 
SEZ. In May 2014, angry villagers in Letpadaung 
kidnapped two Chinese contractors involved with the 
mine and issued similar demands. The government has 
at times given in to protesters’ demands. After 
widespread demonstrations in 2011, President Thein 
Sein suspended construction of the Chinese-backed 
Myitsone hydroelectric dam in Kachin State for the 
remainder of his term. The government also recently 
shelved an ambitious Chinese rail project linking south-
western Yunnan province to the Irrawaddy delta. 
International observers and human rights organisations 
are concerned that anger surrounding Chinese 
infrastructural projects could indicate a return to the 
anti-Chinese pogroms Burma experienced in the 
mid-1960s. There are over 1.6 million ethnic Chinese 
currently living in Myanmar today, constituting three per 
cent of the total population. 
2015 elections and constitutional reform 
The international community is collectively holding its 
breath for the slated November 2015 general elections, 
which are largely seen as a barometer of Myanmar’s 
future suitability for business. Any reports of electoral 
discrepancies in November would undermine much of 
the optimism behind the political reforms and could 
possibly lead to a renewal of sanctions by Western 
governments. U.S. companies in particular have largely 
held back from making commitments until the ground 
settles. Also up for review is the country’s 2008 
Constitution. The government appointed a consti-
tutional review committee in December 2013 that 
would make recommendations for changes to the 
document in February 2015. Points of interest include 
Article 436, which reserves 25 per cent of seats in the 
Hluttaw for military representatives, and Article 59(f), 
which bars individuals with foreign family members, 
such as Aung San Suu Kyi, from becoming President. 
After decades of military suppression, the opposition 
still views the government and its reforms with 
suspicion and this attitude will likely continue until the 
Tatmadaw relinquishes its 25 per cent control of the 
legislature.  
PHILIPPINES 
Historical background 
Although Western colonisers have, to varying degrees, 
shaped the political structures and economies of nearly 
all of the Southeast Asian nations, they achieved an 
unmatched level of cultural and institutional pen-
etration in the Philippines. Far from the Indic influences 
that inspired Angkor Wat, Borobudur and Pagan, the 
island group was only marginally sanskritised during 
the pre-colonial period. With some notable exceptions 
in the south, Muslim communities were also never able 
to establish firm roots. Mindanao, Sulu and even 
southern Luzon were home to maritime sultanates 
beginning in the late 14th century, but a Spanish victory 
over the Muslim Rajah of Maynila in 1571 effectively 
halted widespread adoption of Islam throughout the 
archipelago. More than three centuries of Spanish rule 
have left a profound mark on the culture, language and 
religion of the Filipinos, while the subsequent half-
century of American administration has largely defined 
the structure of their country’s political and legal 
institutions.  
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For the first two centuries of colonial rule, the 
Philippines was primarily a way station in imperial 
Spain’s expansive mercantile empire. Each year, the 
government-operated Casa de Contratación in Seville 
dutifully dispatched a treasure galleon from Acapulco 
to Manila to buy up Chinese porcelain and silk with a 
tightly controlled supply of Mexican gold and silver. It 
was only in the last quarter of the eighteenth century 
that the imperial government lifted bans on commercial 
plantations and opened Manila to foreign shipping. The 
1800s saw the emergence of a provincial gentry 
composed of export -or iented p lanters and 
entrepreneurs with firm control of extractive industries 
such as tobacco, indigo, hemp, and sugar. 
Economic policy during the American administration 
(1899–1946) cemented the Philippines’ role as an 
exporter of raw materials and gave the established 
gentry additional opportunities to consolidate 
economic and political power. By 1902, the U.S. 
Congress had liquidated plantations run by the Catholic 
Church and sold lands held by the friars at public 
auctions. By 1913, it had removed all quota restrictions 
on Philippine exports to the United States. Trade with 
the U.S. ballooned from US$38 million in 1908 to US
$257 million in 1929. In spite of intermittent American 
attempts to limit landholdings and confer land patents 
on new owners, established elites were the primary 
buyers of publicly auctioned land and, by extension, the 
chief beneficiaries of the 1920s trade boom. As the 
colonial government also set about inaugurating 
democratic institutions in its colony, including locally 
elected municipal and provincial offices, a bicameral 
legislature modelled after the U.S. Congress and a 
supreme court, these same families rose to occupy the 
newly opened political positions. Many of today’s 
political elites, including Benigno Aquino III, Imelda 
Marcos and Eduardo ‘Danding’ Cojuangco among 
others, belong to rival political dynasties that can trace 
their roots back to the American colonial period. 
The political economy of the Philippines has revolved 
around rent-seeking and clientelelism since the colonial 
period. Politicians have largely used elected offices to 
secure for family members’ and supporters’ private 
access to state resources, including low-cost 
government credit, licences for state-regulated 
enterprises and selective enforcement of commercial 
regulations. Voters have also expected political victors 
to dole out direct benefits in the form of cash grants, 
tax-breaks on commodities and local infrastructure 
projects. Political patronage systems can support 
significant economic and developmental growth when 
paired with enforced market discipline, as Indonesia 
and Thailand have demonstrated. However, the near 
constant shifts in power and patronage that accompany 
each election cycle in the Philippines has largely 
stymied any attempts to build an industrialised export 
economy. Between 1986 and 2009, the Philippines 
economy grew on average only 3.86 per cent each 
year. 
With the above in mind, the election of Benigno 
‘NoyNoy’ Aquino III in 2010 has brought a newfound 
optimism to Filipino and foreign investors. In spite of a 
sluggish start in 2011, the Philippines under Aquino 
posted 6.8 and 7.2 per cent growth in 2012 and 2013 
respectively. Recent gains were the result of several 
factors, including increased government and private-
sector spending on infrastructure projects, a robust 
peso via the sale of PHP-denominated bonds, a rise in 
overseas remittances and a boom in business process 
outsourcing (BPO) operations. Aquino’s anti-corruption 
initiatives have also encouraged global investment 
rating firms, such as Fitch Service Rating, Standard and 
Poor and Moody’s Investors Service to upgrade the 
Philippines, indicating that the government and local 
corporations could potentially attract much needed 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the coming years. 
While urban centres, especially Metro Manila and Cebu 
City, have become lucrative hubs for Business Process 
Outsourcing or BPO-related industries, the Aquino 
administration still faces significant developmental 
challenges in the countryside. Each post-Marcos 
administration has made poverty eradication a keystone 
of its electoral platform, but 19 per cent of Filipinos 
continue to live on less than US$1.25 per day. An 
additional 22.7 per cent live on less than US$2 per day. 
32 per cent of Filipinos are engaged in agricultural 
activities but inadequate rural infrastructure and 
competition from more developed markets with better 
economies of scale have trapped small-scale farmers in 
a cycle of high-interest crop loans and crippling debt. 
The Philippines also lags behind in achieving several of 
its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). A report 
published by the Overseas Development Institute in 
2010 disclosed that the Philippines had a child 
mortality rate of 28 per 1,000 live births and that 28 per 
cent of children under five years of age were 
malnourished and/or underweight. 
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Key Challenges  
Inadequate infrastructure development and increasing 
vulnerability to recurrent natural disasters  
A combination of geography and underdeveloped 
infrastructure on remote islands has rendered the 
Philippines one of the most disaster-vulnerable 
countries in Southeast Asia in recent years. In addition 
to being situated on the volcano and earthquake-prone 
‘ring of fire’, the island group is also exposed to tropical 
cyclones originating from the equatorial Pacific. Large 
urban centres are often located directly on the coast, 
placing millions of inhabitants at risk of storm surges 
and tsunamis. Typhoons can also dislodge loosely-
packed mud from the more than twenty-three active 
volcanoes in the Philippines, leading to deadly lahar 
flows capable of burying entire villages. It is estimated 
that between 2004 and 2008, the Philippines lost 0.5 
per cent of its GDP each year as a result of natural 
disasters. 
Increasing atmospheric temperatures worldwide have 
resulted in the recent appearance of tropical storms of 
unprecedented ferocity, the so-called ‘super typhoons.’ 
In fact, eight of the ten most destructive typhoons to 
strike the Philippines have made landfall within the last 
seven years. Prior to Typhoon Haiyan’s landfall, the 
international community, including the United Nations, 
had praised the Philippine government for its 
commitment to minimising disaster risk. Both the 2009 
Climate Change Act and the 2010 Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Act created a number of 
government bodies responsible for developing 
comprehensive strategies for managing potential crises 
precipitated by natural disasters. However, Typhoon 
Ha iyan exposed severe defic ienc ies in the 
government’s disaster preparedness measures, with the 
national government largely failing to coordinate with 
its local counterparts. According to the new framework, 
local governments were responsible for purchasing 
health and safety equipment, funding emergency 
services such as fire-fighters and developing 
infrastructure such as flood control systems and 
seawalls. However, provincial and municipal authorities 
were caught significantly unprepared for the 
destruction wrought by Haiyan. For Tacloban in 
particular, a failure to enforce a mandatory evacuation 
led to the majority of deaths, as residents crowded into 
low-lying structures made of corrugated steel that were 
unable to withstand the storm. The island’s already 
fragile infrastructure was also largely obliterated, 
complicating the delivery of food, water and medicine 
after the storm had passed.  
Lack of local opportunities for skilled and unskilled 
labour and increasing vulnerability of some overseas 
workers to exploitation and trafficking 
Political persecution and financial insecurity associated 
with the Marcos regime’s handling of the economy 
initially led significant numbers of Filipinos to leave the 
country in the 1970s and 1980s, but the Philippines has 
maintained a ‘sustained culture of emigration’ even in 
the post-Marcos era. By 2006, 38.5 million Filipinos, or 
43 per cent of the population, were dependent on 
some form of overseas remittances, and as much as 10 
per cent of the population was working overseas. In 
2012, remittances from overseas Filipino workers 
amounted to US$20 billion, or eight per cent of GDP. 
There are several factors behind continued emigration. 
The Philippine economy’s historic reliance on 
agr icu l tura l commodi t ies has prov ided few 
employment opportunities outside basic farming jobs. 
Approximately 10.9 million Filipinos, or 30 per cent of 
t h e p o p u l a t i o n , a re e i t h e r u n e m p l o y e d o r 
underemployed. For educated middle-class Filipinos in 
particular, pursuing careers abroad has become a 
means of exchanging entrenched patronage systems 
and relatively low wages for increased autonomy and 
financial security. Since 1975, successive Filipino 
governments have encouraged emigration as a means 
of repaying foreign debts owed to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Some experts 
have raised concerns that continued reliance on 
overseas remittances stymies development of local 
industries, increases inequality between ‘haves’ and 
‘have-nots’ and contributes to cultural and familial 
erosion. Human rights groups have also brought 
attention to the inadequate work conditions faced by 
many Filipino domestic workers abroad in Singapore, 
Hong Kong and Arab Gulf states as well as their 
vulnerability to traffickers. In 2010, Human Rights Watch 
reported that significant numbers of Filipino maids 
working in Kuwait were forced to work 18-hour work 
days, withheld food and subjected to physical abuse by 
their employers. In the long run, sustainable and 
equitable growth wil l require the Phil ippine 
government to work with local and foreign investors to 
provide local economic opportunities at home. In the 
meantime, maintaining overseas Filipino workers’ safety 
requires the active participation of government 
regulators, human rights organisations and overseas 
businesses. In addition to channelling foreign earnings 
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to public coffers via supplementary taxes on them, the 
Philippine government has also instituted various 
offices and initiatives to protect overseas workers.  
Geopolitical manoeuvring in the South China Sea 
A number of factors, including China’s increasing 
regional dominance and the U.S.’s ‘pivot to Asia,’ have 
heightened tensions between ASEAN members and 
People’s Republic of China. The Philippines, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Brunei, China and Taiwan have maintained 
competing claims concerning various island groups in 
the South China Sea since the close of World War II. 
Between 2002 and 2009, disputes were mitigated by 
the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea, which avoided cut-and-dry questions 
of sovereignty. However, Vietnam and Malaysia 
submitted formal claims under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2009, 
triggering retaliatory claims by both the Philippines and 
China.  
In particular, both the Chinese and Philippine 
governments lay claim to members of the Spratly island 
group as well as Scarborough Shoal. A series of 
confrontations throughout 2011 culminated in a two-
month standoff between Chinese and Philippine naval 
patrol boats in April and May of 2012. The Philippines 
has approached the conflict on chiefly legal grounds. It 
filed a suit with the Arbitral Tribunal of UNCLOS in 
January 2013 regarding claims to the Spratly Islands, 
Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef and other land 
features within its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). The Aquino administration has also reached out 
to long-time allies, including the United States and 
Japan. It recently held joint naval exercises with Japan 
in May of 2015 and is currently negotiating a new 
framework agreement that will ensure continued U.S. 
maritime presence in the region as a counterweight to 
Chinese activities. Although wider regional conflict 
featuring the United States and Japan is unlikely, a 
miscalculation on either side could potentially escalate 
current tensions.  
The ongoing disputes have wider implications for the 
Philippine economy. More than half of global maritime 
tonnage passes through the South China Sea, including 
41 per cent of total intra-ASEAN trade. The Philippines 
is largely interdependent with China and its ASEAN 
partners, and its fragile economy and development 
agenda cannot afford to lose these vital trade links. 
China, in particular, is the Philippines’ third largest 
trading partner, with bilateral trade totalling US$30 
billion in 2007. Throughout the 2012 standoff, China 
made good on its threat to cancel flights to the 
Philippines and delay Philippine goods at customs, 
prompting Filipino agricultural lobbies to lodge 
protests with government hardliners. The Aquino 
administration has to balance a resurgent nationalist 
sentiment against its internal economic interests and 
the profitability of its businesses. A major loss in 
Chinese trade could endanger its agenda of economic 
revitalisation, rural development and infrastructure 
renovation. In the absence of an agreed upon 
multilateral framework for managing natural resources, 
the South China Sea marine environment will be 
especially vulnerable to overfishing and habitat 
destruction. The South China Sea and surrounding 
waters contain more than 30 per cent of the world’s 
coral reefs. The area is also home to extensive fisheries 
and natural gas deposits totalling 900 trillion cubic feet. 
China, Vietnam and the Philippines have each 
unilaterally commissioned exploration contracts for gas 
and oil, while their fishing fleets have at times 
overexploited the region’s delicate fisheries. A 
comprehensive solution to the South China Seas 
disputes will require not only security agreements 
between governments, but also an area-wide 
environmental impact assessment by private 
companies and environmental organisations.  
SINGAPORE 
Historical Background 
Singapore has come a long way since her beginnings 
as a sleepy fishing village and a tiny Malay settlement 
ruled by the Sultan of Johor. Sir Stamford Raffles first 
arrived in Singapore in 1819 and immediately 
recognised that Singapore’s strategic location along the 
Straits of Malacca would be useful to the British in 
developing an alternative to challenge Dutch influence 
and monopoly in the region.   During British colonial 
rule, Singapore developed into an important free port 
and trade city, an essential trait that continues to feature 
heavily in Singapore’s economic development to this 
day. After more than a century of British rule, Singapore 
fell to the Japanese in February 1942. Although 
administration of the island was handed back to Britain 
in 1945, the failure of the colonial government to 
defend Singapore had discredited it greatly with the 
local population. The rise of anti-colonial and nationalist 
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sentiments forced the British to dissolve the Straits 
Settlements and Singapore was given the status of a 
separate Crown Colony with inaugural elections to the 
Legislative Council in 1948. However, an armed 
insurgency led by communist groups in Malaya 
threatened to overturn this fragile new equilibrium.  
The transition period of self-governance in Singapore 
from 1955 to 1963 was tumultuous, marked by riots, 
simmering tensions from the threat of communism and 
the rise of the People’s Action Party (PAP) led by Lee 
Kuan Yew. The ruling UMNO party of Malaya, although 
skeptical of the PAP and distrustful of Singapore’s large 
ethnic Chinese population, agreed to the formation of 
the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. Racial tensions were 
high. The Chinese majority in Singapore was unhappy 
with the ‘bumiputera’ policy in Malaysia that favoured 
Malays, while Singaporean Malays were worried about 
the federal government’s allegations that the PAP was 
mistreating local Malays. UMNO, increasingly 
threatened by the economic independence of 
Singapore, expelled it from the Federation on 9 August 
1965.  
The PAP campaigned on a platform of fair and equal 
treatment for all races. Meritocracy, as expressed by the 
PAP, continues to be one of the central pillars of 
independent Singapore. However, Singapore’s new 
independence was accepted by the ruling government 
with deep apprehension. Amidst the backdrop of 
Konfrontasi and the threat of forcible re-integration into 
the Federation of Malaysia under unfavourable 
conditions, the Singapore government quickly acted to 
gain international recognition of the nation’s 
sovereignty by joining both the United Nations and the 
Commonwealth of Nations. The government also 
needed to address urgent developmental and 
domestic issues such as a lack of natural resources, 
national security, unemployment, housing, water 
security and education. Singapore focused on 
establishing the Singapore Armed Forces with 
assistance from Israel and introduced compulsory 
conscription for all young men. Singapore's Housing 
Development Board worked to ensure that more 
projects were undertaken to provide affordable public 
housing to Singaporeans, and the Public Utilities Board 
was established to drive research into technologies for 
the provision of alternative sources of clean water. The 
Economic Development Board was set up to propel the 
centrally planned economic development of Singapore. 
Concentrating on attracting multinational companies to 
provide employment, it led the drive for indust-
rialisation and the creation of key sectors such as port 
services and manufacturing. A robust education system 
was set up, with English adopted as the primary 
language, with a focus on science and mathematics, to 
ensure that the workforce will be prepared for the 
industry focus later on in life. The government believed 
that as Singapore was land scarce with no natural 
resources, developing the country’s human resources 
was its top priority. 
Singapore’s consistent and strong economic growth 
achieved through the government’s constant strategic 
shift into globally relevant industries and sectors 
catapulted Singapore into the ranks of developed 
nations and enabled the next generation after the 
pioneers, to enjoy peace, prosperity and stability. 
Throughout independence, the PAP has dominated the 
Singapore political scene. While it has governed 
Singapore effectively, it has also maintained tight 
control over the island’s political and civil society 
activities. The government has filed lawsuits against 
opposition politicians and used the Internal Security Act 
to detain citizens suspected of Marxist conspiracy 
without trial. 
Opposition parties were unable to achieve any critical 
support until the elections in 2011, when the Workers’ 
Party won six of the 87 seats, five of which comprised a 
Group Representation Constituency (GRC) that was 
previously thought unattainable by the opposition. The 
PAP won 60.1 per cent of the votes, its poorest showing 
since independence. During 2011, much of the 
campaigning, commentary, discussion and activity took 
place on social media, away from traditional and official 
media platforms. Singaporeans are increasingly 
dissatisfied with the PAP government’s failure to 
address issues such as income inequality, perceived 
overcrowding and competition from foreigners brought 
in via the government’s immigration and manpower 
policies. Recently, the opposition has called for a less 
stressful and competitive environment, even though 
such an environment led Singapore through decades of 
strong economic growth. The ruling government under 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has also sought to 
change its style of governance, taking a softer and 
more consultative approach that differs markedly from 
the past. This has enabled it, in the recent 2015 
elections to secure a mandate of close to 70 per cent 
majority vote from the people. Amidst the rapidly 
changing, interconnected and complex global 
environment, this is the Singapore that we are seeking 
to understand today. 
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Key Challenges  
Rising dissatisfaction with immigration policies and 
social integration of immigrants 
As a hub for multinational corporations seeking to enter 
emerging markets in Asia, Singapore has attracted a 
high number of foreign talent to the country. The influx 
of foreign professionals into Singapore has injected a 
measure of dynamism into the economy. To retain these 
talents, the Singaporean government grants 
approximately 20,000 of them Permanent Residents 
(PR) status every year. This strategy has been successful 
in keeping the workforce strong and competitive while 
preventing the total population from shrinking. With the 
steady stream of foreign manpower entering 
Singapore, the foreign population has grown to an 
estimated 1.3 million out of the country’s 5.5 million 
population. These demographic changes have 
presented several challenges to integration. The 
dilution of national identity has made it even more 
difficult for locals to see Singapore as a single, unified 
community. Locals increasingly see foreign talent as 
exacerbating competition for employment, education, 
housing and infrastructure. Highly-skilled foreign 
manpower dominates Singapore’s resident MNCs. On 
the other hand, construction companies and companies 
providing domestic help, both of which are in high 
demand, also employ foreigners due to the fact that 
Singaporean low-skilled workers are not interested in 
such work. The influx of foreigners at the professional as 
well as the blue-collared levels has caused 
Singaporeans to feel sandwiched in between. It is little 
wonder that some Singaporeans view foreigners with a 
mix of resentment and disdain. These sentiments, as 
well as the fact that many foreign professionals see 
Singapore as a transient work place, has contributed to 
the lack of success in efforts to integrate different 
sectors of the population. 
Growing economic inequality  
Singapore currently has the highest GDP per capita in 
Southeast Asia. Due to its ability to provide safe political 
conditions, stable economic growth and good 
governance, Singapore is able to attract rich 
immigrants. However, the wages of the middle class 
have only risen between three to six per cent in the last 
year. Locals perceive that they are not getting their fair 
share from Singapore’s success and the recent increase 
in the country’s GDP has not resulted in an 
enhancement of citizen well-being. While the average 
monthly household income grew 5.3 per cent from 
2013 to 2014, the growth is not a result of higher 
salaries but more members in a given household 
working longer hours.  
Singapore’s Gini coefficient (before government taxes 
and transfers) is one of the highest in the world. High 
inequality is considered to be more acceptable if social 
mobility is high, such that children with poor parents 
have better opportunities to climb up the economic 
ladder. With meritocracy as Singapore’s main ideology, 
and due to the stratification of Singapore’s education 
system, it is inevitable that the income gap will continue 
to grow. The top 10 per cent of Singapore’s households 
earns almost 25 times more than the bottom 10 per 
cent. The disparity arises partly from work qualifications. 
Unskilled Singaporeans find it a challenge to look for 
jobs with the presence of low-cost migrant workers. 
Without a minimum wage guarantee, these 
Singaporeans face further financial and social pressure 
in a country that is currently ranked one of the world’s 
most expensive cities to live in. If this is not addressed, 
there will be persistent social disquiet and a resistance 
to government policies related to boosting economic 
growth.  
Persistent security threats 
Singapore experienced its first terrorist incident on 31 
Jan 1974, when terrorists from the Japanese Red Army 
(JRA) bombed petroleum tanks at Pulau Bukom. The 
second terrorist threat happened on 26 March 1991 
when four Pakistanis hijacked Singapore Airlines Flight 
117 and demanded the release of a Pakistan Peoples 
Party member from a Pakistani jail. Since then, the 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which is part of a larger regional 
network organisation in Malaysia and Indonesia as well 
as the Islamic State (ISIS) have posed a serious threat to 
national and regional security.  
Singapore is keenly aware that it is a small secular 
nation-state surrounded by predominantly Muslim 
states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. Since 
the beginning of its independence, Singapore has 
sought the help of Western nations to grow its 
economy and aid in its security. This has resulted, at 
times, in the perception that Singapore is a pro-Western 
country and hence, an obvious target for terrorists and 
radicals. The fight against terrorism reached its height 
when former JI leader Mas Selamat bin Kastari escaped 
from detention in February 2008. The search for him 
has been described as the largest manhunt ever 
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launched in Singapore. He was eventually recaptured in 
Skudai, Malaysia, on 1 April 2009, over a year after his 
escape, and has since been returned to Singapore. 
Many efforts have been taken by the government to 
handle these continuously evolving security threats 
including emerging threats from ISIS. Beyond 
intelligence sharing, Singapore has been developing its 
own capabilities to prepare for evolving security threats 
such as policing the public transport network, 
developing early warning systems and establishing 
specialised units to counter terrorism.  
THAILAND 
Historical Background 
Thai migrants first began trickling into the Chao Phraya 
river valley from Southern China in the eleventh century. 
Thai chieftains established petty kingdoms in modern-
day Myanmar, Thailand and Laos, initially as tributaries 
to more established Burmese and Khmer rulers. 
However, both the diminishing influence of the Khmer 
Empire and the Mongols’ sacking of the Burmese 
capital, Pagan in 1287 left a political vacuum in 
mainland Southeast Asia, which was soon filled by Thai 
kingdoms such as Sukhothai (1238–1463), Chiang Mai 
(1296–1775), Ayutthaya (1351–1767) and eventually 
Bangkok (f. 1782). While the Thai polities supplanted 
the Khmer Empire as the dominant power on the 
mainland, they also largely absorbed cultural cues from 
the sophisticated Mon and Khmer peoples, which 
subsequently influenced their writing systems, legal 
codes, art forms, political and administrative structures 
and religion. 
Thailand stands apart from all other Southeast Asian 
countries as the only local power never colonised by 
Europeans in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. To a limited extent, this was a direct result of 
intra-European geopolitics. The Kingdom of Siam 
functioned as a neutral buffer state between French 
Indochina and British interests in Burma and Malaya. 
Nevertheless, the country’s two reformist monarchs, 
Mongkut (r. 1851–1868) and his son Chulalongkorn (r. 
1868–1910) were responsible for launching policies 
that ensured Siam’s continued independence and 
political relevance. Mongkut and Chulalongkorn 
skillfully prevented any single foreign interest from 
exercising undue influence on Thai soil by arranging 
trade treaties with as many Western delegations as 
possible. They also sent Thai aristocrats abroad to 
attend European institutions and modernised Siam’s 
infrastructure, military and administrative apparatus. By 
1940, the kingdom possessed state-of-the-art roads, 
canals, railways, shipyards, hospitals, primary and 
secondary schools, a facility for the study of foreign 
languages, a military academy and two universities. 
Modernist reforms in the late nineteenth century and 
early twentieth centuries gave birth to a professional 
Bangkok-based bureaucratic and military elite that 
continues to exert enormous influence on Thai political, 
business and cultural pursuits today. In 1932, elements 
from both the military and bureaucracy, frustrated with 
an ossifying monarchy, staged a bloodless coup and 
penned the country’s first constitution. Thai politics ever 
since have involved a volatile cocktail of bureaucratic 
elites, military strongmen, big business interests, rural 
politicians tied to provincial patronage systems and 
factions controlled by ambitious royals. Modern 
Thailand has experienced twelve successful coup 
d’états, seven failed coup attempts and eighteen 
constitution reforms. King Bhumibol Adulyadej (r. 
1946–) remains the sole constant and unifying force. 
Although the king has few nominal powers, he has 
successfully intervened on several occasions to reign in 
the military and other factions. 
The 1997 financial crisis has significantly coloured Thai 
politics for the last two decades. Throughout the late 
1980s and early 1990s, increased access to global 
markets and a steady stream of cheap foreign credit 
fuelled annual growth rates reaching into the double-
digits, but the bubble popped when market elasticity 
ran out, export prices plummeted and the government 
was forced to float the baht. By the end of 1998, 
thousands of Thai businesses had gone bankrupt and 
the economy had contracted more than 11 per cent. 
The Democrat Party (DP), supported primarily by 
Bangkok’s middle class, attempted to limit future 
speculation by pushing through a new constitution in 
1997 with provisions for strengthened liberal 
institutions, but the collapse of the Thai economy at the 
hands of foreign creditors also brought Thailand’s 
native business conglomerates into the political ring to 
push for protectionist policies.  
The Thai government’s social and developmental 
policies for the last decade have turned on the 
widening political differences between Bangkok’s 
established power brokers and the newly-awakened 
rural electorate. The military, one of several traditional 
power bases, ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
in a 2006 coup following several high-profile scandals. 
Protests and counter protests staged by the largely 
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middle-class anti-Thaksin People’s Alliance for 
Democracy (PAD), or ‘yellow shirts,’ and the working 
class pro-Thaksin National United Front of Democracy 
Against Dictatorship (UDD), or ‘red shirts,’ have 
dominated international headlines ever since his 
removal. Demonstrations erupted in 2008 and 2010 
and following that, at various junctures during the 
tenure of five Prime Ministers including Prime Minister 
Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister who took office 
from 2011 to 2014. On 20 May 2014, following seven 
months of anti-governments protests, the military 
declared martial law and established the National 
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO).  General Prayut 
Chan-o-cha, the head of the military, assumed the 
position of acting Prime Minister two days later. 
Both the DP and the current military administration are 
anxious to rewrite the constitution in order to prevent 
pro-Thaksin factions from dominating future polls. To 
counter the Thaksin political machine, the current junta 
has appointed a Constitutional Drafting Committee 
(CDC) to create a new constitution that will restore 
‘democracy appropriate to Thai society.’ The 
constitution writers will likely propose to limit the 
influence of direct voting and majoritarian politics with 
a strengthened judiciary and an increased number of 
appointed seats in the legislature. Although Prime 
Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha lifted martial law in March 
2015, he continues to wield power through Article 44 of 
the interim constitution and has postponed elections to 
September 2016. Meanwhile, Thailand’s economy grew 
a paltry 0.7 per cent in 2014 and political enemies are 
increasingly prosecuted under the kingdom’s strict lèse-
majesté law. Former Prime Minister Yingluck is on trial 
for civil and criminal charges and faces heavy backlash 
from a botched rice-pledging scheme launched in 
2013. Although Thaksin has urged his followers to 
remain calm, the CDC’s proposals could spark further 
protests originating from the ‘red shirt’ camp.  
Key Challenges  
Lack of a comprehensive government programme to 
combat regional human trafficking organisations  
The U.S. State Department’s 2014 Trafficking in Persons 
Report recently demoted Thailand to the lowest ‘tier 
three’ rating. During the four consecutive years that it 
was on the ‘tier two’ watch list, the Thai government 
consistently failed to address international concerns 
about Thailand’s domestic sex industry and fisheries. 
Thai officials were found to be complicit in the 
smuggling of migrants from neighbouring Laos, 
Myanmar and Cambodia. Men from Thailand, Myanmar 
and Cambodia were at times sold to Thai fishing 
vessels, where they were forced to work 18 to 20-hour 
days, threatened with deportation and beaten. As much 
as 17 per cent of Thai fishery employees reported 
forced work conditions. The report also found that Thai 
police officers were involved in protecting and 
frequenting brothels, massage parlours and other 
venues that were trafficking women and children.  
In 2013, a series of Pulitzer prize-winning investigative 
reports released by Reuters revealed the involvement 
of members of the Royal Thai Navy and immigration 
officials in the sale of Rohingya migrants from Myanmar 
to Thai fishing captains. The government recently 
cracked down on illegal detention centres in the 
country’s south in May 2015, but it failed to organise a 
concerted and compassionate response to large 
numbers of undocumented Myanmar and Bangladeshi 
migrants stranded off its shores. Migrants often cross 
through Thailand en route to find work in Malaysia.  
Marginalised ethnic minorities and a persistent drug 
trade 
Once a major opium producer in the 1970s, Thailand 
has effectively curbed cultivation of poppies through a 
mixture of livelihood training programmes, construction 
of infrastructure in hill regions and crop replacement 
initiatives. However, its porous borders with Myanmar 
and Laos are still key transit points for heroin and 
methamphetamines. In remote hill tribe areas in 
particular, shared ethnicity with smugglers in 
neighbouring countries combined with a lack of local 
educational or economic opportunities has lured 
significant numbers of youth from Akha, Hmong, Htin 
and Yao Hill Tribes into drug trafficking. It is estimated 
that there are approximately 150,000 Hmong residing 
in Thailand. Thai-Hmong face several societal problems. 
One in four youth are involved in drug consumption 
and/or trafficking because the remoteness of their 
villages allows for few other economic opportunities. 
Hmong youth do not have access to adequate 
education, largely because government teachers are 
frequently absent.  
Political violence and separatist movements in the Deep 
South  
Thailand’s southernmost provinces, including Pattani, 
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Narathiwat and Yala, have experienced intermittent 
separatist activity since the 1960s but Thaksin 
Shinawatra’s attempts to side-line political opponents in 
the region has stirred an unprecedented level of 
political violence since 2004. The three provinces are 
home to 1.8 million Muslim ethnic-Malays, who are 
culturally, linguistically and religiously distinct from the 
majority Thai population. As a nominally Buddhist 
monarchy dedicated to ‘king, country and religion,’ the 
Thai polity makes no acknowledgement of cultural or 
religious minorities. Provincial governors are appointed 
by the Ministry of the Interior and are invariably Thai-
speaking Buddhists. Instruction in local government 
schools in the Deep South is also exclusively in Thai.  
In an attempt to transfer power from the army to the 
police, Thaksin dissolved the military-dominated 
Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre 
(SBPAC) in 2004. The SBPAC had coordinated with local 
Islamic groups and dispensed salaries to religious and 
community leaders, but with their pay-outs cut off and 
no clear indication from the government that it was 
willing to devolve local power to Thai-Malay Muslims, 
militant organisations renewed separatist activity. Both 
the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C) and 
the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) have 
raided police and military outposts, detonated 
improvised explosive devices in civilian areas and 
assassinated Muslim community leaders seen to be 
cooperating with the authorities. Between 2004 and 
2012, roughly 6,000 people died in the conflict, half of 
whom were civilians with no links to either the Thai 
government or militant groups. Human rights violations, 
including the use of child soldiers and targeting of 
civilians, have occurred on both sides. Under the 2005 
emergency decree for the region, authorities can hold 
suspects without court warrant for up to 30 days. Local 
civil society organisations have reported several cases 
of torture by the army and police. 
TIMOR-LESTE 
Historical Background 
Timor-Leste, Asia’s newest nation, is located in 
Southeast Asia, on the southernmost edge of the 
Indonesian archipelago. The country was colonised by 
the Portuguese for over 450 years, occupied by the 
Indonesians for 24 years and administered by the 
United Nations for two and a half years. As a nation, 
Timor-Leste has had a very traumatic birth.  
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste was first 
declared on 28 November 1975 when Portugal gave up 
control of its colonial holdings. Nine days after the 
national flag was raised, Indonesia invaded and 
annexed the territory. Throughout the Indonesian 
occupation, Timorese resistance forces led an armed 
struggle against the Indonesian army for the restoration 
of national independence. This resulted in a protracted 
and bloody 24-year conflict during which an estimated 
102,000 Timorese died, amidst a backdrop of arbitrary 
detention, torture, forced displacement and gender-
based violence. In August 1999, within the context of 
the Asian economic crisis, Indonesia proposed a 
referendum to offer the Timorese a choice between 
autonomy and independence. 78.5 per cent of the 
population voted for independence from Indonesia. 
The announcement of the voting results was followed 
by a surge of violence and destruction on the part of 
anti-independence militias. In the end, thousands of 
Timorese were killed or injured, and more than 500,000 
were displaced.  
In September 1999, the UN Security Council authorised 
an Australian-led International Force to restore peace 
and security under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. A UN 
Transitional Administration was established to 
administer the territory, with the mandate to build a 
state from scratch. Despite the presence of 
peacekeepers, ongoing violence against journalists, 
peacekeepers and civilians continued throughout 2000. 
Humanitarian agencies involved themselves in relief 
efforts, protection and distribution of food to the 
displaced and monitored human rights violations. A 
transitional government was formed in 2001, and in 
August of that year, thousands of voters in East Timor 
turned out to vote for the 88 members of the 
constituent assembly and established the country's first 
parliament. In April 2002, independence leader Kay 
Rala ‘Xanana’ Gusmao won the presidency by a 
landslide victory, becoming Timor-Leste's first 
president. The government drew up a national 
development strategy and plan, including the formation 
of a police force from an amalgamation of young 
recruits and Timorese who had previously served in the 
Indonesian police. A new defence force was also 
formed, half of which comprised those who had been 
in armed resistance. The United Nations Development 
Programme assumed principal responsibility for the 
judiciary and law-making. 
From the standpoint of humanitarian aid and 
international support, a second phase of reconstruction 
and development followed and efforts were focused on 
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poverty reduction, water and sanitation provision, 
vocational skills training, education, health and literacy 
promotion. Security remained precarious, even while 
the UN started winding down its presence in 2005. 
Tensions between the police and neglected armed 
forces precipitated a new conflict that resulted in an 
outbreak of gang violence in 2006. Prime Minister 
Alkatiri’s decision to sack more than 500 from the 
military prompted demonstrations and tensions took on 
an ethno-political character. Accusations were hurled at 
westerners (those living in the west part of the country) 
in Timor-Leste for not contributing to the fight for 
independence as much as the easterners had. 150,000 
Timorese (15 per cent of the population then) had to 
seek refuge in makeshift camps. Both the police and 
military, the two public institutions tasked with 
providing security, perpetrated rampant crime and 
lawlessness. This prompted the United Nations Security 
Council to set up a new peacekeeping force to restore 
stability. In February 2008, a rebel group staged an 
unsuccessful attack against President Jose Ramos-
Horta, a well-respected leader of the Timorese 
resistance who was also recipient of the 1996 Nobel 
Peace Prize. The ringleader, Major Alfredo Reinado was 
killed in the attack and the majority of the rebels 
surrendered to the government in April 2008.  
The 2006 civil unrest revealed deep-seated social, 
economic and governance challenges that lay beneath 
the surface of Timorese society since independence, 
problems such as the high number of rural and urban 
unemployed, inadequate infrastructure, rapid 
population growth, weak public sector, limited service 
capacity, fragile state institutions and weak governance. 
The crisis also set Timor-Leste back by several decades. 
Post-2006, the government has taken measures to 
resettle the people, reconstruct the economy and 
stabilise the nation. The early adoption of prudent fiscal 
and monetary policies contributed to low inflation and 
accelerating economic growth. While the country's 
large petroleum wealth offers the potential for a 
prosperous future, Timor-Leste remains one of the least 
developed countries in the world, with about 50 per 
cent of the population still living in poverty.  
Key Challenges  
A fragmented system of authority  
Post-2006, the path towards national development and 
restoration has not been a smooth one for the 
government. While good policies have been 
established, there remains an implementation gap due 
to Timor-Leste’s checkered past, the presence of multi-
state and non-state actors as well as the multi-ethnic 
and multi-linguistic nature of the population. While the 
plan was to train the Timorese to run a self-sufficient 
government, during the UN Administration, the success 
of skills transfer and capacity development was limited. 
The government remained dependent on foreign 
advice and assistance for many of the tasks of 
administration, particularly at senior levels. To many 
within the Timorese community, foreign intervention 
and help were often levied at the expense of local 
knowledge and practices. That non-state Timorese 
parties were not included led to the Timorese having 
difficulty in accepting some internationally-led 
interventions. There exists a rift between decision 
makers and the community due mainly to the clash 
between old and new value systems. The new system 
uses the structures adopted with international help 
while the old system relies on local and community 
leaders to determine the rule of law.  
For many who had given their lives to decades of 
resistance and fighting for independence, the struggle 
is not over. Veterans of the resistance want recognition 
and compensation for past efforts and sacrifices. They 
question the current constitutional order, and their 
rallying call is for ‘real independence’ - a call that is 
often linked to demands for the withdrawal of the UN or 
former anti-independence politicians from government. 
With the veterans, there have also been expressions of 
disappointment with a post-conflict settlement that did 
not live up to their high expectations of independence, 
which was meant to usher in a new era of plenty and 
equality. The newly-formed national armed forces (F-
FDTL) conceives itself as the mantle-bearer of the 
FALINTIL, or the military wing of the independence 
party FRETILIN and perpetuates the language of 
continuous struggle. Like many of the non-state groups, 
it draws upon the legacy of the struggle to claim for 
itself a special role in developing the future of the 
nation.  
A weak social compact  
It has been observed that following the struggle for 
independence, a technocratic approach to building the 
structures of state overshadowed the need for unifying 
approaches to reconciliation and the creation of a 
sense of citizenship among the Timorese. The principal 
driver of national unity was the resistance during 
Indonesian occupation. That sense of unity flagged 
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after independence was restored. The influx of 
international aid workers and relief agencies post-1999 
changed the dynamics for the Timorese. While 
international relief and development work was 
important to build a nation, the downside of it was that 
foreigners came merely to fulfil a function or mission. 
There was little interaction with the community and 
their lack of interest and time for local history, culture 
and tradition showed. They also perpetuated the 
assumption that the system and institutions that 
function best are those created in the image of those 
dominant in Western countries. In this regard, Western 
aid workers appeared to Timorese to act as the new 
colonisers and invaders. This view is further reinforced 
as many Timorese lived in the remnants of their 
destroyed houses while shops and restaurants catered 
for international expatriates at prices which Timorese 
could not afford, creating a dual economy. The disparity 
is heightened when one considers the sense of betrayal 
felt among many former student activists (now adults) 
who had joined the resistance and who had little 
opportunity for education after independence. These 
adults were forced to return to subsistence farming in 
order to survive, even though some had never farmed 
before. Such tensions within the fledgling nation 
necessarily led to a weak social compact. Ten years 
from independence, the Timorese people still feel their 
government has not delivered. Those who had 
sacrificed themselves in the war had been forgotten, 
there were no attempts to help individual families 
locate loved ones who disappeared during the war, fuel 
prices remain high and there seem to be no signs of 
their economic conditions improving in spite of the oil 
and gas reserves and revenue.  
Contestation of languages and the risk to social capital  
The struggle for nationhood in Timor-Leste can be seen 
as essentially a struggle for the recognition of the 
country’s unique and diverse ethno-cultural identity, 
which is a product of its particular colonial history. The 
nation of Timor-Leste consists of 15 distinct ethno-
linguistic groups which speak at least 16 Austronesian 
and Papuan languages and their sub-varieties. The idea 
that the country’s citizens share one civic identity is 
currently more notional than real. When the declaration 
was made at independence that the Portuguese 
language and culture was part of the identity of the 
Timorese, it created a significant sense of alienation for 
the Indonesian-educated generation. During the 
Indonesian occupation, Portuguese was the language 
of the resistance. The decision to adopt Portuguese 
(rather than English or Bahasa Indonesia) reflected the 
preferences of a political leadership largely educated 
during the Portuguese period. 
The fact, however, remains that at independence, only 
five per cent understood the Portuguese language and 
this was confined to the elites, which meant that the 
majority of Timorese were marginalised from official 
Timorese culture. Even though Tetum was popularised 
as a national language through its use in the Catholic 
Mass during the Indonesian occupation, it was not the 
language of choice due to a relatively unsophisticated 
lexicon. From a sociological standpoint, a common 
language is critical to the relationship between 
government and civil society. Social change requires 
engagement especially within the widespread rural 
community of Timor-Leste. A common language 
ensures that people are included as active citizens, 
rather than excluded as lesser or non- citizens. 
The Timorese leadership’s adoption of the Portuguese 
language has not been comfortably received by either 
the younger generation educated in Indonesian (the 
language of the oppressors) or the majority of the 
Tetum-speaking population who continue to live 
according to traditional values. In realisation of this, 
while the school system has officially adopted a 
Portuguese curriculum at independence, changes are 
underway to ‘indigenise’ parts of the compulsory 
school curriculum and make textbooks more relevant to 
Timor- Leste’s social context. A mother tongue literacy 
agenda is being developed to improve early literacy 
outcomes by teaching the younger grades in local 
Timorese home languages. Efforts have also been 
made to make textbooks available in Tetum at the 
primary level. The contestation of languages will remain 
an issue as Timor-Leste attempts to build social as well 
as economic capital, and the government’s resource-
fulness in handling the issue of language and national 
identity will continue to be tested in the coming years.  
VIETNAM 
Historical Background 
Although most of Southeast Asia is home to religions 
and cultures carrying significant Indic influence, 
Vietnam alone is the mainland’s only Sinicised culture. 
Chinese emperors directly ruled northern Vietnam for 
most of the period spanning 111 BC to 938 AD. The 
next eight hundred years saw a series of independent 
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Vietnamese kingdoms administered by Chinese-style 
mandarins gradually extend control over and supplant 
the Indic Champa civilisation to the south, even as 
French incursions began chipping away at Vietnamese 
territory as early as 1858. By 1884, the French had 
established control over the entire territory which 
included all of present-day Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos. During World War II, Japan took control of French 
Indochina until its defeat in 1945, but France continued 
to rule Vietnam until 1954 when Vietnamese 
Communists or Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh gained 
control of North Vietnam.   On 7 May 1954, after a 57-
day siege, more than 10,000 starving French troops 
surrendered to the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu. This was 
a catastrophic defeat that brought an end to French 
colonialism in Indochina. The following day, 
the Geneva Conference opened to negotiate an end to 
the conflict. Resolutions included an exchange of 
prisoners, the temporary division of Vietnam into two 
zones at the Ben Hai River (near the 17th Parallel) until 
nationwide elections could be held,   the free passage 
of people across the 17th Parallel for a period of 300 
days, and the holding of nationwide elections on 20 
July 1956.  However no elections were held and the 
division of Vietnam became permanent with Ho Chih 
Minh as leader of a communist regime and Ngo Dinh 
Diem still holding power in the south. It wasn’t long 
before South Vietnam was rocked by demonstrations 
and Diem was ousted in a coup in 1963. 
The United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War 
began as early as 1950 when they sent military advisers 
to South Vietnam, gave financial support to the French 
and later the South Vietnamese government. When two 
American ships were allegedly attacked by the North 
Vietnamese in 1964, the Americans began their 
bombing campaign of the north by sending 183,000 
soldiers to prevent further aggression. By the end of 
1967 there were nearly half a million American soldiers 
waging war against the Vietcong or Northern guerillas. 
Even though the Vietcongs launched massive offensives 
in towns and cities across South Vietnam and suffered 
heavy losses, the Americans gradually withdrew from 
Vietnam due to pressure from the Americans on the 
home front who were bombarded by horrific images of 
the war on their television screens and campaigned 
against it. In January 1973 they signed a ceasefire and 
the remaining American troops withdrew. The South 
Vietnamese continued the fight until the early months 
of 1975 when their resistance collapsed and Saigon 
was captured.  Communist victory and reunification of 
the country as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was 
achieved in 1975.  
For over a decade after reunification, Vietnam 
experienced little economic growth because of its 
centra l i sed economic pol ic ies and growing 
international isolation, while Vietnam's 1978 invasion of 
Cambodia resulted in tensions and fighting with China. 
Vietnam began to emerge from international isolation 
after it withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989. 
China re-established full diplomatic ties with Vietnam in 
1991, and a visit to Vietnam by United States President 
Bill Clinton in 2000 was the culmination of the efforts by 
both countries to normalise relations. 
Vietnam’s struggle for independence became the chief 
fixation of American containment policies during the 
height of the Cold War, but the country has managed to 
overcome its reputation as a battlefield since the 
overwhelming success of its manufacturing economy in 
recent years. In spite of slowdowns, Vietnam continues 
to be regarded as a textbook case for the virtues of 
market-oriented reform and its ability to generate rapid 
economic development. With its economy in shambles 
at the end of the Second Indochina War in 1975, 
Vietnam has since risen to become the 57th largest 
economy in the world and the 6th largest in Southeast 
Asia. As recently as 1979, the Vietnamese people 
suffered widespread famine. Today, their country is the 
second largest rice exporter globally. In 2008, the 
World Bank reclassified Vietnam as a ‘lower middle-
income country’ after gross national income per capita 
surpassed US$1,000. 
Liberalisation and subsequent economic growth have 
come to Vietnam through a series of cautious 
piecemeal reforms, many of which are still ongoing. Its 
socialist government flirted with market-oriented 
economics as early as 1979, allowing farmers and SOEs 
to sell surplus stock after meeting government quotas. 
The 1986 Doi Moi reforms formally privatised the 
Vietnamese economy, permitting rice farmers to earn 
up to 40 per cent profits on sales of rice and factory 
workers to earn bonuses and piece-rate wages. 
However, Vietnam’s economy truly took off with the 
explosion of foreign direct investment in the mid-1990s. 
The end of Soviet aid programmes and Vietnam’s 
withdrawal of its military from Cambodia in 1989 paved 
the way for the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo in 
1994, subsequent U.S. approval of International 
Monetary Fund loans and a substantial widening of 
ODA from the U.S. and its allies. In spite of the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis, Vietnam posted on average 7.4 
per cent annual growth between 1992 and 2007. 
Unfortunately, the high growth rate has stalled in recent 
years, revealing cracks and inefficiencies in Vietnam’s 
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‘socialist-oriented market economy.’ Vietnam’s 
accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2007 and 
the liberalisation of stocks and real estate markets that 
p r e c i p i t a t e d i t s m e m b e r s h i p a t t r a c t e d a n 
unprecedented number of foreign transactions using 
the Vietnamese dong. Without an independent central 
bank to enforce monetary policy, inflation rates ran as 
high as 18.7 per cent in 2011. At the same time, growth 
has been sluggish, averaging only 5.7 per cent in the 
last six years. 
Key Challenges  
Remote populations, particularly ethnic minorities, 
overwhelmingly lack access to education and health 
care  
In spite of Vietnam’s increased income levels, remote 
ethnic minority communities have few opportunities for 
economic advancement. The Vietnamese government 
officially recognises 53 distinct minority ethnic groups, 
including Tay, Khmer Krom, Hoa, Nung and Hmong, 
which together make up 14 per cent of the population 
(nearly 13 million people). Approximately half of all 
ethnic minority Vietnamese live below the poverty line. 
Children from these groups may experience difficulty 
travelling to school, or else attend schools with 
undertrained teachers or inadequate facilities. Girls, in 
particular, may be expected to help with household 
chores at the expense of their education. Or, they may 
be married off at an early age, effectively putting an 
end to their studies. Children in Vietnam’s remote 
communities also lack access to basic medical care, 
including vaccinations. Ethnic minority children are 
three times more likely to die before reaching five years 
of age than children from the Vietnamese majority. 
Vietnamese men, women and children continue to be 
vulnerable to traffickers working within Vietnam and on 
the Cambodian and Chinese borders  
In addition to being a destination for child sex tourism, 
Vietnam is also a major source country for forced labour 
and sex trafficking outside its borders. Several of 
Vietnam’s labour export companies, some of which are 
affiliated with SOEs, have at times charged fees in 
excess of legal limits and placed workers in debt 
bondage situations in Japan, Laos, Malaysia, South 
Korea, Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates. Significant 
numbers of Vietnamese women, particularly domestic 
factory workers, have been lured into sex trafficking 
rings in China, Cambodia, Malaysia and Russia, usually 
with offers of foreign manufacturing jobs. China’s 
gender imbalance has also increased demand for 
internationally brokered marriages. Some women, 
having relocated to China, Singapore or South Korea as 
part of such arrangements, have been subjected to 
domestic servitude or forced prostitution. Finally, 
Chinese and Vietnamese crime syndicates have 
facilitated the sale of Vietnamese children to cannabis 
farms in the UK and Denmark. The Vietnamese 
government passed a new anti-trafficking law in 2012 
and defined penalties for violation of the law in 2013. 
However, they have yet to prosecute any offenders 
under the law. Multiple NGOs in Vietnam run 
programmes dedicated to stopping human trafficking 
in and outside the country. These include shelters for 
trafficking victims, awareness campaigns targeting 
vulnerable groups and workshops with immigration 
and border officials. 
Vietnam is among the most extensively mined countries 
in the world, and unexploded ordnances continue to kill 
and maim Vietnamese  
All 63 of Vietnam’s provinces and cities are 
contaminated with unexploded ordnances (UXOs) from 
wars fought with Cambodia, China, France and the 
United States between 1946 and 1989. It is estimated 
that up to 66,000 square kilometres (one-fifth of 
Vietnam’s landmass) contain unexploded cluster 
munitions or active landmines. 2,121 people were 
injured or killed in incidents involving UXOs in 2013, 
and victims’ rights groups estimate that there are 
currently between 66,000 and 100,000 survivors of 
UXOs in Vietnam. In recent years, the Vietnamese 
government has made efforts to expand access to free 
healthcare and physical rehabilitation for UXO 
survivors, having established the Vietnam Federation on 
Disability to coordinate victims’ assistance programmes 
in 2011. However, the government alone is currently 
unable to shoulder the massive costs associated with 
UXO disposal, UXO awareness campaigns and victim 
support and rehabilitation. At the time of this writing, 
the Ministry of National Defence oversees mine 
removal in coordination with select INGOs and social 
enterprises. VUFO-NGO Resource Centre has also 
convened a working group on UXO disposal.  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CHAPTER THREE 
CHALLENGES FACED BY CIVIL SOCIETY 
ORGANISATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
This chapter discusses insights gleaned from interviews 
and conversations with leaders in business, civic 
organisations and government in each of the Southeast 
Asian countries. It focuses chiefly on the challenges 
faced by civil society organisations (CSOs) as they seek 
to make societal impact. 
Dilemmas faced by Local Civil Society Organisations 
(CSOs) due to Politicisation & Bureaucracy 
In some Southeast Asian countries, local civil society 
organisations are divided along political lines and 
participation in civil society organisation programmes 
can be construed as a political statement. In Myanmar, 
for instance, the previous military government’s policies 
between 1988 and 2011 have left the country divided 
in two, often bitterly, between supporters of the ruling 
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD. There is a discernible lack of 
trust between the government and certain civil society 
groups, with several CSOs providing social services to 
the opposition, as opposition members are reluctant to 
use government services. The Free Funeral Service 
Society (FFSS), headquartered in North Dagon, began 
as a charity providing free mortuary services. FFSS and 
its founders have received significant political attention 
from both Aung San Suu Kyi and pro-sanction American 
politicians such as John McCain. Today FFSS provides a 
range of social services independent of the 
government, including a school, a clinic, ambulances 
and garbage disposal trucks. The Myanmar community 
who are unable or unwilling to utilise government 
services due to their affiliation with the opposition often 
choose to utilise FFSS services in lieu. On the other 
hand, the government has also grown its own pool of 
CSOs, often headed by retired government officials. 
They tend to criticise rival civil society efforts as 
‘redundant’ and discourage outsiders from engaging 
with CSOs that had originated outside of the 
government.  
In Thailand, civil society groups have also not been 
immune to the increasing politicisation of Thai society 
in the post-Thaksin era. The relatively permissive 
environment of the 1990s prior to the crisis had allowed 
for the formation of two distinct groups of CSOs, which 
today espouse two very different philosophies of 
development. The first group, made up primarily of 
urban activists, initially lobbied for increased rule of law, 
transparency and liberal institutions that provided 
checks against executive power. The second group 
consisted of grassroots organisations representing rural 
farmers that protested against bread-and-butter issues 
such as access to water and falling crop prices. 
Members of the former group have tended to support 
Democrat Party (DP) candidates and policies, 
participate in anti-Thaksin ‘yellow shirt’ protests and 
support an overhaul of the current constitution. The 
latter formed the basis of many pro-Thaksin ‘red shirt’ 
organisations and are staunch supporters of Pheu Thai 
Party rural development programmes.  
Rural activism and support for government subsidy 
programmes largely stems from Thailand’s vastly 
unequal distribution of wealth. Thailand’s poor are 
concentrated in provinces in the north and east, which 
also double as ‘red shirt’ strongholds. The average 
incomes in these regions are up to 60 per cent less than 
commensurate salaries in the capital. In a bid to 
stimulate rural growth after his election in 2001, Thaksin 
established government funds that provided 
microcredit to farmers and launched a sweeping 
infrastructure overhaul in the countryside. His 
government programmes also subsumed many of the 
functions of groups of CSOs. ‘Red shirt’ activism post-
Thaksin has largely consisted of securing government 
subsidies and cash stimulus in lieu of development 
programmes funded by donors. Although they remain 
popular in the countryside, some of these programmes 
have gone terribly wrong. Former Prime Minister 
Yingluck currently faces criminal charges for a 
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controversial rice subsidy scheme that bought rice from 
farmers at above market rates. Government losses were 
estimated at THB 600 billion (US $18 billion). 
In place of large-scale fiscal stimulation and 
government subsidies, the DP and the royal family have 
favoured small-scale development programmes that 
promote sustainability, self-sufficiency and livelihood 
training for rural communities. After the 1997 crisis, 
King Bhumibol began to espouse a philosophy of 
‘sufficiency economy’ (settakit po piang) that 
emphasised traditional piety and moderation. Rural 
initiatives created by the Royal Projects Foundation and 
the Mae Fah Luang Foundation have tended towards 
teaching rural communities sustainable agricultural 
methods, crafts and (most recently) social enterprise. 
The DP government of Abhisit Vejjajiva also established 
a Thai Social Enterprise Office to provide funding and 
training to social businesses in 2010. However, it is not 
clear if these small-scale programmes can meet the 
aspirations of rural farmers. Few farmers graduating 
from Royal Projects programmes have adopted their 
techniques and the above initiatives are largely under 
the purview of the Bangkok-based middle class. 
In other Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, 
CSOs face significant hurdles in mustering the 
resources necessary to fulfil governance and reporting 
requirements or to apply for international grants. As the 
civil society sector becomes more professionalised, 
proper accounting methods will become more and 
more vital if CSOs wish to have access to new funding 
sources. International grants often contain complex 
reporting requirements, and application is increasingly 
by invitation only. Like corporations, Indonesian CSOs, 
for instance, receive no tangible financial benefits, such 
as tax exemptions, when they register with the 
government. At the same time, they must expend 
significant resources on professional accounting 
procedures and government fees in order to meet 
registration requirements. Even large yayasans or 
foundations interviewed were unable to comply with 
government audits without in-kind donations from 
multinational accounting firms. Small organisations are 
simply unable to field the resources necessary to 
uphold rigorous accounting practices or conduct 
audits. It is not surprising that only 15 per cent of 
Indonesian yayasans are registered under the current 
laws. Additionally, donors are often unwilling to provide 
funds for ‘back-end’ administration costs including 
salaries for grant writers and accountants. Private-sector 
companies may a lso v iew corporate soc ia l 
responsibility (CSR) as cheap public relations and 
earmark their donations for ‘front-end’ programmes. 
For this reason, administration staff at small CSOs often 
perform double or triple duty as accountants, grant 
writers and public relations representatives. A 
substantial number are volunteers. Besides obvious 
governance issues, such practices present significant 
obstructions to raising the efficiency and overall 
effectiveness of CSOs.  
While the monitoring and evaluation procedures 
attached to international grants stifle innovative 
solutions, they also encourage NGOs to incorporate 
more sustainable practices. Much of the aid 
Cambodians receive from foreign donors and their 
local affiliates does not target the root causes of the 
country’s problems. Dollars from international 
foundations often come with strict monitoring and 
evaluation requirements that effectively bar them from 
being used in experimental aid programmes. New 
approaches that fail to deliver results could potentially 
give foreign philanthropic foundations reason to pull 
annual funding from an NGO.  
Many NGOs are aiming to procure more ‘unrestricted’ 
funds, which can be spent as the NGO sees fit. While 
maintaining their current donor funding for tried-and-
true programmes, several non-profit organisations are 
now attempting to fund the expansion of experimental 
programmes with self-sustaining social businesses, 
which we will discuss later in this chapter. 
Tenuous Relationship between Civil Society and 
Government  
In a number of Southeast Asian countries, business and 
civil society sectors are often unwilling or reluctant to 
form partnerships with the government. There is a 
distinct lack of trust between government and other 
sectors. In Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos, both 
corporations and CSOs tend to lie low lest they attract 
unneeded attention, bullying and attempts at graft from 
government offices. Indonesian business and civil 
society leaders are generally unwilling to speak 
candidly at forums attended by government officials, 
and even when government help is sought, dealings 
can be difficult and frustrating. Working relationships 
with civil servants are painstakingly cultivated but often 
cut short when officials are rotated out. Licensing 
procedures are so convoluted that organisations often 
hire consultants who specialise in filling out 
government paperwork.  
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Additionally, there is a sentiment among many 
Indonesian minority communities, such as Christians 
and Chinese that the government has not designed 
policies and programmes to suit their needs. As such, 
these communities have constructed their own 
networks, schools and institutions outside the 
government framework, which they see as unhelpful 
and obstructive. Minority-based organisations, in 
particular, have tended to focus on creating private-civil 
society partnerships to the exclusion of the 
government.  
Constraints faced by Non-government Organisations 
(NGOs)  
Tapping the same small pool 
Bruneian civil society is in a unique position as the 
country has a strong welfare system. The needy and 
elderly receive monthly allowances from the 
government of up to B$250 a month. Financial help, in 
cases of disasters like flood or fire, has even been 
signed off personally by the Sultan. The Sultan has also 
embarked on projects to provide new apartments for 
citizens living in Kampong Ayer (Brunei’s Water Village) 
whose boathouses were ravaged by fire. In recent years, 
small welfare groups and NGOs have emerged whose 
founders are retired senior government officials or 
young working adults who have been educated 
abroad. These founders have decided that they would 
like to contribute to building their community. Engaged 
in areas such as care for the elderly or disabled, special 
needs children and environmental protection, these 
NGO leaders seek to fill the gap where government 
efforts have not been deemed adequate. Their 
emergence could be due to a few factors: a greater 
awareness of more complex needs in the community, 
higher expectations on the part of the less fortunate 
and a civil service which has not been very responsive 
to the plight of the needy. To support their work, the 
NGO leaders, have, in the first instance, sought funding 
from the government. When the government is 
reluctant to fund their projects, their recourse is then to 
go to corporate organisations such as the banks or 
companies involved in oil and gas for sponsorship. As 
the pool of donors within the Bruneian community is 
small, and because there are not many MNCs, 
businesses nor rich individuals outside the royal family 
in Brunei, they have not been able to expand or scale 
up their efforts. Pusat Ehsan, the largest NGO in Brunei 
which looks into the needs of the disabled was started 
under the patronage of Hajah Mariam, the second wife 
of the Sultan whom he has since divorced. Apart from 
Pusat Ehsan, no other NGO has had the privilege of 
royal patronage. Again, without patronage or 
philanthropy, the strategies adopted by the social 
welfare groups have been fairly similar and restricted to 
bazaars, charity run or golf and sale of products. Social 
enterprises are non-existent in Brunei mainly because 
of the small population size and a fairly conservative 
and homogenous culture.  
Reliance on patronage 
Malaysia is an upper-middle income economy but 
poverty is still visible and there are an estimated 1500 
homeless persons in the capital, Kuala Lumpur. 
Government agencies and policies are not always 
comprehensive enough to provide aid to all of those in 
need. Indigenous peoples and refugees are not always 
included in government services. Therefore, many of 
the city’s NGOs provide basic social services such as 
healthcare, food hand-outs, foster care for children, and 
documentation and legal services for them. Patronage 
appears to be essential to the success of civil society 
organsiations (CSOs) in Malaysia. Many Malaysian 
NGOs have a Dato or Datin who is the public face of 
the organisation, but generally does not participate in 
its daily operations. The existence of such patrons is 
necessary for obtaining sustained government support 
in the form of grants or authorisation for projects (which 
could otherwise be stalled indefinitely due to 
bureaucratic obstacles). One corporate foundation 
professional opined that NGOs are likely to fail without 
patronage, even if they have adequate funding and 
other forms of support. An influential figure is key for an 
organisation to achieve and sustain momentum. Having 
an influential figure attached to an organisation is 
helpful for fundraising as well. An active philanthropist 
disclosed that her wealthy friends rely on her for 
direction as to where to make charitable donations and 
are especially likely to give to projects in which she is 
involved. 
Reputational risks and constraints due to politics 
In the Philippines, Benigno Aquino III rode to 
nationwide victory largely on an anti-corruption 
platform endorsed by middle-class voters occupying 
the professional and bureaucratic sectors of Metro 
Manila, Cebu City, Davao and other major urban 
centres. These same voters demanded the dismantling 
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of the culture of provincial patronage, clienteles and 
hand-outs practised between rural politicians and their 
electorates. In past elections, politicians have promised 
rice subsidies, tax breaks and cash grants to poor rural 
Filipinos in return for votes. Recent corruption scandals 
involving government development funds have 
severely compromised public perceptions of NGOs 
and their ability to solve development issues. In 
response, the resurgent middle class has included 
publicly-funded or administered social programmes in 
its assault against what it perceives as corruption and 
government waste.  
The Public Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) 
scandal dealt an enormous blow to public perception 
of civil society in the Philippines. The PDAF was a 
discretionary fund originally intended to support small-
scale or community infrastructure projects. In July 2013, 
businesswoman Janet Lim-Napoles and several 
members of Congress, including members of Aquino’s 
Liberal party, were accused of funnelling over 10 million 
PHP in discretionary PDAF funds into NGOs under their 
control for ersatz development initiatives. The resulting 
backlash from middle-class demonstrators spurred the 
government to freeze the PDAF funds and institute a 
formal system of certification under an independent 
body - the Philippines Council for NGO Certification 
(PCNC). The PDAF scandal has had significant 
repercussions for the social sector and its future 
approach to development issues. After the scandal 
broke, the government chose to shelve its planned 250 
million PHP ‘empowerment fund,’ which would have 
provided human capacity development and skills 
training for NGO personnel. More generally, the PDAF 
scandal has stigmatised the thousands of legitimate 
NGOs in the country. Philippine civil society 
organisations and NGOs attracted worldwide attention 
in 1986 when they brought the decades-old Marcos 
regime to its knees. However, Filipino civil society is 
currently struggling under the newly-imposed 
certification procedures. Of the 250,000 registered civil 
society organisations in the Philippines, only 350 to 400 
are currently PCNC certified. Without certification, 
NGOs must pay up to a 42 per cent levy on charitable 
donations. NGOs without certification invite further 
stigma and struggle to find donors to fund 
programmes and organisational costs, including the 
certification process itself. Government-administered 
social programmes have also suffered from the PDAF 
scandal fallout. Middle-class critics had expressed 
concern in the past concerning these programmes, but 
have since intensified their calls to cut government 
efforts aimed at the bottom of the pyramid. For 
instance, the Arroyo administration launched the 
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (PPPP) in 2008 to 
provide supplemental income in the form of 
conditional cash transfers (CCTs) to poor Filipinos living 
in Geographically Isolated and Disadvantaged Areas 
(GIDA). Beneficiaries only received funds if they sent 
their children to school and attended monthly family 
development sessions. By 2013, the Aquino 
government had expanded PPPP to benefit 3.93 million 
households. In spite of statements from the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank defending the 
programme, critics have increasingly maintained that 
CCTs perpetuate a culture of dependency and ‘hand 
out’ mentality. In its place, they have proposed that the 
government invest in livelihood training programmes 
and social enterprise. 
In spite of piecemeal liberalisation of the economy, the 
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) maintains a tight 
level of control on activities in the country. In theory, the 
VCP represents the workers and farmers of Vietnam and 
holds a monopoly on civil society through various party 
instruments, such as the Farmers’ Union, Youth Union 
and Women’s Union. Furthermore, the role of civil 
society in mobilising political demonstrations in other 
Southeast Asian countries, such as Malaysia and the 
Philippines, has provided the party with the rationale to 
keep NGOs under strict regulations. In practice, this 
means that the government has created few means for 
local NGOs, even those with apolitical agendas, to 
register with them. Decrees 177 and 148 allow for the 
establishment of social and charity funds, but these 
require substantial backing from the government in 
order to receive permits. Most organisations registered 
under the above two decrees are chaired by former 
government officials or VCP members. Local NGOs 
without access to political elites have registered as 
‘Science and Technology Organisations’ under Decree 
35. However, the latter designation does not entitle 
NGOs or their donors to tax breaks. Registration for 
Science and Technology Organisations must be 
renewed every three months at both the central and 
local levels. This short time window hampers long-term 
projects and provides opportunities for government 
officials to demand ‘co-ordination fees’ or otherwise 
obstruct operations under the pretence of political 
stability. The government also reserves the right to 
cancel events deemed politically liable. Several NGOs 
interviewed reported that government offices had 
cancelled events as little as 12 hours before scheduled. 
The presence of multiple government offices, all of 
which must give their approval, exacerbates the 
problem. International NGOs, whose permits are 
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handled by the People’s Aid Coordination Committee 
(PACCOM), have encountered similar issues with 
government approval. Interviewees had only positive 
things to say about PACCOM’s registration procedures, 
but added that local offices must approve INGO 
funding to local NGOs. Decree 93 stipulates that all 
foreign funding must be approved before it can be 
dispersed, and approval itself may take up to six 
months. Because INGOs and aid agencies often 
execute development programmes through local NGO 
partners, they experience (albeit indirectly) many of the 
same delays and harassment reported by local NGOs. 
Budgeting for lengthy approval times may be feasible 
for large projects, but it effectively kills smaller projects. 
Limits to impact 
Cambodia is trapped in a cycle of dependency, but 
foreign aid workers are becoming increasingly 
unwelcome in Phnom Penh. There are currently more 
than 3 ,500 NGOs in Cambodia , many wi th 
headquarters in Phnom Penh. This means there is one 
NGO per every 10,000 Cambodians, the second-
highest number of NGOs per capita globally after 
Rwanda. One corporate professional interviewed went 
as far as to refer to Phnom Penh as ‘NGO City.’ 
International NGOs provide education and healthcare 
in lieu of governments that are unable to offer basic 
services to large swathes of their populations. However, 
services funded or subsidised by outside money should 
by no means become permanent solutions. Without 
adequate build-operate-transfer (BOT) models in 
practice in Cambodia, there are no incentives for the 
government (and no opportunities for local businesses) 
to replace foreign organisations. Cambodian NGOs are 
often focused on meeting the basic needs of the 
bottom twenty per cent of the population. As one 
corporate professional put it, ‘NGOs are only focused 
on the lower classes. They only meet basic needs 
without actually developing the country.’ In order for 
foreign aid organisations to complete their mission and 
exit, it is also necessary that they develop and train a 
generation of Cambodian professionals who can grow 
their country’s economy, man a robust and effective 
government and provide social services supported by 
domestic funds. 
Reduction in philanthropic contributions 
In the years following the World Bank’s 2008 
designation of Vietnam as a ‘lower middle income’ 
country, international foundations and overseas 
development agencies have begun to reevaluate their 
aid strategies. The 2008 financial crisis seriously 
damaged the endowments of several international 
philanthropic organisations. After losing nearly one-
third of its assets, the Ford Foundation made the 
strategic decision to shut its Hanoi office in 2009 and 
significantly reduce programme support to rural 
poverty initiatives in Vietnam. Ford Foundation grants in 
2007 comprised 80 per cent of total American 
philanthropic grant dollars to Vietnam. Major 
development agencies have also indicated their 
intention to reduce aid dollars to Vietnam, with the 
Australian, Canadian, Danish, Swedish and American 
governments each reporting reductions or withdrawals 
within the next five years. The British ambassador to 
Vietnam announced in March 2011 that the UK’s 
Department for International Development would cut 
aid to 16 middle-income countries, including Vietnam, 
and ‘re-focus’ support to 26 least developed countries. 
For the time being, total ODA to Vietnam continues to 
grow, having risen from US$2.94 billion in 2010 to US
$4.12 billion in 2012, but development agencies have 
largely shifted programme funding away from poverty 
reduction in favour of environmental, governance and 
human rights initiatives. Vietnamese CSOs traditionally 
involved in poverty reduction work reported that they 
have struggled to secure funding from international 
sources in the last 7 years. 12.5 per cent of Vietnamese 
in 2012 lived on less than US$2 per day, and there 
remain significant numbers of urban and rural poor, 
including ethnic minorities, with few opportunities to 
escape the poverty cycle. In order to fill the looming 
gap left by major international donors, Vietnamese 
CSOs will have to increasingly secure funding from 
local sources. 
The Rise of Social Entrepreneurship 
Youth are drawn to social entrepreneurship  
New generations in Southeast Asia are increasingly 
involved in the social sector, especially through social 
enterprise. For privileged individuals with influential 
positions in Malaysia, usually identified by Malay 
honorific titles, and youth in Indonesia with wealthy 
parents, contributing to society is a way of ‘saving face.’ 
Their social projects are often supplemented by a 
traditional, often family-owned, business. This practice 
is indicative of a larger and growing trend among 
millennials, especially those educated abroad who are 
not satisfied with corporate careers as were past 
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generations. They instead strive for a career that serves 
society in addition to their own needs, which often 
centres on a sense of ownership. The social enterprise 
is a more appealing model to serve this dual purpose 
than NGOs that offer notoriously low compensation.  
In recent years, higher standards of living and changing 
social norms have also made it increasingly popular for 
young Thais to pursue riskier careers with social 
enterprises or impact investment firms. According to 
one interviewee, current tertiary students and young 
professionals are looking for purpose above pay. In 
2014, Thammasat University tapped into this demand 
when it established a ‘Global Studies and Social 
Entrepreneurship’ degree. Students enrolled in the 
programme learn human-centred design principles, 
problem recognition, design thinking, business 
planning and financial management. However, one of 
the chief challenges the programme faces is the severe 
cultural disconnect between urban students and the 
rural poor they aim to assist. Students in the 
programme are invariably privileged children of the 
middle-class or political elites. As discussed above, 
social enterprise and sustainability initiatives that 
patronise rural farmers can backfire and fail to achieve 
the key objective of raising standards of living in 
remote areas or among marginalised groups. In spite of 
well-developed problem solving skills and business 
acumen, middle-class urban development profess-
ionals face a high risk of misinterpreting the needs of 
rural residents.  
With increased domestic incomes and external funding 
drying up, locally-driven social enterprises are now a 
viable possibility in Vietnam. Business models can 
provide the social sector with viable alternatives to 
external funding, especially as Vietnam opens itself to 
new consumer markets. Since the 1986 Doi Moi 
reforms, the Vietnamese have increasingly turned to 
entrepreneurial activities as their primary means of 
income. According to the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, 208,009 new small-medium enterprises 
registered with the government between 2007 and 
2009. Although they only represent a fraction of 
Vietnam’s start-up scene, social entrepreneurs in both 
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) have pioneered 
business models that provide vocational training, 
healthcare and sustainable livelihoods for Vietnam’s 
poor as an alternative to traditional grant-based aid. A 
2011 study commissioned by the British Council noted 
nearly 200 social enterprises in Vietnam. 
Vietnamese social enterprises currently focus on tourist 
markets for handicraft goods and hospitality services. 
Prominent examples include Mekong Quilts, which 
provides raw textiles and distribution services to rural 
weavers, and Know One Teach One (KOTO), which 
employs and trains street youth as hospitality staff. 
However, increasing domestic incomes, especially in 
urban areas, will create new opportunities in the 
upcoming years for social enterprises to sell products 
directly to the Vietnamese. Vietnam’s relatively stable 
technological infrastructure provides additional 
opportunities for social entrepreneurs to employ web 
and mobile-based applications to address the country’s 
social and environmental challenges. Vietnam’s Internet 
broadband capacity (360 Gbps), although lagging 
behind Thailand (463 Gbps) and Malaysia (400 Gbps), 
is significantly stronger than neighbouring Cambodia 
(11 Gbps) and Laos (2.5 Gbps). Startup incubators, such 
as Hanoi-based Hatch! have sponsored networking 
events and ‘hackathons’ to bring social sector workers 
together with technology entrepreneurs. Charity Map, a 
Vietnamese crowdfunding website dedicated to social 
causes, raised over US$50,000 online between 2013 
and 2014. Vietnam also has more mobile phone 
subscriptions (135 million) than inhabitants (90.8 
million). 
Social enterprises have been enormously successful in 
the United States and Europe at providing sustainable 
solutions to social problems, but the sector is still in its 
infancy in Vietnam and Southeast Asia at large. One 
Vietnamese social enterprise interviewed had cleared 
US$1.3 million in sales in 2012, but this is only a fraction 
of the billions of dollars in ODA that flow into the 
country each year. Business models are also vulnerable 
to the vagaries of the market. Vietnam has experienced 
widespread inflation in the past seven years, and small 
commercial firms - let alone social enterprises - have 
had significant trouble staying afloat. Vietnamese social 
entrepreneurs are not in a position at the moment to 
‘take over’ from traditional grant-based NGOs. Before 
foreign aid dries up, Vietnam will require a significant 
expansion of the social enterprise sector, including 
increased donor matching, a larger pool of human 
capital and streamlined registration procedures.  
Social enterprises may be more acceptable than NGOs 
to some governments 
Vietnam’s government has strict measures in place to 
control civil society, but enterprises, including social 
enterprises, experience less friction with the 
government. Vietnam recently passed a new enterprise 
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law in 2005 that allows for social enterprises to register 
as commercial businesses. Social enterprises that 
register as businesses face fewer registration hurdles 
than those that register with the Ministry of Science and 
Technology. However, funders of social enterprises 
registered as businesses are not currently entitled to 
any tax breaks. For the past seven years, Centre for 
Social Initiatives Promotion (CSIP), a leading Vietnam-
based NGO, has been lobbying for such a designation. 
PACCOM estimates that the Vietnamese National 
Assembly will draft a separate social enterprise law with 
corresponding tax incentives within the next two to 
three years. Because they are profit-making businesses 
at their core, social enterprises do not pose the same 
challenge to the government as civil society groups.  
Emerging market for local products  
Southeast Asia has an increasingly socially and 
environmentally-conscious consumer base willing to 
pay a premium for local products sold by social 
businesses. The Manila public is well versed in the 
social and environmental challenges facing their 
country, and social enterprises are able to exploit these 
sentiments to sustain sales in spite of increased costs 
carried by consumers. Social enterprises interviewed 
during the Metro Manila Country Insights Lab (CIL) 
reported that the social enterprise label increased sales 
among Manila’s savvy middle class. Markets selling 
local eco-conscious produce and showrooms 
displaying socially-conscious handicrafts are becoming 
increasingly commonplace in the capital. Because 
social enterprise products are manufactured locally, 
they also play to current nationalist sentiments among 
the middle class.  
Recent survey results published by market research firm 
Nielsen reported that 63 per cent of Asian consumers - 
more than on any other continent were willing to pay 
extra for products or services from countries with 
positive social or environmental impact. For middle-
income countries such as the Philippines, middle and 
upper class segments of society are becoming 
financially secure enough to pay these premiums. One 
social enterprise and eco-tour operator interviewed in 
Manila, for instance, reported that more than 50 per 
cent of its customers were local Filipinos. This stands in 
stark constrast to Southeast Asian countries with low 
development indicators, such as Cambodia and 
Myanmar where social enterprise sales are primarily 
generated by foreign tourists or expatriates.  
The Needs of Social Entrepreneurs 
Social entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia find they need 
revenue streams to survive 
Social entrepreneurs often focus more on social impact 
than on a viable business model. Social enterprises in 
Southeast Asia are not always the primary source of 
income for their founders. Either the founders continue 
in their full-time positions in the private sector 
alongside their social enterprise or they are 
independently wealthy. Therefore, although social 
enterprises are meant to be profit-yielding, this is not 
the emphasis for these founders. Several people in the 
social enterprise sphere have reported that founders 
often refuse to accept failures. These businesses are 
their ‘passion projects’ and often are not measured 
against the same standards used for traditional 
businesses. In fact, social enterprise founders often use 
another income stream, such as their personal funds or 
government grants, to keep these ventures afloat.  
Lack of managerial and business skills hampers the 
growth of a social enterprise 
In the transition from NGO to social enterprise, a 
mismatch appears between the skills of current social 
sector professionals and those necessary for social 
enterprise. As a result of decreased international 
funding, NGOs are seeking to restructure and become 
more sustainable. This often means converting to 
become a social enterprise, a model which, as 
previously stated, has recently been highly propagated 
by some governments. However, human resources 
issues have arisen with this transition. First, many social 
entrepreneurs complained about the lack of profess-
ionals with business and management skills available 
for hire. Second, full-time staff retention is a problem as 
the working conditions and salaries offered by social 
enterprises are not able to match those of established 
enterprises.  
In Vietnam, the increasing role of social enterprise and 
impact investing is raising demand for business 
management and leadership skills. The shift away from 
foreign-funded grants and aid towards locally managed 
social impact programmes is placing an increasing level 
of responsibility in the hands of Vietnamese civil society 
workers. Social entrepreneurs potentially have access to 
millions of dollars via impact investors, but without 
adequate business skills, they will be unable to meet 
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expected returns. In order to fully leverage investor 
interest, social entrepreneurs, most of whom do not 
have business backgrounds, will require training in 
financial management, sales, marketing and business 
planning.  
Social entrepreneurs will also need to be able to think 
creatively if they are going to formulate innovative 
solutions for Vietnam’s social and environmental 
problems. For the past two decades, Vietnamese civil 
society organisations have largely limited themselves to 
executing programmes and agendas designed by well-
funded international organisations, leaving few locals 
with any leadership experience. However, the recent 
shift towards locally-driven organisations places the 
onus of initiating and designing programmes on local 
CSOs. As they transition from passive implementers to 
active innovators, Vietnamese CSO personnel will 
require additional leadership skills, such as systems 
thinking and problem solving. By nature, social 
enterprises face steeper challenges than commercial 
businesses. Social enterprises that employ the disabled 
or disenfranchised will require innovative and well-
trained HR managers to compensate for expected 
productivity losses. Social entrepreneurs working in 
remote regions will have to design creative solutions to 
minimise deficits in distribution chains and road 
infrastructure.  
Vietnamese CSOs are still forced to send staff abroad 
for extended training, thereby losing precious human 
resources. However, there are an increasing number of 
local centres providing business management and 
social innovation training. CSIP, the Spark Centre and 
Hatch! each runs one or more programmes dedicated 
to business skills, information technology, accounting 
or legal procedures. Impact investors, including IIX Asia, 
LGT Venture Philanthropy, Lotus Impact Fund and Unitus 
Capital, also conduct their own business consulting to 
bring social enterprises up to an acceptable level of 
returns for investors.  
Language barriers impede the skills transfer for social 
entrepreneurs 
The imparting of skill sets from foreign organisations to 
local (often rural) entrepreneurs in need of training is 
often hampered by language barriers. To overcome this 
issue, several organisations have instituted training of 
trainers (ToT) programmes. For instance, Oxfam Novib 
currently plans to train 35 bilingual consultants over 
four to six months as part of its inclusive impact 
investment fund. These consultants will in turn mentor 
rural small and medium-size enterprise owners on 
topics such as business strategy, human resources and 
accounting. The Finnish government’s Innovation 
Partnership Program trains twenty bilingual ‘fellows’ 
during a two-month immersion. Fellows will, in turn, 
become the trainers for a six-month accelerator 
programme running until 2018. Ultimately, the mark of 
a successful social enterprise is whether it is able to 
scale its operations while moving beyond the social 
entrepreneur who founded it. As organisations become 
more complex, they require additional skill sets that the 
founder may not possess. Social enterprises, like any 
business, will need to build their financial and 
institutional sustainability through improved human 
resources.  
Cambodian civil society organisations are in need of 
business management training couched in practical 
experience. Although NGOs are increasingly prevalent 
at all levels of Cambodian society, local NGO personnel 
often lack key skill sets. Several leaders from civil 
society groups complained that NGOs are doing work 
typically slated for the government, such as providing 
for educational and health facilities, but that the leaders 
running these organisations are often untrained and 
inexperienced. Examples of much-needed training 
included human resource management, financial 
management, ethical leadership, mentoring and 
coaching ski l ls . More emphasis was put on 
management over leadership skills. According to one 
community leader interviewed, ‘Everyone is talking 
about leadership, but we don’t need leadership skills. 
We need management skills, especially for middle 
managers.’  
The lack of business management skills and clarity on 
social impact is stifling growth in the social sector. For-
profit investors current ly have a hard t ime 
understanding the potential of the social enterprises 
they are keen on supporting. This is largely caused by 
the fact that many social enterprises do not have proper 
book-keeping practices and lack the know-how to 
appropriately value their organisations. Founders of 
social enterprises tend to prioritise the social aspects of 
their work, often neglecting the business management 
aspect that is actually necessary to grow the 
organisation.  
The social enterprises interviewed agreed that in order 
to grow, they would need to improve their business 
management skills - they could not run the organisation 
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on passion alone. However, they added that they were 
not able to spare the time and cash to attend courses. 
One social entrepreneur remarked that they were 
fortunate to have been assigned a mentor by a 
Japanese-funded capacity building initiative. The 
assigned mentor provided advice for an extended 
period of two years. The absence of effective business 
management practices and financial accountability 
could well be the reason many social enterprises fail to 
scale after the start-up phase, when the patience and 
goodwill from supporters like donors, foundations and 
angel investors wear out.  
In Myanmar, instead of representing skills attained, 
Myanmar degrees and certifications are very often 
employed as their own currency. Credentials from 
academic institutions are coveted by young graduates, 
who will continue to amass an array of certifications, 
including accounting, management and leadership 
courses, well after graduation. Many Myanmar see 
credentials as a ticket to high-prestige jobs in local 
businesses or the government, but they are also 
important bargaining chips in other aspects of life, such 
as marriage arrangements.  
After over a half-century of mismanagement, Myanmar 
universities, once among the most prestigious in 
Southeast Asia, are today largely dysfunctional. Courses 
are poorly taught, and ‘soft skills,’ such as critical 
thinking and problem solving, are rarely imparted. 
Undergraduates choose their course of study based 
solely on high school exit-exam results, leaving large 
numbers of students to read subjects for which they 
have little to no aptitude. Companies interviewed, both 
local and foreign, expressed their frustration with the 
current system, citing the difficulty they encounter 
staffing their own offices. With the economy growing at 
a brisk 6.7 per cent annually, Myanmar is simply unable 
to provide enough skilled personnel locally to fill the 
rapidly expanding number of management positions 
opening up across all sectors. Local graduates, despite 
impressive CVs, possess little to no practical skills or 
experience and must be trained on-site, after which 
they are susceptible to poaching from rivals. Employers 
overwhelmingly prefer repatriate Myanmar, but in 
recent years the sheer demand for talent has exhausted 
the supply of overseas graduates.  
Social enterprises hence face a similar dearth of hard 
management skills. Social entrepreneurs who are able 
to dream up innovative and transformative solutions do 
not necessarily possess the day-to-day business know-
how to ensure that their operation runs as effectively as 
a well-oiled corporate machine. Yangon Bakehouse, for 
instance, responded that their chief need was for 
qualified accountants. Social enterprises in Yangon face 
a similar scarcity of local mid-tier funding, forcing them 
to turn to overseas donations and grants. Of the social 
enterprises interviewed, all received substantial mid-tier 
funding through large foreign organisations. Proximity 
Designs is the recipient of several international grants, 
including grants from the San Francisco-based Mulago 
Foundation, while Yangon Bakehouse was recently 
awarded an Asia Foundation grant. Incubator Project 
Hub Yangon receives partial funding from USAID for its 
ADEPT programme at the Yangon Institute of 
Economics. All of the social enterprises interviewed for 
this report were founded and led by expatriates 
working in Myanmar. Foreign-born social entrepreneurs 
employ professional grant writers and possess the 
necessary savvy and connections to apply for overseas 
funding. They exercise a significant advantage over 
local entrepreneurs, especially those outside the 
Anglophone corporate world. At the moment, Myanmar 
has only a few funds available to local social 
entrepreneurs and civil society leaders. The British 
Council, via its Amatae programme, provides medium-
sized start-up grants of up to £200,000 (US$320,000) to 
civil society organisations. Social venture capital firm 
Insitor Management has also made recent inroads into 
the country. Insitor currently provides funding to CSOs 
operating in Cambodia and India and plans to begin 
providing similar seed funding to social start-ups in 
Myanmar within the next two to three years. One 
notable exception to the above rule is the Free Funeral 
Service Society (FFSS), one of Myanmar’s largest local 
civil society groups. FFSS, which provides medical and 
educational services to Yangon communities, operates 
entirely on local donations and has even refused past 
offers of foreign aid. As a Buddhist charity organisation, 
it has been able to draw on donations from religious 
individuals.  
Impact Investment as a Source of Funding for Social 
Enterprises 
Expatriates and Indonesian ‘repats’ returning from stints 
abroad have recently established social enterprise hubs 
in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Bandung and Denpasar. These 
cities have large numbers of young people, well-
regarded universities and high net worth individuals 
willing to provide seed funding. There is currently an 
estimated US$300 million in impact investment funds 
devoted to Indonesia, but impact investors throughout 
Southeast Asia have been notably wary of using their 
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money to finance social enterprises without the 
assurance of low-risk returns. Several organisations 
interviewed reported consultations with various impact 
investment funds, only to be turned down because the 
fund deemed their business too high risk. Some of 
these organisations had even graduated from incubator 
and accelerator programmes that were supposed to 
have primed them for investment. Where impact 
investors have decided to put money into organ-
isations, they have primarily employed debt vehicles 
that minimise risk.  
It should also be noted that several social enterprises 
interviewed found the social impact assessments used 
by impact investors to measure social return on 
investment (SROI) of limited use. To date, no firm has 
developed a rigorous and scientific system of 
conducting SROI measurements. Social entrepreneurs 
interviewed remarked that SROI ratings simply do not 
attract socially-conscious investors as promised. Of the 
social enterprises interviewed, those that were most 
successful had not received funding from impact 
investors. Instead, they had been connected to ‘angel 
investors’ willing to absorb the increased risk and who 
viewed their investment as a long-term partnership 
rather than a speculative venture. Such investors have 
committed to not exiting the business they have 
invested in, thus ensuring its ability to scale over the 
next five to ten years.  
Impact investing is an exciting new funding tool for 
Vietnamese social entrepreneurs, but it is still in its 
infancy stage and could potentially lead to troubling 
debt and equity arrangements. According to 
interviewees, one of the key challenges Vietnamese 
social entrepreneurs face is access to venture capital 
funding and investors. In the last decade, incubators 
supporting technology entrepreneurs have cropped up 
in both Hanoi and HCMC. However, only two 
organisations currently provide venture capital to 
Vietnamese social entrepreneurs: the Centre for Social 
Innovation Promotion (CSIP) and the Spark Centre for 
Social Entrepreneurship Development. CSIP provides 
up to US$10,000 in seed funding each year to three 
social enterprises accepted to its incubator programme 
and up to US$30,000 in funding each year to three 
existing social enterprises to expand and scale 
successful operations as part of its accelerator 
programme. The Spark Centre does not dispense start-
up funding, but it awarded 19 established social 
enterprises grants of US$5000–20,000 each to scale 
their operations in 2014. Last year, the Spark Centre 
received more than 300 applications for grants. 
International impact investors moving into Vietnam, 
such as IIX Asia, LGT Venture Philanthropy and Unitus 
Capital, can potentially fill existing funding gaps for 
social enterprises. In 2013, Vietnam-based VinaCapital 
Group created Lotus Impact Fund, which has already 
provided one round of funding to KOTO. Netherlands-
based Oxfam Novib is also planning to use past 
proceeds from microcredit programmes to create an 
‘inclusive impact investment fund’ for rural SME owners 
in Vietnam, Nigeria and Uganda.  
Impact investment funds typically arrange investments 
with social enterprises under a combination of debt 
and equity agreements where investors accept reduced 
returns of 7 to 9 per cent on impact investments 
(compared to the 17 to 25 per cent returns usually 
accumulated on standard commercial investments in 
Vietnam). Impact investment funds have the potential to 
offer dong on a scale significantly larger than the grants 
offered by incubators and accelerators. Lotus Impact 
Fund is aiming to raise US$50 million for investments 
over the next 10 years. Oxfam Novib has set aside US$8 
million for investments in Vietnam. However, impact 
investment’s ability to maximise social impact while at 
the same time generating attractive returns for investors 
is still untested, and it remains to be seen what 
repercussions capitalising the social sector will 
produce. Purely profit-driven private equity firms do not 
invest in social enterprises because the latter typically 
carry increased risk paired with low returns. To correct 
for this, many impact investment firms provide business 
consulting to ensure that social enterprises produce 
reasonable returns. However, when an impact investor 
provides funding for a given social entrepreneur to 
scale its operations, it is not clear whether the priority 
becomes increased social impact or maintaining 
attractive returns. It is also unclear whether the markets 
in which social entrepreneurs operate are elastic 
enough to accept larger firms in greater numbers doing 
similar things. Multiple impact investment funds 
flooding rural markets with capital may increase 
revenues, but profit margins may also shrink to the 
point of endangering livelihoods.  
Vietnam’s largest social enterprise cleared US$1.3 
million in sales in 2012, but its profits have suffered in 
the last two years after a severe decline in tourism. 
Although business models can provide sustainable 
sources of income, they are also vulnerable to the 
vagaries of the market. Indebted organisations may find 
themselves scrambling to repay interest or recover 
losses at the expense of social impact. Or worse, they 
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may find themselves at debt levels impossible to repay. 
2011 saw an over-proliferation of microcredit loans in 
India and other developing countries, leading to 
widespread bankruptcies and even suicides. 
Overzealous impact investments could create a similar 
bubble in upcoming years if social enterprises are 
unable to generate returns as promised, all at the 
expense of professed social agendas. 
Venture Philanthropy and Big Corporations in 
Southeast Asia 
Venture philanthropy organisations and corporations 
are becoming valuable partners in developing and 
implementing social impact strategies in Southeast 
Asia. This is a partnership where social investment 
organisations or impact investors bring their 
experience, knowledge, skills and risk-taking social 
investment approach to the table, while corporates 
bring significant resources, solid structures and scaling 
opportunities. The key characteristics of venture 
philanthropy include a high engagement support of a 
few organisations, organisational capacity-building, 
tailored financing, non-financial support, involvement of 
networks, multi-year support and impact measurement.  
In Vietnam, social enterprise and impact investment are 
offering new opportunities to pioneer solutions to 
stubborn social problems and poverty. Yet building (or 
rebuilding) infrastructure, and providing emergency 
food, water and shelter to displaced peoples are simply 
incapable of generating short-term returns. Revenue-
driven models are, hence, limited to providing 
vocations and livelihoods to the disadvantaged and 
marginalised. Philanthropic grants, when managed with 
an eye for sustainability, have produced substantial 
results in lowering poverty worldwide, without putting 
small-scale entrepreneurs in debt. As foreign dollars 
begin to disappear, it is more important than ever for 
countries to develop their own home-grown 
philanthropic institutions. The Southeast Asian countries 
have a long way to go in this respect.  
Philanthropic institutions in Vietnam and in a number of 
Southeast Asian countries still function largely within a 
traditional charitable mind-set. Public opinion holds 
that employees in the social sector should be 
volunteers or accept only minimal salaries. Few 
corporate donors feel justified funding ‘back-end’ costs, 
including salaries or administration. With civil society 
organisation workers in Vietnam currently earning less 
than half of what their private-sector counterparts are 
earning, Vietnamese CSOs are challenged to recruit 
and retain quality talent. However, it is high-cost 
talented people who are able to design innovative 
programmes that lead to systemic change. One notable 
exception to the above rule is VinaCapital Foundation. 
VinaCapital Group funds the foundation’s adminis-
tration costs and matches donations to individual 
programmes made by outside corporations. By making 
a commitment to support VCF’s day-to-day costs, 
VinaCapital has ensured its CSR arm's long-term 
sustainability and success.  
As seen in the case of VinaCapital, the traditional CSR 
approach of companies is moving towards a more 
investment oriented one that evaluates joint 
opportunities for both financial return and social 
impact. In addition to being strong drivers of economic 
development, corporates can contribute to social 
impact by applying their capacity, knowledge, skills, 
networks and assets to societal issues. Other 
multinational corporations such as General Electric (GE) 
in Yangon generate financial and social impact through 
outside ventures aiming for social or environmental, as 
well as financial return. 
GE and Myanmar Electric Power Enterprise (MEPE) 
signed a collaboration agreement in November 2014 to 
work together on a new commitment to help in 
repowering and upgrading existing gas turbines in 
Yangon. This init iat ive wil l result init ial ly in 
approximately 25 megawatts (MW) of additional power 
for Myanmar, which is needed to help the country 
continue on its rapid development path. To address the 
high incidence of maternal and infant mortality rates, 
GE Healthcare launched a rural healthcare pilot project 
in partnership with the Myanmar Ministry of Health. 
Under this project, GE will supply both training and 
technology which include the Venue 40 Ultrasound 
system, infant warmers, LED phototherapy, patient 
monitors and other equipment. Beyond focusing on 
critical needs faced by the people of Myanmar, GE has 
also been working on capacity building within 
Myanmar. Through the Myanmar Executive Leadership 
Program (MELP), 27 leaders from business, government 
and private sectors in Myanmar received training on 
leadership skills at GE’s corporate training centre in 
Crotonville, USA. In addition, the GE Foundation is 
supporting an undertaking by the International Senior 
Lawyers Project to help train civil society advisors on 
rule-of-law concepts as they engage with government 
officials on policy matters.  
All in all, companies that pro-actively push social impact 
 40
strategies benefit by identifying innovative growth 
opportunities. These are often within new client 
segments and in emerging markets to start with, but 
innovations implemented could subsequently be 
‘reverse engineered’ into their traditional markets, and 
provide significant differentiation potential there as 
well. To quote European Venture Philanthropy 
Association (EVPA) , “Companies are often surprised by 4
how much the engagement in corporate social impact 
strategies helps increase the value of their brand, 
reduces risks, builds additional important relationships 
and retains motivated employees, as well as attracts 
young top talent. There seem to be enough reasons for 
CEOs to start or continue moving on their social impact 
journey for the sake of doing smart business”.  
 Eva Varga, (2015), “Corporate Social Impact Strategies – New Paths for Collaborative Growth”. EVPA.  4
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OPPORTUNITIES TO 
ENHANCE SOCIETAL IMPACT 
This chapter highlights some of the insights from 
interviews with civil society leaders and delineates the 
opportunities that key players across sectors can focus 
on for greater societal impact. Using examples drawn 
from CIL reports, key approaches recommended to 
enhance societal impact include stepping up 
government administration, improving public 
education, better infrastructure, an improved banking 
sector, applying innovation and mentorship for social 
enterprises. The chapter also contains a call for better 
cross-sector collaboration and partnerships to improve 
efforts targeted at enhancing societal impact. 
Better Cross-Sector Collaboration  
Civil society organisations sit within the socio-political 
contexts of the countries they are in. One key factor that 
has surfaced among CSO leaders interviewed is the 
need for a culture of trust to be built between the social 
and government sectors to optimise international or 
local resources available for societal impact.   
As a case in point, one frustration that international 
NGOs working in Laos face is the need for NGOs to 
sign an annual memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
before they can carry out work for their organisation. 
This greatly hampers programme implementation as 
the MOU terms are stringent and approval can take a 
long time to come. By the time it comes, the NGO 
would have very little time and budget left to carry out 
their projects for the year. To navigate the system and 
drive initiatives, NGOs comply with as many 
government regulations as they need to, and employ 
intelligent methods to collaborate with the government, 
including engaging in dialogues and learning how to 
deal with the nuances. So as not to get on the wrong 
side of the approving authorities, NGOs are very 
cautious when it comes to sharing information beyond 
those they trust, for fear of the consequences of 
misinterpreted content. As NGOs are in the country to 
support social development, it would help if a stronger 
understanding and trust be built so that resources can 
be optimised all round. The NGO representatives will 
then not be frustrated in their efforts and at the same 
time, the government can work more closely to ensure 
the delivery of services to communities most in need of 
basic help. 
In the case of Thailand, Thai businesses in general have 
less developed CSR practices than their counterparts 
from other parts of Asia. Thai companies have 
traditionally made charitable donations to religious or 
educational institutions, but there are few local firms 
practising CSR that aims to generate systemic change 
or solve social and environmental challenges. CSR 
activities are generally confined to employee 
volunteerism and community service, and only a few 
corporations have attempted to apply global-class 
sustainability and fair trade standards to their supply 
chains or industrial processes. Better CSR will require 
brainstorming with civil society leaders who have first-
hand knowledge of social and environmental issues as 
well as leveraging company resources to invent novel 
methods for confronting such issues. Thailand has one 
of Southeast Asia’s most vibrant civil society spaces, but 
grassroots organisations have struggled to maintain 
political neutrality. During military rule in the 1960s and 
1970s, the government v iewed civ i l society 
organisations (CSOs) as potential havens for Marxist 
resistance and imposed measures that restricted such 
groups from operating. However, laxer regulations in 
subsequent decades led to an explosion of CSOs. By 
1989, Thailand had over 12,000 local NGOs. Although 
the current political deadlock looks bleak, Thailand 
faces several issues that could benefit from increased 
coordination between business, government and civil 
society. Since 2004, Thailand’s southern provinces 
bordering Malaysia have seen increased separatist 
activity and political violence, largely due to an absence 
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of social buy-in and political intransigence. Recent 
investigative reporting has also revealed unfortunate 
instances of local government involvement in human 
trafficking networks. Finally, endemic poverty and lack 
of economic opportunities in ethnic-minority areas 
continue to fuel the regional drug trade in Thailand’s 
most remote regions.  
There continues to be a lack of basic cross-sector 
understanding of intentions, strategies and roles. The 
insight here is that theory and desire have far outpaced 
reality for the Southeast Asia region where improve-
ments in society have taken place ‘in spite of’ rather 
than ‘because of’ cross sector collaboration. 
Need to Step Up Government Administration 
In countries where there are laws meant to promote 
CSR and accountability, weak administration hampers 
the implementation of such laws.  During the Suharto-
era, Indonesian business became synonymous with 
large corporate interests linked to government 
sponsorship. Both SOEs, such as oil giant Pertamina, 
and conglomerates owned by Indonesian-Chinese 
businessmen (cukong), including Lippo, Salim, 
Sampoerna and Ciputra, dominated export-oriented 
industries for three decades. Indonesian-Chinese 
financiers provided generals and government officials 
with access to capital in exchange for state concessions 
and monopoly rights. However, following the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis, the cukongs have largely lost 
ground to a more varied group of SOEs and 
multinationals. While 20 Indonesian conglomerates, 
almost all Chinese-owned, accounted for 56 per cent of 
nominal GDP in 1996, the largest 20 companies only 
accounted for 17.9 per cent of nominal GDP in 2012. 
In 2007, Indonesia passed Law No. 40, Article No. 74, 
which made CSR mandatory for limited liability 
companies involved in extractive industries. However, 
there are several matters pertaining to the law that have 
yet to be clarified. Corporations and legal institutions 
are provided with little guidance in terms of what CSR 
consists of, what percentage of funds should be spent 
on CSR or which institutions (corporations, the 
government or associated civil society groups) should 
administer and monitor the funds. Article 47 also 
stipulates that those companies that do not institute 
CSR practices will face sanctions, but Indonesia’s weak 
and decentralised judicial system has experienced past 
problems in enforcing labour and environmental 
regulations. 
Civil society and activist groups have grown rapidly in 
the post-reformation period and today form a powerful 
counterweight to big business interests. In 2012, there 
were more than 19,000 registered perkumpulan 
(associations) and yayasan (foundations) in Indonesia, 
including large Islamic organisations such as Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyah, labour unions, indigenous 
activists, environmental watchdogs, women’s rights 
associations, churches, agrarian organisations and 
political groups. As many as 84 per cent of Indonesians 
belong to some form of civil society organisation, the 
highest in Southeast Asia. However, some Suharto-era 
legislation (Law No. 8/1985) is still present in the 
Indonesian legal code and could potentially be used by 
the government to arrest members of civil society 
groups. Foreign-funded CSOs in particular are 
sometimes viewed as soft power extensions of Western 
donors and such organisations must receive 
government permission to use internationally-sourced 
money. Law No. 16/2001 includes requirements that 
yayasans registered with the government must make a 
public summary of donations of more than IDR500 
million (US$36,261) in an Indonesian newspaper and 
submit to audits by government accountants. However, 
registration does not currently confer any benefits, such 
as tax exemptions for the organisation or tax 
deductions for donors, and small CSOs are often 
unable to muster the funds required to pay for 
accountants and registration costs. A 2009 survey 
revealed that only 15 per cent of Indonesian CSOs were 
compliant with the law. 
In Cambodia, interviewees from the private sector have 
complained about red tape that prevents them from 
launching businesses in Cambodia. Laws governing 
arbitration are incomplete, and legal backing is not 
always present when disputes arise. According to 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index, Cambodia has the most corrupt business 
practice in ASEAN and is rated 160 out of 175 countries 
worldwide. Government agencies monitoring 
businesses often possess faulty governance structures 
and are involved in practices that generate significant 
conflicts of interest. For instance, most government 
officials involved in regulating the private sector are 
underpaid and supplement their income by 
demanding bribes and penalties.  
Cambodians who recently returned from education 
abroad tend to be the only young people in the country 
who have the confidence to embark on a business plan, 
but there are very few institutions that can provide 
these young entrepreneurs with start-up capital. Behind 
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the current trend of successful cafes and restaurant 
owners are not banks or venture capital funds, but well-
resourced families flushed with cash from established 
industries such as textiles, tourism and agriculture. It is 
not clear whether these enterprises are even turning a 
profit. If Cambodia is unable to open up the business 
sector to skilled Cambodians eager to found their own 
business, the country could suffer a brain drain in 
coming years as its frustrated young people depart for 
more start-up-friendly shores. 
There is no denying that the recent acceleration of 
social enterprises in a space previously dominated by 
both international and local NGOs has given most 
governments in Southeast Asia even greater 
administrative challenges. Caught between the 
dilemma of whether to encourage or to manage the 
influences of such social impact organisations, most 
administrations find themselves without a clear policy 
position. With the exception of Thailand and Singapore, 
we believe that the stepping up necessary for the 
administration will take some time.   
Need to Improve Public Education 
In most parts of Southeast Asia, public education 
remains under-resourced and not uniformly delivered 
across the country. Education is a necessary engine of 
economic growth and the factor that will enable a 
country to transit to value-added services and products. 
Many countries currently face a huge skills gap 
between their graduates and the needs of the 
workforce. As a case in point, Cambodia’s government 
is working hard to reform the country’s education 
system to produce graduates with marketable skill sets, 
but reform will take time. The public education system 
in Cambodia, even at its most elite institutions, is 
currently inadequate for preparing its graduates with 
skills relevant to a professional setting. Education is 
primarily test-driven and favours rote-learning over 
creative thinking, analysis and problem solving skills. 
Bribes are also commonplace, and a diploma is by no 
means an assurance that the student has mastered the 
knowledge tested. As one corporate professional 
pointed out, ‘it’s a past they may or may not have paid 
for.’ Businesses in Cambodia are often unable to find 
and retain adequately skilled local personnel to staff 
their offices. Although there are 78 independent 
universities in the country, graduates are not always 
equipped with the skills and competencies needed for 
the work place. Most firms expend a significant amount 
of their own resources training their employees, even if 
there is no guarantee that new hires will stay with the 
organisation past their initial contract. To avoid costly 
training, organisations continue to fill leadership 
positions with foreign talent. Cambodians are still 
largely unable to assume private and social sector 
leadership positions in their own country. Cambodia’s 
secondary school system has shown some signs of 
progress, but these must be tempered with 
expectations that the problem will not be resolved 
overnight. Hang Chuon Naron, the newly appointed 
Minister for Education, recently tightened controls on 
the high school exit examination in an attempt to 
combat widespread bribery and cheating. In spite of 
reform from the top and a strong state-mandated 
curriculum, the unfortunate reality is that government-
tenured teachers have not adequately prepared 
students for the examination. Due to their low salaries, 
many Cambodian teachers have developed a practice 
of not teaching during school hours and leaving 
students to sign up for paid tuition sessions held after 
school.  
In countries like Cambodia, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Timor-Leste and Myanmar, public education is highly 
augmented by private institutions as well as civil society 
organisations. Student outcomes and the skills level of 
the workforce can be improved. The starting point is an 
honest appraisal of where the system is, and system 
leaders must muster the relevant resources to move it 
one notch further. This has been possible with the least 
as well as better-resourced countries in the world. What 
it often takes is political will. 
It is therefore not a surprise that the majority of social 
efforts in all these countries involve high degrees of 
training and development – as a way to overcome the 
limitations of public education. In theory this should be 
a positive effort. However, the difficulty in this instance 
lies with who the provider of such training is. Without 
sufficient experience, good intentions do not always 
lead to good results when providers are weak in 
curriculum and pedagogy. Because of the perception 
that training is easy, we have seen many individuals 
(local or foreign) trying to do good by providing 
trainers – an effort which may well be the lowest 
common denominator for calling someone a societal 
leader.  
Need for Better Infrastructure 
The infrastructure in many of the Southeast Asian 
countries must play catch up before the country can 
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become a viable business prospect for local 
entrepreneurs. In Cambodia, for instance, many young 
professionals educated abroad are returning home to 
launch their own entrepreneurial ventures, but they 
often find themselves hamstrung by the absence of 
basic infrastructure in the country. Cambodia, especially 
the Cambodian countryside, lacks roads, bridges, 
irrigation systems and electricity grids. When asked 
about the number one challenge to starting a business 
in Phnom Penh, one interviewee replied succinctly: 
‘Electricity. Full stop.’ Interviewees generally felt that 
rural areas would benefit the most from increased 
infrastructure development. Investment in technology 
and learning from others, such as Thai farmers, could 
also bolster the agricultural sector and teach 
Cambodians how to improve yield as well as package 
and distribute their products. 
In the case of Myanmar, although there is a general 
feeling that the political situation will not return to that 
of pre-2011, the country still has a long road ahead of it 
in terms of building a functioning regulatory 
government capable of nurturing foreign investment. In 
2011 and 2012, amid all the excitement of the country’s 
opening up, many foreign firms rushed into the country 
to set up offices. They are only now beginning to realise 
the magnitude of the problems the country faces and 
the challenges of doing business there. Infrastructure, 
including roads, mass transit, water supply and housing, 
is vastly outdated, rendering shipping and distribution 
lines difficult to establish. According to the Asian 
Development Bank, Myanmar has only 40 km of road 
for every 1,000 sq km. By comparison, Thailand and 
Vietnam have 350 km and 480 km respectively. Due to 
the sheer lack of supply, office space rents at nearly 
US$95 per square metre, the highest in the region. Few 
if any multinationals that have opened up offices in 
Myanmar are in the black at the moment, primarily due 
to soaring operating costs. One corporate professional 
interviewed estimated that it would take another three 
to five years before Myanmar's business sector could 
take off.  
This however is an area where we believe real societal 
change can take place. There are emerging 
organisations (both social enterprises and NGOs) 
attempting to build such infrastructure for others in the 
region. Many are in the technology space developing 
web-based applications but there are also those in the 
physical infrastructural space. Such efforts do not lead 
to direct impact but they do provide the foundation for 
others to do a lot of good. We believe that the societal 
leaders engaged in these areas are those who have the 
greatest propensity to deliver progress for their 
societies. 
Need for Improved Banking Sector 
Pressure to be sustainable in the absence of an existing 
small and medium enterprise (SME) banking sector has 
led many organisations to establish their own in-house 
microcredit programmes. Self-sustainability has 
become a buzzword among the social enterprise and 
non-profit communities in recent years, driving many 
social impact organisations to explore alternative 
funding models. The IFC estimates that demand for 
microcredit in Myanmar is close to US$1 billion, but that 
current supply falls far short at only US$283 million. 
With Myanmar banks currently unable or unwilling to 
finance small business or crop loans, several 
organisations have instituted their own in-house 
microcredit programmes. Organisations that operate 
microloan programmes included Opportunities Now, 
which has provided loans of up to US$2,000 to start-
ups and SMEs in Yangon since 2012, and Proximity 
Designs, which provides small crop loans to farmers at 
2.5 per cent interest per season. At the time of writing, 
Opportunities Now and Proximity Designs have yet to 
expand their micro-credit operations to the volume 
necessary to fully sustain their operating budget. Both 
organisations continue to rely on outside funding for 
their core programmes. There are already several 
organisations in Yangon, including Ideabox, Project 
Hub, Opportunities Now, EDNA, and Building Markets, 
which award start-up funding in the form of loans or 
grants to local entrepreneurs, but none of these 
organisations provide mid-tier funding in the 
US$50,000 to US$200,000 range. The maximum 
amount of individual funding a local entrepreneur can 
access from any of these organisations is US$2,000 - 
too little to effectively scale a small business. One 
potential ray of light is the ongoing banking reforms 
and entrance of foreign financial institutions into 
Myanmar. The IFC recently announced a partnership 
with Yoma Bank that will provide US$5 million in loans 
for the country’s SME owners. In total, the IFC plans to 
establish between five and ten partnerships with local 
banks.  
Without clear regulations in this space, many of the 
organisations that provide credit and loans to social 
organisations and individuals are not required to be 
transparent with their financials. Hence it is difficult to 
determine what real success and support really 
translates to because key metrics such as repayment of 
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loan ratio or conversion of loan to other forms of debt 
repayment do have different interpretations. The critical 
need for funds will make these creative new channels 
attractive but how this will impact the sector in the 
longer term could well be the more important question 
to ask. 
Applying Innovation 
In the Philippines, social businesses are overwhelmingly 
centred around agricultural processes, but well placed 
innovation can diversify the sector. The Philippines is 
beset with social and environmental challenges that 
require innovative solutions that disrupt cycles of 
poverty and generate systemic change, but most 
Filipino social businesses are selling the same products 
as commercial businesses, albeit at reduced returns. Of 
the five social enterprises interviewed for this study, 
four operated processing sites for products derived 
from agricultural commodities. The Philippines’ most 
widely praised social enterprise, beauty company, 
Human Nature, also manufactures products from 
ingredients grown at local farms. Large commercial 
producers of coconuts, cacao, sugar and lemongrass 
ship out raw goods for processing in other countries in 
order to reduce costs, but these social businesses have 
kept their processing facilities local, employing workers 
from poor rural districts or disenfranchised groups such 
as ex-criminals or the physically disabled.  
Globalisation has stymied the development of 
Philippine export agriculture for the time being, but it 
has also contributed to recent gains where the country 
has comparative advantages, such as services and 
business processing operations. A recent Credit Suisse 
report placed only two agricultural products (crude 
coconut oil and bananas) on a list of top 20 Philippines 
exports. On the other hand, few Philippines social 
businesses have developed innovative solutions that 
couple their country’s comparative advantages in the 
electronics or mining industries with equitable growth 
and social change. The upcoming Social Enterprise Bill 
stipulates the creation of a National Centre for Social 
Enterprise Development (NCSED) that will equip every 
social enterprise with innovative and sustainable 
approaches to improve the access to basic social 
services by the poor. In addition to providing capability 
training and business development assistance, the 
private sector or government will be in an ideal position 
to develop countrywide strategies that take advantage 
of the Philippines’ native strengths. Run correctly, the 
NCSED can become a centre for replicable innovation 
leading to widespread and systemic solutions for social 
and environmental ills.  
The need for such societal innovation has been widely 
accepted and we see significant promise in this area. 
Both governments and MNCs are making some serious 
investments in innovation that transform society and 
this can only be good because both have the scale to 
execute at a level that can bring sustainable change. 
Societal impact organizations have for too long been 
stuck at the ideas stage (invention) and new efforts in 
building systems and structures to deliver consistent 
results (innovation) can only be beneficial. 
Mentorship for Social Entrepreneurs
 
Several social entrepreneurs interviewed described the 
difficulties they experienced while starting their 
businesses and pointed to the absence of mentors to 
turn to during the process. Of the social entrepreneurs 
interviewed in Metro Manila, all were young graduates 
with limited business experience. According to these 
entrepreneurs, developing a business concept was 
relatively simple. However, when they attempted to 
launch their businesses, they immediately ran into 
unanticipated roadblocks such as bureaucratic red tape 
and supply chain logistics. Once firmly established, 
social entrepreneurs also face difficult questions on 
how to scale their businesses. More specifically, many 
are unschooled in modern management practices and 
reported that they did not know how to ‘let go’ or 
delegate responsibilities. All the social entrepreneurs 
interviewed stressed their need to train middle 
managers to take care of day-to-day business.  
Metro Manila is currently home to business schools 
such as Ideaspace, which has increasingly catered to 
social entrepreneurs, but there are few resources 
tailored specifically to their needs. Gawad Kalinga 
recently launched a social enterprise incubator, the 
Enchanted Forest, but its agriculture focus and limited 
size leaves significant room for other training 
organisations to enter Metro Manila’s budding social 
business space. In spite of the current popularity of 
social enterprise in the Philippines, there are few 
mentorship resources for aspiring social entrepreneurs. 
This is an area where the private sector can help fill. 
Mentorship as an idea is very well established in the 
business sector. Corporations have for years hired 
mentors for their top leaders as well as emerging talent. 
The selection of who can and should be a ‘mentor’ is a 
rigorous one. Success is attained only because of the 
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robustness of the process. A mentorship model is 
needed for the social sector, but it has to be 
customised and made very relevant to the context of 
the mentee. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
 
he Country Insights Labs (CILs) undertaken by ISL 
are attempts to uncover the critical social and 
environmental issues facing leaders from business, 
government and civil society in a given country. The 
study identified emerging trends in Southeast Asia and 
the Institute will be directing further research efforts 
toward interconnected social and environmental 
themes and the organisational challenges faced by 
CSOs in each Southeast Asian country. A CSO is 
broadly defined as any organisation with the capacity to 
contribute to the betterment of communities. These 
include, but are not limited to, philanthropic 
o rg a n i s at i o n s , c o r p o rat e f o u n d at i o n s , n o n -
governmental organisations (NGOs), activist groups, 
social enterprises and impact investors.  
The Institute did not intend the lab reports to be 
exhaustive or to produce statistically significant data. 
The series was a qualitative study that employed 
interviews and market insights as a means of 
understanding an increasingly complex landscape. As 
one of the world’s most diverse regions, Southeast Asia 
is home to an array of cultures, languages, religions and 
economic levels of development. At the heart of each 
country study is a belief that workable solutions and 
partnerships depend on an awareness of how each 
country’s unique context informs the social issues which 
are continually evolving. 
 48
T
References
REFERENCES 
Brunei 
Hoon, Shaun. ‘Companies that Care; NGOs in Brunei’. INSPIRE. Oct-Dec 2014 Issue. 
Hoon, Shaun. ‘Brunei Entrepreneurs, Franchises and Technology’. INSPIRE. Jul-Sep 2014 Issue.  
Hoon, Shaun. ‘Fifty Bruneian Women Who Shape Our Future’. INSPIRE. Apr- Jun 2014 Issue.  
Mohamed, A.Fattaah, Singh, Satwinder, Irani, Zahir and Darwish, Tamer T. An analysis of recruitment, training and 
retention practices in domestic and multinational enterprises in the country of Brunei Darussalam. The International 
Journal of Human Resource Management,  24.10 (2012) : 2054–2081.  
Oxford Business Group. The Report: Brunei Darussalam 2014. 
Policy Studies Organisation. ‘Cyberspace in Brunei’. Asian Politics and Policy, 4.1 (2013): 127 – 142. Wiley Periodicals, 
Inc.  
DeSilva-Ranasinghe, Sergei. ‘Small State Security: Brunei’s 21st
 
Century Defence Policy. Military Technology: MIL-
TECH, Dec Issue (2013): 48 – 51.  
Roberts, Christopher. ‘Brunei Darussalam: Consolidating the foundations of its future’. Southeast Asian Affairs (2011): 
36 – 50.  
Thambipillai, Pushpa. ‘Brunei: Making Progress Slowly’. Southeast Asian Affairs (2012): 89 – 100.   
Cambodia 
Becker, Elizabeth. When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution. New York: Public Affairs, 
1998.  
‘Cambodian Genocide Program’. Accessed 22 October 2014. http://www.yale.edu/cgp/.  
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. Accessed 22 October 2014. http://www.cia.- gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook.  
Chenda Keo. ‘Human Trafficking and Moral Panic in Cambodia’. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science (2014): 202–224.  
Corruption Perceptions Index 2013. Berlin: Transparency International, 2013. Accessed 22 October 2014. http://
www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results#myAnchor2.  
Domashneva, Helena. ‘NGOs in Cambodia: It’s Complicated’. The Diplomat, 3 December 2013.  Ear, Sophal. ‘The 
Political Economy of Aid and Governance in Cambodia’. Asian Journal of Political Science 15.1 (April 2007): 68–96.  
ECCC at a Glance. Phnom Penh: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, April 2014. Accessed 22 
October 2014. http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20at%20a %20Glance%20-%20EN%20-%20April
%202014_FINAL.pdf.  
Ecosystems in the Greater Mekong: Past trends, current status, possible futures. Gland, Switzer-land: WWF - World 
Wildlife Fund for Nature, 2013. Accessed 22 October 2014. http://cambodi- a.panda.org/news_cambodia/
 49
References
publications/?208456/Ecosystems-in-the-Greater-Mekong-past- trends-current-status-possible-futures.  
Engvall, Anders Örjan Sjöberg and Fredrik Sjöholm. ‘Poverty in Rural Cambodia: The Differentiated Impact of 
Linkages, Inputs, and Access to Land’. Asian Economic Papers 7.2 (May 2008): 74–95.  
Human Rights Watch. World Report 2014. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2014. Accessed 22 October 2014. http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2014_web_0.pdf.  
Khatharya, Um. ‘Cambodia in 2013: The Winds of Change’. Southeast Asian Affairs (2014): 97– 116.  
Kheang, Un. ‘The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A Politically Compromised Search for Justice’. The Journal of Asian Studies 
72 (November 2013): 783–792.  
Marks, Simon. ‘Somaly Mam: The Holy Saint (and Sinner) of Sex Trafficking’. Newsweek, 21 May 2014. 
Mydons, Seth. ‘A Survivor Documents Cambodia’s Nightmare’. New York Times, 4 September 2006. 
Residential Care in Cambodia. New York: UNICEF, 2011. Accessed 22 October 2014. http:// www.unicef.org/
cambodia/Fact_sheet_-_residential_care_Cambodia.pdf.  
Steinfatt, Thomas M. ‘Sex trafficking in Cambodia: fabricated numbers versus empirical evidence’. Crime, Law and 
Social Change 56 (2011): 443–462.  
Whalan, Jeni. ‘Evaluating Peace Operations: The Case of Cambodia’. Journal of International Peacekeeping 16 (2012): 
226–251.  
Indonesia 
Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index 2014 Indonesia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014.  
Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005: 15 Key Findings. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, 2005.  
Hoon, Chang Yau. ‘Face, Faith and Forgiveness: Elite Chinese Philanthropy in Indonesia.’ Journal of Asian Business 
24.1–2 (2010): 51–66. 
Hutton, Jeffrey. ‘Muslim NGO lawsuits threaten Indonesia president's reformist agenda.’ Christian Science Monitor, 1 
April 2015.  
‘Indonesia.’ CIA World Factbook. Accessed on 15 June 2015. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook.  
Republic of Indonesia. Office of the President. The Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2007 Concerning 
Limited Liability Company [legalised by the President of the Republic of Indonesia in Jakarta 16 August 2007].  
Rustam, Ibrahim. ‘Civil Society in Indonesia.’ In An ASEAN Society For All: Exploring the Scope For Civil Society 
Engagement. Edited by Terence Chong and Stefanie Elies, 52–64. Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office for 
Regional Cooperation in Asia, 2011.  
Sar-Desai, D. R. Southeast Asia, 5th Edition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003. 
Sato, Yuri. ‘Business Groups in Indonesia: What has Changed and What Remains Unchanged?’ Presentation at 
Singapore Management University, Singapore, 9 September 2014.  
Schwartz, Adam. A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability. Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2004.  
 50
References
‘Spicing up growth: Bad policy as much as bad infrastructure is holding Indonesia back.’ The Economist, 9 May 2015.  
Ulla Fionna, Siwage Dharma Negara and Hui Yew-Foong. ‘Indonesia in 2013: Anticipating 2014,’ Southeast Asian 
Affairs (2014): 119–138.  
‘Violence against Indonesia’s indigenous peoples spikes as government drags feet on land rights and forestry 
legislation.’ Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, 27 January 2014. http:// www.aman.or.id/en/2014/01/27/violence-
against-indonesias-indigenous-peoples-spikes-as- government-drags-feet-on-land-rights-and-forestry-legislation/.  
Waagstein, Patricia Rinwigati. ‘ The Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility in Indonesia: Problems and 
implications.’ Journal of Business Ethics 98 (2011): 455–466.  
Winarno, Zain. ‘President Jokowi’s Infrastructure Projects: Quantity vs Quality.’ Jakarta Post, 23 February 2015.  
‘World Development Indicators.’ The World Bank. Accessed 15 June 2015. http://data.world- bank.org/. 
Laos 
Berliner, David. 'Multiple Nostalgias: The Fabric of Heritage in Luang Prabang (Lao PDR)’. Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 18 (2012): 769-786.  
Coleman, D. Youngblood. Laos 2014 Country Review. Houston, USA: Country Watch Inc., 2014. 
Fox, Christine. 'No Place for Girls? Gender, Ethnicity and Citizenship Education in the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic’. Compare, 33.3 (2003): 401-412. 
Holly, High and Pierre, Petit. 'Introduction: The Study of the State in Laos’. Asian Studies Review, 37.4 (2013): 417–432. 
Kim, Dongryul. and Mi—Kyeng Jeong. 'Insufficient Partnership, Ineffective Foreign Aid, and Public Education in Laos’. 
KEDI Journal of Educational Policy 10.1 (2013): 173 -193. 
Menon, Jayant and Peter Warr. 'Lao Economy: Capitalizing on Natural Resource Exports’. Asian Economic Policy 
Review 8 (2013): 70–89. 
Stuart-Fox, Martin. 'The Political Culture of Corruption in the Lao PDR’. Asian Studies Review 30 (2006): 59–75.  
T. F. ‘Gone Missing: Civil Society in Laos’. The Economist, 8 Jan 2013. Accessed 9 Jan 2015. http://
www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2013/01/civil-society-laos  
Malaysia 
Chin, James. ‘Malaysia: The Rise of Najib and 1Malaysia.’ Southeast Asian Affairs 2010 (2010): 165-179.  
‘Country and Lending Groups.’ Accessed 5 January 2015. http://data.worldbank.org/about/ country-and-lending-
groups.  
Gooch, Liz. ‘Indigenous Malaysians Miss School, Agency Finds.’ New York Times (New York, NY), September 9, 2012.  
‘Malaysia.’ Accessed 5 January 2015. http://data.worldbank.org/country/malaysia.  
Nicolas, Colin. ‘The Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia,’ Centre For Orang Asli Concerns. Last modified 20 August 2012. 
http://www.coac.org.my/main.php?section=about&page=about_in- dex  
 51
References
Noor, Farish. ‘The Malaysian General Elections of 2013: The Last Attempt at Secular-inclusive Nation-building?’ 
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 2 (2013): 89-104.  
Parameswaran, Prashanth. ‘Malaysia as ASEAN Chair in 2015: What to Expect.’ The Diplomat, November 22, 2014. 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/malaysia-as-asean-chair-in-2015-what-to- expect/.  
Osborne, Milton. Southeast Asia: An Introductory History. Singapore. Allen & Unwin, 2013. Ricklefs, M.C., Bruce 
Lockhart, Albert Lau, Portia Reyes, Maitrii Aung-Thwin. A New History of Southeast Asia. London. Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010.  
Riddell, Peter. ‘Islamization, Civil Society and Religious Minorities in Malaysia.’ Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social 
and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century. Singapore. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.  
Saravanamuttu, Johan. ‘Malaysia in the New Geopolitics of Southeast Asia.’ The New Geopolitics of Southeast Asia 
(2014): 47-52.  
U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report 2014. June 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/ tip/rls/tiprpt/2014/
index.htm  
Tan, Tai Yong. Creating ‘Greater Malaysia’: Decolonisation and the Politics of Merger. Singapore. Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2008.  
Myanmar 
Aung-Thwin, Maetrii. ‘Myanmar in 2013: Integration and the Challenge of Reform’. Southeast Asian Affairs (2014): 205–
23.  
Aung-Thwin, Maureen and Thant Myint-U. ‘The Burmese Way to Socialism’. 3rd World Quarterly 13.1 (1992): 67–75  
Aung Hla Tun and Jared Ferrie. ‘Myanmar says it will release more than 3,000 prisoners’. Reuters, 7 October 2014. 
Accessed 17 October 2014. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/07/uk- myanmar-prisoners-release-
idUKKCN0HW0ID20141007.  
Aye Chan. ‘The Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan (Rakhine) State of Burma (Myanmar)’. SOAS Bulletin of 
Burma Research 3.2 (2005): 396–420.  
Charney, Michael. A History of Modern Burma. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
Crossette, Barbara. ‘Exhausted Burma Struggles in Isolation’. New York Times, 23 March 1987. Accessed 17 October 
2014. http://’.nytimes.com/1987/03/23/world/exhausted-burma- struggles-in-isolation.html.  
Duflos, Eric, Paul Luchtenburg, Li Ren and Li Yan Chen. Microfinance in Myanmar: Sector Assessment. Hanoi: IFC and 
CGAP, January 2013. Accessed 17 October 2014. http://’.cgap.org/sites/default/files/Microfinance%20in
%20Myanmar%20Sector%20Assessment.pdf.  
Grudgings, Stuart. ‘Four dead as Myanmar violence spills into Malaysia’. Reuters, 5 June 2013. Accessed 17 October 
2014. http://’.reuters.com/article/2013/06/05/us-malaysia-myanmar- violence-idUSBRE9540BA20130605.  
‘ODA Loan Agreements Signed with the Republic of the Union of Myanmar’. JICA press release, 7 June 2013. 
Accessed 17 October 2014, http://’.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/ 2013/130607_01.html.  
Mahtani, Shibani. ‘Myanmar Phone Service Makes Leap’. Wall Street Journal, 17 August 2014. Accessed 17 October 
2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/myanmar-phone-service-makes-leap- 1408296679.  
Mahtani, Shibani. ‘Myanmar’s Small Businesses Targeted by World Bank Lending’. Wall Street Journal, 16 September 
2014. Accessed 17 October 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/myan- mars-small-businesses-targeted-by-world-
 52
References
bank-loan-1410861135?KEYWORDS=myanmar+ifc.  
‘Myanmar in Transition: Opportunities and Challenges’. Manila: Asian Development Bank, August 2012. Accessed 17 
October 2014. http://’.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2012/ myanmar-in-transition.pdf.  
Nyein Nyein. ‘Nationwide Ceasefire Hangs in the Balance at Rebel Meeting’. The Irrawaddy, 18 July 2014. Accessed 
October 17 2014. http://’.irrawaddy.org/burma/nationwide-ceasefire-hangs-balance-rebel-meeting.html.  
Peel, Michael. ‘Myanmar opens doors to foreign banks’. Financial Times, 1 October 2014. Ac- cessed 17 October 
2014. http://’.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5bc39bb8-494e-11e4-8d68-00144fe- ab7de.html#axzz3GYlEKnnf.  
Peel, Michael. ‘Myanmar property prices surge as country opens up to investment’, Financial Times, 23 October 2013. 
Accessed 17 October 2014. http://’.ft.com/intl/cms/s/ 0/90be8c0c-3bb6-11e3-b85f-00144feab7de.html?
siteedition=intl#axzz3GYlEKnnf.  
Perlez, Jane. ‘Ban on Doctors’ Group Imperils Muslim Minority in Myanmar’. New York Times, 13 March 2014. Accessed 
17 October 2014. http://’.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/asia/myanmar-bans-doctors-without-borders.html.  
Perlez, Jane. ‘China Looks to High-Speed Rail to Expand Reach’. New York Times, 8 August 2014. Accessed 17 October 
2014. http://’.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/world/asia/china-looks-to-high-speed-rail-to-expand-reach.html.  
Pomfret, Richard. ‘ASEAN’s New Frontiers: Integrating the Newest Members into the ASEAN Economic Community’. 
Asian Economic Policy Review 8 (2013): 25–41.  
The Potential Economic Impact of Mobile Communications in Myanmar. Stockholm: Ericsson AB, 2012. Accessed 17 
October 2014. http://’.ericsson.com/res/docs/2012/myanmar- report-2012-13nov.pdf.  
Social Enterprise Landscape in Myanmar. Yangon: British Council, September 2013. Accessed 17 October 2014. 
http://’.britishcouncil.org.mm/sites /britishcouncil.mm/files/social_enterprise_landscape_in_myanmar-
september_2013.pdf.  
Suwanvanichkij, Voravit, Noriyuki Murakami, Catherine Lee, Jen Leigh, Andrea L Wirtz, Brock Daniels, Mahn Mahn, 
Cynthia Maung and Chris Beyrer. ‘Community-based assessment of human rights in a complex humanitarian 
emergency: the Emergency Assistance Teams-Burma and Cyclone Nargis’. Conflict and Health 4 (2010): 8–21. 
Accessed 17 October 2014. http://’.- conflictandhealth.com/content/4/1/8.  
Szep, Jason and Andrew Marshall. ‘Special Report - Thailand secretly dumps Myanmar refugees into trafficking rings’. 
Reuters, 5 December 2013. Accessed 17 October 2014. http://uk.reuters.- com/article/2013/12/05/uk-thailand-
rohingya-special-report-idUKBRE9B400920131205.  
Turnell, Sean. ‘Fundamentals of Myanmar’s Macroeconomy: A Political Economy Perspective’. Asian Economic Policy 
Review 6 (2011): 136–54  
‘World Development Indicators’. World Bank Website. Accessed 17 October 2014. http://wdi.- worldbank.org/table/
5.5. 
  
Philippines 
Abinales, Patricio N. ‘The Philippines in 2010: Blood, Ballots, and Beyond.’ Asian Survey 51.1 (January/February 2011): 
163–172.  
‘After a False Start, Philippine Public-Private Partnership Projects Find Spark.’ International Finance Corporation, 5 
January 2012. Accessed 10 May 2015. http://’.ifc.org/wps/wcm/con-nect/region__ext_content/regions/east+asia+and
+the+pacific/news/after+a+false+start, +philippine+public-private+partnership+projects+find+spark.  
Alcantara, Patrick. ‘Lessons learned from the Philippine government’s response to Typhoon Haiyan.’ Journal of 
 53
References
Business Continuity & Emergency Planning 7.4 (April 2014): 335–346.  
CIA World Factbook. Accessed 10 May 2015. https://’.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook.  
Cruz De Castro, Renata. ‘The Philippines in 2013: Popular President Confronts Daunting Challenges.’ Southeast Asian 
Affairs (2014): 243–260.  
Dancel, Raul. ‘Who is the woman behind Filipina Mary Jane Veloso’s last-minute reprieve from execution?’ The Straits 
Times, 14 May 2015. Accessed 14 May 2015. http://’.straitstimes.- com/news/asia/south-east-asia/story/who-the-
woman-behind-filipina-mary-jane-velosos-last-minute-reprieve.  
De Castro, Renato. ‘The Philippines Confronts China in the South China Seas: Power Politics vs. Liberalism-Legalism.’ 
Asian Perspective 39 (2015): 71–100.  
Doing Well By Doing Good: Increasingly, consumers care about corporate social responsibility, but does concern 
convert to consumption? New York: Nielsen, 2014.  
‘First 100 Days: Sen. Bam Champions Inclusive Growth, Reforms.’ Office of Senator Bam Aquino, 10 October 2013. 
http://’.bamaquino.com/first-100-days-sen-bam-champions-inclusive-growth-reforms/.  
Fradera, Josep M. ‘The Historical Origins of the Philippine Economy: A Survey of Recent Research on the Spanish 
Colonial Era.’ Australian Economic History Review 44.3 (November 2004): 307–320.  
Gawad Kalinga Website, accessed 14 May 2015, http://’.gk1world.com/NewOurVision. Global Terrorism Index 2014: 
Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism. Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014).  
‘Indicators produced and compiled by the NSCB.’ Philippines Statistics Authority. Accessed on 10 May 2015. 
http://’.nscb.gov.ph/stattables/.  
Kares, Faith R. ‘Practicing Enlightened Capitalism: Fil-Am Heroes NGO Activism, and the Reconstitution of Class 
Difference in the Philippines.’ Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints 62.2 (2014): 175–204.  
Kelly, Tim and Manuel Mogato. ‘Japan, Philippines to hold first naval drill in South China Sea.’ Reuters, 8 May 2015. 
Accessed 10 May 2015. http://’.reuters.com/article/2015/05/08/us-southchinasea-philippines-japan-
idUSKBN0NT11J20150508.  
Lau, Bryony. ‘The Southern Philippines in 2013: One Step Forward, One Step Back.’ Southeast Asian Affairs (2014): 
260–273.  
Limpangog, Cirila. ‘Migration as a Strategy for Maintaining a Middle-Class Identity: The Case of Professional Filipino 
Women in Melbourne.’ ASEAS – Austrian Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 6.2 (2013): 308–329.  
McCoy, Alfred ‘. An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines. Madison, Wisconsin: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2009.  
Millennium Development Goals Report Card: Measuring Progress Across Countries. London: Overseas Development 
Institute Publications, 2010.  
Nititham, Diane Sabenacio. ‘Migration as Cultural Capital: The Ongoing Dependence on Over- seas Filipino Workers.’ 
Malaysian Journal of Economic Studies 48.2 (2011): 185–201.  
Parry, Jane. ‘Philippines: cash transfers succeeding where other programmes have failed.’ The Guardian, 30 October 
2013. Accessed 10 May 2015. http://’.theguardian.com/global-de-velopment-professionals-network/2013/oct/30/
philippines-cash-transfers-development-impact.  
‘Philippines-Mindanao, 1971 – first combat deaths.’ Project Plouhshares. Accessed 10 May 2015. http://
ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/philippines-mindanao-1971-first-combat- deaths/  
Republic of the Philippines. Cong. House of Representatives. 16th Congress, 1st Session. S 1331. An Act Ordaining 
 54
References
the Promotion of Social Enterprises to Alleviate Poverty, Establishing for the Purpose the Poverty Reduction Through 
Social Entrepreneurship (Present) Program and Providing Incentives and Benefits Therefore [received by the 
Philippines House of Representatives 10 July 2013]. http://’.congress.gov.ph/download/basic_16/HB01331.pdf.  
Rosenberg, David. ‘Governing the South China Sea: From Freedom of the Seas to Ocean En-closure Movements.’ 
Harvard Asia Quarterly 12.3-4 (2010): 4–12.  
SarDesai, D.R. Southeast Asia, Fifth Ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003. Sathirathai, Santitarn. ‘Philippines: 
What are the next big things for export?’ Credit Suisse, 1 October 2012. https://plus.credit-suisse.com/u/cDUjsi.  
Virola, Romulo A. ‘The Devastation of Ondoy and Pepeng.’ Republic of the Philippines Statistics Authority. Accessed on 
10 May 2015. http://’.nscb.gov.ph/headlines/StatsSpeak/ 2009/110909_rav_mrsr_typhoons.asp  
Walls at Every Turn: Abuse of Migrant Domestic Workers through Kuwait’s Sponsorship System. New York: Human 
Rights Watch, 2010.  
‘World Development Indicators.’ The World Bank. Accessed 10 May 2015. http://data.world- bank.org/.  
Xu, Beina. ‘South China Seas Tensions.’ Council on Foreign Relations, 14 May 2014. http:// ‘.cfr.org/china/south-china-
sea-tensions/p29790.  
Singapore 
Chou, Bill. ‘Perceived Threats and Governing Capacity: Building National Identities in Post- Colonial Singapore and 
Macao.’ African and Asian Studies 13 (2014): 147–66. 
Lenouvel, Vincent, Lafforgue Michel, Chevauché Catherine and Rhétoré Pauline. ‘The energy cost of water 
independence: the case of Singapore.’ Water Science & Technology 70.5 (2014): 787–94.  
Bhaskaran, Manu. ‘Challenges Facing the Singapore Economy.’ Southeast Asian Affairs (2014): 290–302. 
Behbahani, Mohammad Ali. ‘Studying the Level of Integration of Singapore as an Asian-Pacific Global City.’ Spaces 
and Flows: An International Journal of Urban and ExtraUrban Studies 5 (2014): 7–22. 
Yang, Peidong. ‘Authenticity and Foreign Talent in Singapore: The Relative and Negative Logic of National Identity.’ 
SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 29.2 (2014): 408–37.  
Lee, Wing On. ‘Future-oriented citizenship: A possible citizenship model starting from the case of Singapore.’ 
Citizenship Teaching & Learning 10.1 (2015): 95–108.  
Thailand 
A Coup Ordained? Thailand’s Prospects for Stability. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014. ‘Civil Society Briefs: 
Thailand.’ Asian Development Bank. Accessed 15 June 2015. http://adb.org/publications/civil-society-briefs-thailand.  
Corporate Social Responsibility in Thailand. Bangkok: Asian Institute of Technology, 2011.  
Dalpino, Catharin. ‘Thailand in 2010.’ Asian Survey 51.1 (2011): 155–162.  
Hookway, James. ‘Former Thai Leader Yingluck Shinawatra Charged in Rice-Subsidy Case.’ The Wall Street Journal, 19 
February 2015.  
 55
References
McCargo, Duncan. Southern Thailand: From Conflict to Negotiations? Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 
2014.  
Phongpaichit, Pasuk and Chris Baker. Thaksin. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2009.  
Rossi, Amalia. ‘Turning Red Rural Landscapes Yellow? Sufficiency Economy and Royal Projects in the Hills of nan 
Province, Northern Thailand.’ ASEAS - Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Stud- ies 5.2 (2012): 275–291.  
SarDesai, D. R. Southeast Asia: Past & Present, Fifth Edition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003.  
Szep, Jason and Andrew R. C. Marshall. ‘Special Report: Thailand secretly supplies Myanmar refugees to trafficking 
rings.’ Reuters, 4 December 2013.  
Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012. Trafficking in Persons Report. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, June 2014. Accessed 15 June 2015. http://’.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2014/
index.htm. 
Windle, James. ‘Drugs and Drug Policy in Thailand.’ Improving Global Drug Policy: Comparative Perspectives and 
UNGASS 2016. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2015.  
‘World Development Indicators.’ The World Bank. Accessed 1 June 2015. http://data.world- bank.org/.  
Timor-Leste 
Asante, Augustine. D., Nelson Martins, Michael E. Otim and John Dewdney. ‘Retaining doctors in rural Timor-Leste: a 
critical appraisal of the opportunities and challenges’. Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 92 (2014): 277–282.  
Coleman, D. Youngblood. East Timor: 2014 Country Review. Houston, USA: Country Watch, 2014.  
Harmadi, S. Harry. B. and Rui A. Gomes. ‘Developing Timor-Leste's non-oil economy challenges and prospects’. 
Journal of Southeast Asian Economies 30.3 (2013): 309–321.  
Hill, Hal and Joao M. Saldanha.’ The Key Issues’. In East Timor: Development Challenges for the World’s Newest Nation. 
Edited by H. Hill and J. M. Saldanha. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001.  
Leach, Michael. ‘Timor-Leste in 2013: Charting its own Course’. Southeast Asian Affairs (2014): 337– 352.  
Lothe, Elizabeth and Gordon Peake. ‘Addressing symptoms but not causes: stabilisation and humanitarian action in 
Timor-Leste’. Disasters 34.3 (2010): 427–443.  
Macalister, John. ‘Language policies, language planning and linguistic landscapes in Timor-Leste’. Language Problems 
& Language Planning 36.1 (2012): 25–45.  
Muggah, R., O. Jütersonke, R. Murray, E. Rees and J. Scambary. Urban violence in an urban village: A case study of Dili, 
Timor-Leste. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2010.  
Myrttinen, Henri. ‘Resistance, symbolism and the language of stateness in Timor-Leste’. Oceania 83.3 (2013): 208–220  
Sahin, B. Selver. ‘Timor-Leste’s foreign policy: Securing state identity in the post-independence period’. Journal of 
Current Southeast Asian Affairs 2 (2014): 3–25.  
Taylor-Leech, K. Jane. ‘Language choice as an index of identity: linguistic landscape in Dili, Timor-Leste’. International 
Journal of Multilingualism 9.1 (2012): 15-34.  
Wigglesworth, Ann. ‘The growth of civil society in Timor- Leste: Three moments of activism’. Journal of Contemporary 
Asia 43.1 (2013): 51-74.  
 56
References
Vietnam 
Achievements and Challenges in the Progress of Reaching Millennium Development Goals of Vietnam. Hanoi: United 
Nations Development Programme, December 2013. Accessed 22 February 2015. http://’.undp.org/content/dam/
undp/library/MDG/english/MDG%20Country %20Reports/Viet%20Nam/MDG_FullReport_Final%20approved.pdf.  
Dang Hai-Anh. ‘Vietnam: A Widening Poverty Gap for Ethnic Minorities.’ In Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and 
Development, edited by Gillette ‘. Hall and Harry Anthony Patrinos, 304–343. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014.  
Dang Nguyen Anh, Le Kim Sa, Nghiem Thi Thuy, Nguyen Van Lang and Phi Hai Nam. Philanthropy in Vietnam. Hanoi: 
The Asia Foundation, 2011. Accessed 22 February 2015. https://asi- afoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ASIAEfinal.pdf.  
Giang Dang and Pham Minh Tri. Corporate Philanthropy and Corporate Perceptions of Local NGOs in Vietnam. Hanoi: 
The Asia Foundation, October 2013. Accessed 22 February 2015. https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/
TAFCSOReportEFinal.pdf.  
Hayton, Bill. Vietnam: Rising Dragon. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.  
Ngo Thi Ngoc Chau. ‘In Vietnam, a shipping line raises alarm over debt.’ Reuters, 26 June 2012.  
Nguyen Dinh Cung, Luu Minh Duc, Phạm Kieu Oanh and Tran Thi Hong Gam. ‘Social Enterprise in Vietnam: Concept, 
Context and Policies.’ Hanoi: The British Council, 2012. Accessed 22 February 2015. http://’. britishcouncil.vn/sites/
britishcouncil.vn/files/13389753729370_so-cial_enterprisesenglish.pdf.  
Ruddy, Michael and Esra Ozdemir. An In-Depth Study of Broadband Infrastructure in the ASEAN Region. Bangkok: 
UNESCAP, August 2013. Accessed 22 February 2015. http://’.un-escap.org/sites/default/files/Broadband
%20Infrastructure%20in%20the%20ASEAN%20Re-gion_0.pdf.  
SarDesai, D. R. Southeast Asia: Past & Present, Fifth Edition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003.  
Spector, Mike. ‘Ford Foundation to Close Two Overseas Offices.’ Wall Street Journal, 29 April 2009. Accessed 22 
February 2015. http://’.wsj.com/articles/SB124103990271770173.  
Thayer, Carlyle A. ‘Vietnam in 2013.’ Southeast Asian Affairs (2014): 353–371. 
’Through a border darkly: Relations between two Communist neighbours are at their lowest point in decades.’ The 
Economist, 16 August 2014. 
 
Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, June 2014. Accessed 22  
February 2015. http://’.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2014/index.htm.  
Tran Van Tho. ‘Vietnamese Economy at the Crossroads: New Doi Moi for Sustained Growth.’ Asian Economic Policy 
Review 8 (2013): 122–143.  
‘Vietnam.’ UN Data. Accessed 22 February 2015. http://data.un.org/. 
 
’Vietnam Country Profile.’ Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor. Accessed 22 February 2015. http://’.the-monitor.org/
index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/profile/1022.  
 57
References
COUNTRY PROFILES ANNEX 
 
 58
Brunei By Numbers 
Official Name:    Negara Brunei Darussalam 
Capital:      Bandar Seri Begawan 
Area:     5,765 sq km 
Population:    422,675 million 
Ethnic Groups:    Malay (65.7%), Chinese (10.3%), Other Indigenous (3.4%), Other (20.6%), 
Religion:    Muslim (78.8%), Christian (8.7%), Buddhist (7.8%), Other (4.7%)  
Language:   Malay (Official), English, Chinese 
  
Currency:    Brunei Dollar 
GDP (PPP):   US$22.25 billion [2013 est.]  
GDP Per Capita (PPP): US$54,800 [2013 est.] 
GDP Real Growth Rate: 1.4% [2013 est.] 
Labour Force:   Agriculture (4.2%), Industry (62.8%), Services (33%) 
Literacy:    95.4% (whole); 97% (male); 93.9% (female) 
Life Expectancy:  76.8 years (whole); 74.5 years (male); 79.2 years (female) 
Source: CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) 
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Cambodia By Numbers 
Official Name:    Kingdom of Cambodia (1993–present) 
Capital:      Phnom Penh  
Area:     183,035 sq km 
Population:    15.46 million (country); 1.55 million (Phnom Penh) 
Ethnic Groups:    Khmer (90%), Vietnamese (5%) Chinese (1%), Other (4%) 
Religion:    Buddhist (96.9%), Muslim (1.9%), Christian (0.4%), Other (0.8%) 
Language:   Khmer (official), but minority ethnic groups speak their own languages 
      
Currency:    Cambodian Riel  
GDP (PPP):   US$39.63 billion [2013 est.]  
GDP Per Capita (PPP): US$2,600 [2013 est.; 2nd lowest in Southeast Asia] 
GDP Real Growth Rate: 7% [2013 est.] 
Labour Force:   Agriculture (55.8%), Industry (16.9%), Services (27.3%) 
Literacy:    73.9% (whole); 82.8% (male); 65.9% (female) 
Life Expectancy:  63.8 years (whole); 61.4 years (male); 66.3 years  
     (female) [2014 est., 2nd lowest in Southeast Asia] 
Source: CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) 
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Indonesia By Numbers 
Surface Area:  1,910,000 sq km 
Population: 246.86 million [2012] 
Population Density: 129.2 per sq km 
Population of Jakarta: 9.77 million 
Urban Population: 52.3% [2013] 
Currency: Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) 
GDP (Nominal): US$878.04 billion [2012] 
Growth Rate: 6.2% [2012] 
GDP Per Capita: US$3,556.80 [2012] 
Unemployment: 6.2% [2012] 
Life Expectancy at Birth: Females (72.8 years); Males (68.7 years) 
Forested Area: 51.8% [2011] 
Source: UN Data (http://data.un.org) 
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Laos By Numbers 
Official Name:    Lao People’s Democratic Republic  (1975 – present) 
Capital:      Vientiane (Viangchan) 
Area:     236,800 sq km 
Population:    6.8 million (country); 810,000 (Vientiane) 
Ethnic Groups:    Lao (55%), Khmou (11%), Hmong (8%), minor ethnic group (26%) [2005 census] 
Religion:    Buddhist (67%), Christian (1.5%), other (31.5%) [2005 census] 
Language:   Lao (official), French, English, various ethnic languages 
  
Currency:    Lao Kip (official), United States Dollar {de facto}  
GDP (PPP):   $20.78 billion [2013 est.] 
GDP Per Capita (PPP): $3,100 [2013 est.] 
GDP Real Growth Rate: 8.3% [2013 est.] 
Labour Force:   Agriculture (73.1%), Industry (6.1%), Services (20.6%) 
Literacy:    72.7% (whole); 82.5% (male); 63.2% (female) 
Life Expectancy:  63.5 years (whole); 61.5 years (male); 65.6 years  
     (female) [2014 est.] 
Source: CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) 
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Malaysia By Numbers 
Official Name:    Federation of Malaysia (1963–present) 
Capital:      Kuala Lumpur; Putrajaya (seat of federal government) 
Area:     328, 657 sq km 
Population:    30 million (country); 1.6 million (Kuala Lumpur) 
Ethnic Groups:    Malay (50%), Chinese (23%), Indigenous (12%), Indian (7%),    
     Other (1%), Non-citizens (8%) 
Religion:    Islam (61%), Buddhism (20%), Christianity (9%), Hinduism (6%), 
     Other or None (3%) 
Language:   Bahasa Malaysia (official), English, Chinese (Cantonese, 
     Mandarin, Hokkien, Hakka, Hainan, Foochow), Tamil, 
     Telugu, Malayalam, Panjabi, Thai, and in East Malaysia 
     there are several indigenous languages; most widely 
     spoken are Iban and Kadazan) 
  
Currency:    Ringgit (MYR) 
GDP (PPP):   US$312 billion [2013 est.]  
GDP Per Capita (PPP): US$17,500 [2013 est.] 
GDP Real Growth Rate: 4.7% [2013 est.] 
Labour Force:   Agriculture (11.1%), Industry (36%), Services (53.5%) 
Literacy:    93.1% (15 years and older); 95.4% (male), 90.7% (female) 
Life Expectancy:  74.5 years  
Source: CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) 
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Myanmar By Numbers 
Official Name:    Republic of the Union of Myanmar (1989–present) 
Capital:      Nay Pyi Taw (2006–present)  
Area:     676,578 sq km 
Population:    55.75 million (country); 4.46 million (Yangon) 
Ethnic Groups:    Bamar (68%), Shan (9%), Karen (7%), Rakhine (4%), Chinese (3%), Indian (2%),
     Mon (2%), Other (5%) 
Religion:    Buddhist (89%), Christian (4%), Muslim (4%), Animist (1%), Other (2%) 
      
Language:   Burmese (official), but minority ethnic groups speak their own languages 
  
Currency:    Myanmar Kyat  
GDP (PPP):   US$111.1 billion [2013 est.]  
GDP Per Capita (PPP): US$1,700 [2013 est.; lowest in Southeast Asia] 
GDP Real Growth Rate: 6.8% [2013 est.] 
Labour Force:   Agriculture (70%), Industry (7%), Services (23%) 
Literacy:    92.7% (whole); 95.1% (male); 90.4% (female) 
Life Expectancy:  65.9 years (whole); 63.6 years (male); 68.5 years (female) 
     [2014 est., 3rd lowest in Southeast Asia] 
Source: CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) 
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Philippines By Numbers 
Surface Area:  300,000 sq km  
Population: 96.71 million [2012] 
Population Density: 322.4 per sq km 
Population of Metro Manila: 11.86 million 
Urban Population: 49.3% [2013] 
Currency: Philippines Peso (PHP) 
GDP (Nominal): US$250.18 billion [2012] 
Growth Rate: 6.8% [2012] 
GDP Per Capita: US$2,587.00 [2012] 
Unemployment: 7.0% [2012] 
Life Expectancy at Birth: Females (72.2 years); Males (65.3 years) 
Source: UN Data (http://data.un.org) 
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Singapore By Numbers 
Official Name:    Republic of Singapore (1965–present) 
Capital:      Singapore 
Area:     697 sq km 
Population:    5.57 million 
Ethnic Groups:    Chinese (74.2%), Malay (13.3%), Indian (9.2%), other (3.3%) 
Religion:    Buddhist (33.9%), Muslim (14.3%), Taoist (11.3%), Catholic (7.1%),  
     Hindu (5.2%), Other Christian (11%), Other (0.7%), No Religion (16.4%) 
Languages:   Mandarin, English, Malay and Tamil are official, but Hokkien, Cantonese, 
     Teochew, other Chinese dialects and various Indian languages are also  
     widely spoken. 
  
Currency:    Singapore Dollar (SGD)  
GDP (PPP):   US$339 billion [2013 est.]  
GDP Per Capita (PPP): US$62,400 [2013 est.; highest in Southeast Asia] 
GDP Real Growth Rate: 4.1% [2013 est.] 
Labour Force:   Agriculture (1.3%), Industry (18.6%), Services (80.1%) 
Literacy:    95.9% (whole); 98% (male); 93.8% (female) 
Life Expectancy:  84.4 years (whole); 81.9 years (male); 87.1 years (female) 
Source: CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) 
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Thailand By Numbers 
Surface Area:  513,120 sq km 
Population: 66.78 million [2012] 
Population Density: 130.2 per sq km 
Population of Bangkok: 8.43 million [2011] 
Urban Population: 34.8% [2013] 
Currency: Thai Baht (THB) 
GDP (Nominal): US$385.69 billion [2012] 
Growth Rate: 6.4% [2012] 
GDP Per Capita: US$5,775.20 [2012] 
  
Unemployment: 0.7% [2012] 
Life Expectancy at Birth: Females (77.7 years); Males (71.0 years) 
Source: UN Data (http://data.un.org) 
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Timor-Leste By Numbers 
Official Name:    Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (2002 – present) 
Capital:      Dili 
Area:     14,874 sq km 
Population:    1.2 million (country); 180,000 (Dili) 
Ethnic Groups:    Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian), Papuan, a small Chinese minority 
Religion:    Roman Catholic (96.9%), Protestant (2.2%), Muslim (0.3%), other (0.6%) 
Language:   Tetum (official), Portuguese (official), Indonesian, English 
  
Currency:    United States Dollar 
GDP (PPP):   $25.41 billion [2013 est.]  
GDP Per Capita (PPP): $21,400 [2013 est.] 
GDP Real Growth Rate: 8.1% [2013 est.] 
Labour Force:   Agriculture (64%), Industry (10%), Services (26%) 
Literacy:    58.3% (whole); 63.6% (male); 53% (female) 
Life Expectancy:  67.4 years (whole); 65.9 years (male); 69.0 years  (female) [2014 est., 3rd] 
Source: CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) 
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Vietnam By Numbers 
Surface Area:  330,957 sq km 
Population:  90.80 million [2012] 
  
Population Density:  274.3 per sq km 
Population of Hanoi:  2.96 million [2011] 
Population of HCMC:  7.96 million [2014] 
Urban Population:  32.3% [2013] 
Currency:  Vietnamese Dong (VND)  
GDP (Nominal) : US$155.82 billion [2012] 
Growth Rate:  5.3% [2012] 
GDP Per Capita:  US$1716.20 [2012] 
Unemployment:  1.8% [2012] 
Life Expectancy at Birth:  Females (80.4 years), Males (71.2 years) 
Source: UN Data (http://data.un.org) 
